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ABSTRACT 
This study views conflict of interests in professional accounting firms through the lens of 
behavioural risk management. The research problem driving this study is the accounting 
professionals’ deviant decision-making behaviour due to conflict of interests. Extant literature 
suggests that the prevalence of said problem is attributable to the ineffective management of 
conflicting interests – the existing procedures do not account, sufficiently, for the accounting 
professionals’ independence in fact. This research builds, primarily, on the work of Moore, Tanlu 
and Bazerman (2010) and Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo (2010). Although they attempted to 
address the professionals’ independence in fact by examining the psychological and cognitive 
impacts of conflict of interests, there still is a lack of understanding about the interaction of conflict 
of interests with decision-making. Consequently, there have been repeated calls for more research 
to understand how conflict of interests operates at the level of an individual accounting 
professional. Accordingly, this study is aimed at examining the process through which conflict of 
interests affects accounting professionals’ decision-making behaviour. To achieve this aim, a 
cognitive approach has been developed through integration of social cognitive theory and 
throughput model of decision-making.  
This research adopts a quantitative approach to investigation and the data have been collected by 
conducting a quasi-experiment with 105 professionals from the Big Four accounting firms in the 
UK. Likert-type items/scales are used to record data as the professionals’ self-reports on their 
perceptions and behaviour. Partial Least Squares-Path Analysis has been implemented for data 
analysis and hypotheses testing. Following the post-positivists stance, the concern is ‘failure to 
reject’ a hypothesis rather than ‘proving’ it. The empirical results provide that the professionals’ 
positive outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making (POE), perceived difficulty in making 
compliant decisions (PD) and ethical judgements (EJ) play mediating role in the relationship 
between conflict of interests (CoI) and the likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour (DD). 
The low POE, high PD and less EJ are evidenced to be the situational cognitive predictors and the 
high propensity to morally disengage (PMD) the dispositional cognitive predictor of DD. Decision-
making behaviour is evidenced to be prone to bias due to the significant role of POE and PD in the 
decision-making process. These results suggest that the process through which CoI affects 
accounting professionals’ decision-making behaviour is governed through the agency of their POE, 
PD and EJ. During this process, CoI plays biasing role and due to which the deviations from 
compliant behaviour might occur even undesirably. Therefore, DD is high in case of the 
professionals who perceive the negative outcomes of compliant decision-making to outweigh its 
positive outcomes, perceive high difficulty in making the given compliant decision, form a 
judgement that deviant decision choice is the most ethical and have high propensity of considering 
unethical behaviour as acceptable. Thus, in the events of conflict of interests, the likelihood of 
deviant behaviour can be reduced through encouraging amongst professionals the high POE, low 
PD, high EJ and low PMD. 
This study holds significance since it provides the much-needed empirical evidence for the role of 
accounting professionals’ cognitive processes in the relationship between conflict of interests and 
their decision-making behaviour. The cognitive approach adopted in this study provides a novel 
perspective for investigating the decision-making process. Moreover, the robust experiment 
employed for data collection adds to the extant research that lacks in experimental scenarios for 
addressing conflict of interests. Since all the insights revealed by this study’s results are relevant to 
the professionals’ state of mind, these insights can be combined to strengthen their independence 
in fact – to this end, I have proposed a behavioural framework to complement the accounting firms’ 
current efforts for managing conflict of interests. On a practical level, the professional accounting 
firms, the accounting professionals, the regulators and the other relevant professions can use this 
study’s findings and the new knowledge for making better decisions and to improve their policies. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT OF STUDY 
“Research is creating new knowledge” 
Neil Armstrong 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an overview of this research. The second section will include background 
to the study. The motivation for undertaking this study will be discussed in the third section, 
followed by details of the research problem in the fourth section. The aim and objectives and 
the corresponding research questions will be included in the fifth section. Research 
methodology will be introduced in the sixth section. The significance of study will be 
elaborated in the seventh section and the structure of this thesis will be briefed in the eighth 
section.  
1.2 Research Background 
The last two decades have witnessed numerous corporate accounting scandals such as the 
Enron scandal in 2001, the WorldCom and Tyco scandals in 2002, the Lehman Brothers and 
Bernie Madoff scandals in 2008, the Autonomy corporation scandal in 2012 and the more 
recent FIFA corruption and Toshiba accounting scandals in 2015. These and other similar 
scandals have brought the integrity of accounting professionals and that of the professional 
accounting firms into question (Tepalagul and Lin, 2014; Church et al., 2015). Conflicts of 
interests faced by accounting professionals have been playing a central role in such scandals 
(Clements, Neill and Stovall, 2012; Crump, 2013). The discussions around conflict of interests 
and resultant deviant behaviour became the area of research in the 1980s, gained hype in 1990s 
and 2000s and is still a crucial concern. This is because, the instances of deviant behaviour due 
to conflict of interests in professional accounting firms are still largely pervasive (Ayal and 
Gino, 2012; Clements, Neill and Stovall, 2012).  
The primary responsibility of accountants is to serve and protect the public interest by reporting 
on the fairness of clients’ financial statements – this constitutes the primary interest. Conflict 
of interests is said to arise if the professionals have any other interest (i.e. secondary interest) 
that might interfere with their responsibility to protect the public trust (Boyd, 2004; Bazerman 
and Gino, 2012). According to The Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants by the 
2 
International Ethics Standards Board for Accountants (IESBA), the primary interest of serving 
in the best interest of public denotes compliance with five fundamental principles of 
professional ethics, i.e. integrity, objectivity, professional competence and due care, 
confidentiality and the professional behaviour. However, the code recognises various threats, 
that serve as sources of secondary interests, which threaten compliance with the said 
fundamental principles. The main threats are the self-interest – i.e. due to the financial or other 
personal interest, self-review – i.e. when professionals have to review their own work, 
advocacy – i.e. when professionals have to promote the client's position, familiarity – i.e. due 
to the long-term or close firm-client relations and the intimidation threat – i.e. due to the actual 
or perceived pressures (IESBA, 2015). 
With reference to what constitutes a conflict of interests, Davis (1993) and Gaa (1994) provided 
that conflict of interests refers to a range of scenarios that pose a risk that an individual in 
question will compromise the professional judgement. According to Thagard (2007), conflict 
of interests arises when people have to make decisions that are biased by their personal goals 
and they are, therefore, prone to neglecting the interest of others. Johnson and Hansen (2011) 
suggested that the presence of a conflict of interests might lead to the pursuance of secondary 
at the cost of primary interest. Moreover, Florio (2012) regarded conflict of interests as 
circumstances where there is a risk that an individual or organisation has incentives to deviate 
from compliance with the primary interest. Conflicting interests are also viewed as threats to 
the accounting professionals’ integrity, objectivity, professional competence and due care, 
confidentiality and the professional behaviour (IESBA, 2015). Thus, conflict of interests in 
accounting firms is likely to result in deviant decision-making behaviour, i.e. behaviour that 
does not accord with the professional accounting standards or, in other words, is in 
disagreement with the fundamental principles of professional ethics. These views converge to 
the stance that conflict of interests is, actually, the risk.  
Lo and Field (2009) and Florio (2012) considered the conflict of interests a risk and highlighted 
the need for identifying, assessing, controlling and monitoring the conflict of interests. They 
asserted that there is a need for promoting effective risk management practice in this regard. 
Similarly, Bedard, Deis, Curtis and Jenkins (2008) also support the identification, assessment 
and control of conflict of interests. In this regard, various researchers (e.g., Moore, Tetlock, 
Tanlu and Bazerman, 2006; Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo, 2010; Moore, Tanlu and 
Bazerman, 2010) strongly support the adoption of behavioural perspective. Hence, this study 
3 
looks at conflict of interests through the lens of behavioural risk management and defines 
conflict of interests as ‘a situation involving a disagreement between the accounting 
profession’s primary interest and the professional’s secondary interest(s) which, in turn, leads 
to the likelihood of deviant behaviour’.   
In relation to the accounting professionals’ deviant behaviour due to conflict of interests, extant 
literature suggests that the main focus of existing measures and regulations on professionals’ 
independence in appearance1 (Nelson, 2004; Moore, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2010; Bazerman 
and Gino, 2012; Clements, Neill and Stovall, 2012) and minimal focus on their independence 
in fact2 (Bazerman and Banaji, 2004; Cain, Loewenstein and Moore, 2005; Guiral, Rodgers, 
Ruiz and Gonzalo, 2010; Moore, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2010; Ayal and Gino, 2012) are the 
potential barriers to effectiveness of accounting regulation for dealing with the situations 
involving conflict of interests. Thus, increased focus on accounting professionals’ 
independence in fact is the suggested response.  
Following the suggestions in relevant literature (e.g., Chugh, Banaji and Bazerman, 2005; 
Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2006; Moore, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2010; Ayal and 
Gino, 2012), this study intends to address accounting professionals’ independence in fact 
through understanding relationship between conflict of interests and deviant decision-making 
behaviour and examining the role of professionals’ mental processes towards their decision-
making behaviour. To this end, empirical evidence will be sought for; (i) relationship between 
the conflict of interests due to different threats (to compliance with fundamental principles of 
professional ethics) and accounting professionals’ deviant decision-making behaviour, (ii) the 
role of accounting professionals’ cognitive processes towards their decision-making behaviour 
in the events of conflict of interests and (iii) the biasing role of conflict of interests towards 
accounting professionals’ decision-making behaviour.  
1.3 Research Motivation 
This research is primarily motivated by the fact that despite increased regulations, especially 
                                                 
1 Independence of an accounting professional is about taking an unbiased viewpoint in performing audit tests, 
evaluation of results and in issuing the audit reports (Arens, Beasley and Elder, 2002). Independence implies 
freedom from conflict of interests (Nelson, 2004). Independence in appearance is about the public’s perception 
that an accounting professional (and accounting firm) is objective in conduct and forms impartial judgements 
(Dopuch, King, Schwartz, and Zhang, 2003; Salehi, 2009). 
2 Independence in fact denotes actual objectivity and a state of mind characterized by the professional’s 
unbiasedness and integrity (Dopuch, King, Schwartz, and Zhang, 2003; Salehi, 2009). 
4 
in response to numerous accounting scandals in the last two decades, the instances of deviant 
behaviour due to conflict of interests in professional accounting firms are still prevalent. The 
bigger as well as the smaller accounting firms are equally likely to be affected by the conflict 
of interests (Crump, 2013). For instance, the Big Four accounting firms have recently faced 
heavy fines on account of the conflict of interests – Deloitte was fined $10m in 2013, PwC was 
fined $25m in 2014, EY was fined £250,000 in 2015 and KPMG was fined £390,000 in 2015 
(Agnew, 2015; Crump, 2015). Instances like these are a matter of concern for the regulators 
and policy makers, the professional accounting firms, the professionals and the public. 
Although it is evident that the accounting regulation has increased, that the firms do not want 
to be fined due to reputational concerns and that the professionals do not want their integrity 
to be questioned; the deviations due to conflict of interests do happen and, mostly, undesirably 
(Moore, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2010). It suggests that there are some serious lapses in existing 
practices and that there is a need to address this concern. 
This study is also motivated by the repeated calls of several researchers (Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu 
and Bazerman, 2006; Moore, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2010; Ayal and Gino, 2012; Bazerman and 
Gino, 2012) to examine the conflict of interests as a topic deserving of its own focus. Although 
the devastating effects of conflict of interests are well-documented (e.g., Boyd, 2004; Pierce 
and Sweeney, 2004; Favere-Marchesi and Emby, 2005; Daugherty, Dickins, Hatfield and 
Higgs, 2012), there is a significant lack of research that addresses accounting professionals’ 
independence in fact (Wickramasinghe, Hamid, Pirzada and Ahmad, 2015). Surprisingly, the 
extant research has focused on the professionals’ independence in appearance when it is 
evident that since individual professionals experience the conflict of interests, it is important 
to understand this phenomenon from their perspective.  
Moreover, this research is also motivated by a significant gap in the literature, i.e. a lack of 
understanding about how conflict of interests operates at the level of an individual accounting 
professional. Addressing this gap is, primarily, about examining the process through which 
conflict of interests affects accounting professionals’ decision-making behaviour. The need to 
address the identified gap is supported by some experts in the field (e.g., Bazerman and Banaji, 
2004; Cain, Loewenstein and Moore, 2005; Tenbrunsel, 2005; Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz and 
Gonzalo, 2010; Moore, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2010; Ayal and Gino, 2012). In this regard, this 
study has attempted to move beyond the behaviourists’ Stimulus-Response (S-R) Paradigm3 
                                                 
3 The S-R Paradigm provides that ‘behaviour is the result of the stimulus’ (Holland, 2008). 
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(Holland, 2008) to the cognitivists’ Stimulus-Organism-Response (S-O-R) Paradigm4 (Holt et 
al., 2015) that is well-suited to address the gap towards this study’s research problem.  
1.4 Research Problem 
Having briefed in the background section that professional accounting firms operate within a 
heavily regulated environment, the deviations of accounting professionals from serving the 
primary interest of the profession are still largely pervasive. The research problem driving this 
study is the accounting professionals’ deviant decision-making behaviour due to conflict of 
interests. Considering that conflict of interests faced by accounting professionals have been 
playing a central role in numerous corporate scandals (Clements, Neill and Stovall, 2012; 
Crump, 2013) and that the bigger as well as the smaller accounting firms are equally likely to 
be affected by the conflict of interests (Moore, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2010), the epidemic 
impact of the said problem is evident. 
A critical review of literature clarifies that the accounting professionals’ deviant decision-
making due to conflict of interests is prevalent because of the weaknesses in existing measures 
implemented for managing conflicting interests (Florio, 2012; Williford and Small, 2013; 
Tepalagul and Lin, 2014), the limited effectiveness of regulations in dealing with decision-
makers’ unconscious bias (Bazerman and Banaji, 2004; Cain, Loewenstein and Moore, 2005; 
Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2006; Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo, 2010), the 
apparent lack of focus on the root causes of conflict of interests (Ayal and Gino, 2012; 
Bazerman and Gino, 2012) and the lack of focus on psychological and cognitive barriers that 
professionals experience in the face of conflicting interests (Nelson, 2004; Moore, Tanlu and 
Bazerman, 2010; Bazerman and Gino, 2012). These studies suggest that the primary reason 
underlying the pervasiveness of research problem is the ineffective management of conflict of 
interests in professional accounting firms. 
The relevant literature, therefore, suggests that the main focus of existing measures and 
regulations on accounting professionals’ independence in appearance (Nelson, 2004; Moore, 
Tanlu and Bazerman, 2010; Bazerman and Gino, 2012; Clements, Neill and Stovall, 2012) and 
minimal focus on their independence in fact (Bazerman and Banaji, 2004; Cain, Loewenstein 
                                                 
4 The S-O-R Paradigm provides that ‘in the face of the stimuli, organisms form the cognitive representations (i.e. 
perceptions and judgements) of the world, and respond through their conduct, actions or behaviour’ (Holt et al., 
2015). 
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and Moore, 2005; Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2006; Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz and 
Gonzalo, 2010; Moore, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2010; Ayal and Gino, 2012) are the core reasons 
for prevalence of the research problem. These reasons serve as potential barriers to the 
effectiveness of accounting regulation for addressing deviant decision-making behaviour due 
to conflict of interests. 
Because of the various dysfunctional consequences of conflict of interests, it is essential to 
investigate the research problem driving this study. Such consequences include, but are not 
limited to, the prioritisation of clients’ satisfaction than the professional standards (Boyd, 2004; 
McMillan, 2004; Reinstein and McMillan, 2004), the maximization of profit/fee (Young, 2005; 
Pierce, 2007), the deterioration of audit quality (Pierce and Sweeney, 2004; Favere-Marchesi 
and Emby, 2005; Daugherty, Dickins, Hatfield and Higgs, 2012), the impaired independence 
of a professional (Ronen, 2010; Bae, Kallapur and Rho, 2013; Ahmad, 2015), the biased 
decision-making (Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo, 2010; Moore, Tanlu and Bazerman, 
2010; Bazerman and Gino, 2012), the inadequate paperwork (Willett and Page, 1996; Sikka, 
2004), the premature signing-off on audit assignments (Wickramasinghe, Hamid, Pirzada and 
Ahmad, 2015) and the under-reporting of audit hours (McNair, 1991; Anderson-Gough, Grey 
and Robson, 2001). Almost every year, the professional accounting firms face heavy fines on 
account of the deteriorated audit quality due to conflict of interests (Agnew, 2015). 
With reference to the research problem, some interconnected gaps have been identified in 
relation to the accounting professionals’ independence in fact. In this regard, there is a 
significant lack of empirical evidence for the relationship between conflict of interests and the 
professionals’ deviant decision-making behaviour, the role of professionals’ mental processes 
towards their decision-making behaviour in the events of conflict of interests and also for the 
biasing role of conflict of interests. These gaps converge into one substantial gap, i.e. a lack of 
understanding about how conflict of interests operates at the level of an individual accounting 
professional. The need to address this gap is supported by several researchers (e.g., Cain, 
Loewenstein and Moore, 2005; Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2006; Guiral, Rodgers, 
Ruiz and Gonzalo, 2010; Ayal and Gino, 2012). It is expected that the new knowledge will 
help address the professionals’ independence in fact in a better manner which, according to 
Bazerman and Gino (2012), will facilitate effective management of the conflict of interests in 
professional accounting firms.  
Clements, Neill and Stovall (2012) strongly asserted that there is a need for some revolutionary 
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approach to address the ramifications of conflict of interest. Although this problem of 
accounting professionals’ deviant decision-making is well documented, there remains a clear 
lack of adequate solutions. Tenbrunsel (2005) suggests that understanding the operation of 
conflict of interests at the level of an individual accounting professional is about recognising 
the cognitive obstacles to compliant decision-making and then finding out how to overcome 
these barriers. Similarly, Moore, Tanlu and Bazerman (2010) call for examining the interaction 
of conflict of interests with decision-making, as a way to understand how such conflicts operate 
at the level of an individual professional. Thus, there is a need to understand how the conflict 
of interests leads to deviant decision-making through the agency of professionals’ mental 
processes. In this regard, the adoption of behavioural risk management perspective (Lo and 
Field, 2009; Florio, 2012; IESBA, 2015) and particularly the cognitive approach (Lieberman, 
2007; Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo, 2010) seems promising for addressing the 
independence in fact. 
Given the complexity of conflict of interests in a professional environment, there is a growing 
trend amongst researchers (e.g., Moore, Loewenstein, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2003; Moore and 
Loewenstein, 2004; Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo, 2010; Moore, Tanlu and Bazerman, 
2010) to use a combination of cognitive theories and decision-making models, for examining 
the phenomena surrounding professionals’ independence. By combining the social cognitive 
theory (Bandura, 1986) and the throughput model of decision-making (Rodgers, 1997), this 
study adopts the Stimulus-Organism-Response (S-O-R) Paradigm (Holt et al., 2015) for 
addressing the research problem. The viability of social cognitive theory to investigate 
cognitive processes of an individual decision-maker (Bandura, 1986; 2006; 2008) and the 
feasibility of the throughput model to capture decision-making process at an individual’s level 
(Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo, 2010) are the main reasons for adopting the cognitive 
approach. Furthermore, the social as well as the ethical nature of conflict of interests (Finn, 
Chonko and Hunt, 1988; Mills and Bettner, 1992; Argandona, 2004) also support the adoption 
of a cognitive stance to address the problem driving this study.  
1.5 Aim, Objectives and Research Questions 
In order to fill the gap in the extant literature (i.e. a lack of understanding about how conflict 
of interests operates at the level of an individual accounting professional), this study is aimed 
at examining the process through which conflict of interests affects accounting professionals’ 
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decision-making behaviour. The study considers four main categories of conflict of interests 
(CoI), i.e. conflict of interests due to self-interest threat (CoI-1), that due to intimidation threat 
(CoI-2), that due to a combination of self-interest and self-review threats (CoI-3) and the 
conflict of interests due to a combination of self-interest, intimidation, self-review and 
familiarity threats (CoI-4).  
In order to serve the aim, the objectives of this study and the corresponding research questions 
to operationalise these are as follows; 
1.5.1 First Objective & Research Question 
The first objective of this study is to examine the relationship between the conflict of interests 
and the accounting professionals’ likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour, which has 
been operationalised with the help of the following research question; 
RQ1: What is the relationship between the conflict of interests and the accounting 
professionals’ likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour? 
This research question will testify the threatening impact of different categories of conflict of 
interests on the accounting professionals’ adoption of compliant behaviour. 
1.5.2 Second Objective & Group of Research Questions 
The second objective of this study is to understand the role of accounting professionals’ 
cognitive processes towards their decision-making behaviour in the events of conflict of 
interests, which has been operationalised with the help of the following research question; 
RQ2: What is the role of accounting professionals’ cognitive processes towards their deviant 
decision-making behaviour in the events of conflict of interests? 
This question has, further, been categorized into three subgroups. 
• Subgroup-1 
The first subgroup examines the relationship between conflict of interests and the accounting 
professionals’ positive outcome expectancy, perceived difficulty and ethical judgement. 
RQ1/2.1: What is the relationship between the conflict of interests and the accounting 
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professionals’ positive outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making? 
RQ2/2.1: What is the relationship between the conflict of interests and the accounting 
professionals’ perceived difficulty in making compliant decisions?  
RQ3/2.1: What is the relationship between the conflict of interests and the accounting 
professionals’ ethical judgement? 
This subgroup will help understand the process through which the relationship between the 
conflict of interests and the likelihood of their deviant decision-making behaviour is governed. 
• Subgroup-2 
The second subgroup examines the relationship of accounting professionals’ positive outcome 
expectancy, perceived difficulty and ethical judgement with their likelihood of deviant 
decision-making behaviour.  
RQ1/2.2: How in the events of conflict of interests, is the accounting professionals’ positive 
outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making related to their likelihood of deviant 
decision-making behaviour? 
RQ2/2.2: How in the events of conflict of interests, is the accounting professionals’ perceived 
difficulty in making compliant decisions related to their likelihood of deviant decision-making 
behaviour? 
RQ3/2.2: How in the events of conflict of interests, is the accounting professionals’ ethical 
judgement related to their likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour? 
This subgroup will help establish the situational cognitive predictors of the likelihood of 
deviant decision-making behaviour. 
• Subgroup-3 
The third subgroup seeks to examine the interrelationships of accounting professionals’ 
positive outcome expectancy, perceived difficulty and ethical judgement.  
RQ1/2.3: How in the events of conflict of interests, are the accounting professionals’ positive 
outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making and their perceived difficulty in making 
compliant decisions interrelated? 
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RQ2/2.3: How in the events of conflict of interests, are the accounting professionals’ positive 
outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making and their ethical judgement interrelated? 
RQ3/2.3: How in the events of conflict of interests, are the accounting professionals’ perceived 
difficulty in making compliant decisions and their ethical judgement interrelated? 
This subgroup will help understand the process through which the relationship of the 
accounting professionals’ cognitive processes with their likelihood of deviant decision-making 
behaviour is governed. 
1.5.3 Third Objective & Research Question 
The third objective of this study is to understand the biasing role of conflict of interests towards 
the accounting professionals’ decision-making behaviour, which has been operationalised with 
the help of the following research question; 
RQ3: Why in the events of conflict of interests, might the accounting professionals’ deviant 
decision-making behaviour be prone to perceptual biases? 
This research question will help understand the process through which the unintentional and/or 
intentional perceptual biases might increase the likelihood of deviant decision-making 
behaviour, in the events of conflict of interests. 
With particular reference to facilitating effective management of conflict of interests, it is 
expected that the insights obtained through serving the aforementioned aim, objectives and 
research questions will help develop behavioural interventions to strengthen accounting 
professionals’ independence in fact. 
1.6 Methodology 
This research is explanatory by purpose, fundamental by outcome, deductive by logic and 
quantitative by the process. The overall quantitative approach to this research has been 
informed by the interconnectedness of the research paradigm, research methodology and 
research methods for data collection and analysis. Specifically, this research is underpinned by 
the postpositivism paradigm, adopts a quasi-experiment as the methodology, is conducted with 
105 professionals from the Big Four accounting firms in the UK and uses the Likert-type scales 
and items to collect data as self-reports on perceptions and behaviour. The statistical technique 
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for testing theoretical model is the Partial Least Squares (PLS) - Path Analysis, that has been 
performed using SmartPLS 3.  
The choice of postpositivism paradigm is justified by the research questions being addressed 
by this study. The primary rationale to adopt this paradigm is the concordance between 
philosophical assumptions of postpositivism and that underlying this study. For instance, the 
empirical data has been collected through the scientific method of enquiry and using the scales 
for participants’ self-reports. Furthermore, the inclusion of perceptions as the intervening 
processes implies that imperfect evidence can be established and that the knowledge so gained 
will be conjectural. Moreover, the process of enquiry draws on deductive approach. 
Postpositivism also provides that valid knowledge is derived using a scientific method of 
enquiry (Creswell, 2014). This paradigm is concerned with studying behaviour and developing 
numeric measures of observations of the cognitive processes (Creswell, 2014). Moreover, it 
asserts that only the imperfect evidence can be established towards different phenomenon 
(Littlejohn and Pegler, 2007). Thus, postpositivism is the most appropriate paradigm for this 
study.  
Moreover, the adoption of a quasi-experiment methodology is suitable for this study due to the 
various advantages of quasi-experiments that are of direct relevance to this study. For instance, 
Derue, Nahrgang, Hollenbeck and Workman (2012) provide that quasi-experiments allow 
researchers to use any manipulations they want to. Furthermore, these incorporate features 
from both the experimental and non-experimental designs in that both the manipulated and 
measured variables can be brought in. In this way, quasi-experiments tend to maximise the 
internal and external validity. This study’s theoretical framework stresses the need for both the 
manipulated and measured variables and, therefore, the quasi-experiments are well-suited to 
this research. 
The appropriateness of using Likert-type scales and items for collecting the data as participants’ 
self-reports on their perceptions and behaviour has been established on the basis of provisions 
by Collis and Hussey (2009), Saunders, Thornhill and Lewis (2009) and Creswell (2014). 
Similarly, there are some compelling reasons that make the Big Four in the UK an appropriate 
research context. For instance, these firms represent the largest international services network 
that offer a wide range of audit and non-audit services (Agnew, 2015; Loxton, 2015) and the 
mismanagement of conflict of interests in the Big Four is still an active issue of concern (Irvine 
and Doherty, 2015). Furthermore, these firms are considered the trendsetters in the professional 
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accounting world and their policies also have an impact on other firms (Crump, 2015).  
Following the guidance and provisions by Rudestam and Newton (2007), Field (2009), Hair, 
Ringle and Sarstedt (2011), Creswell (2014) and Lowry and Gaskin (2014), the statistical 
technique this study adopts to analyse the empirical data is the Partial Least Squares (PLS) 
based path analysis. For instance, this study’s theoretical model draws on the integration of 
social cognitive theory with the throughput model of decision-making that is less developed 
for this study’s area of research. Moreover, the goal of this research is the explanation of 
phenomenon and the sample size is not very large. Furthermore, most of the variables follow a 
non-normal distribution and the empirical examination is based on a rather complex structural 
model which also includes interaction effects and intends to compare alternate models. Path 
analysis has been performed using one of the leading PLS-SEM software programs, i.e. 
SmartPLS 3 – it works with PLS path modelling algorithm and offers a great deal of data 
analysis functions.  
1.7 Significance of the Study 
This study holds specific significance since it has been conducted in response to the repeated 
calls of several experts in the field (Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2006; Moore, Tanlu 
and Bazerman, 2010; Ayal and Gino, 2012; Bazerman and Gino, 2012), who have been 
suggesting the need to examine conflicts of interests as a topic deserving of its own focus and 
from a behavioural ethics perspective. To this end, this research views conflict of interests in 
professional accounting firms through the lens of behavioural risk management. In this way, 
this research provides a new horizon for addressing the longstanding problem of the accounting 
professionals’ deviant behaviour due to conflict of interests. It, particularly, focuses on the 
professionals’ independence in fact, in order to complement the existing measures for 
managing conflict of interests that are, primarily, focused on the professionals’ independence 
in appearance.   
The further significance of this study is attributable to the much-needed comprehensive 
cognitive approach it adopts to examine the process through which conflict of interests affects 
the accounting professionals’ decision-making behaviour. Most of the previous studies (e.g., 
Brandon, 2003; Cohen and Bennie, 2006; Iskandar and Sanusi, 2011; Cabrera-Frias, 2012; 
Juhari, Mohd-Sanusi, Rahman and Omar, 2013; Afifah, Sari, Anugerah and Sanusi, 2015) have 
employed a single theory to conduct the research regarding conflict of interests. However, 
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given the complexity of conflict of interests in a professional environment, some scholars 
(Moore, Loewenstein, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2003; Moore and Loewenstein, 2004; Guiral, 
Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo, 2010; Moore, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2010) strongly suggest using 
a combination of cognitive theories and decision-making models for a better examination of 
the conflict of interests. Accordingly, this study develops a theoretical framework which 
integrates the social cognitive theory with throughout model of decision-making, for offering 
a comprehensive and novel perspective to achieve the aim and objectives of this study. 
Most of the previous studies (e.g., Iskandar and Sanusi, 2011; Juhari, Mohd-Sanusi, Rahman 
and Omar, 2013) have used the behaviourists’ Stimulus-Response paradigm (Holland, 2008) 
that implies using cognitive processes as the independent variable (stimulus) and resulting 
behaviour as the dependent variable (response) – this paradigm does not allow a thorough 
examination of the phenomenon as complex as conflict of interests. Significantly, this study’s 
theoretical model is underpinned by cognitivists’ Stimulus-Organism-Response paradigm (Holt 
et al., 2015) that offers a fresh perspective for addressing the behavioural concerns regarding 
conflict of interests – this paradigm allows examining the cognitive processes as intervening 
variables (the organism dimension) between the situations involving conflict of interests as 
independent variable (the stimulus dimension) and the behaviour as dependent variable (the 
response dimension).  This approach is, perhaps, novel and equally important for facilitating 
an understanding of how the conflict of interests operate at the level of an individual accounting 
professional.  
This study also holds significance as it provides empirical evidence regarding different 
categories of conflict of interests. Irrespective of the specific sources, the extant literature has 
used the term ‘conflict of interests’ to denote all the conflicting interests originating from 
different sources. So that this research includes the most prevalent categories of conflict of 
interests, suggestions from the interviews with four professionals (see Appendix 1 for interview 
questions), one each from the Big Four accounting firms, were considered. Accordingly, the 
four categories of conflict of interests have been considered in this research, i.e. conflict of 
interests due to self-interest threat, that due to intimidation threat, that due to a combination of 
self-interest and self-review threats and the conflict of interests due to a combination of self-
interest, intimidation, self-review and familiarity threats. The consideration of different 
categories provides strong empirical evidence for the observed relationships and helps ensure 
the stability of results across different conflict of interests. This unique approach is specific to 
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this study and it will open new doors for the future research. Moreover, this study provides a 
direct focus on conflict of interests when most of the extant literature addresses this topic 
indirectly and, usually, in terms of the professionals’ independence (Bedard, Deis, Curtis and 
Jenkins, 2008). 
Another reason for this study’s significance is the consideration of, arguably, all the main 
cognitive processes that are of direct relevance to the events of conflict of interests. 
Specifically, this study’s model includes the positive outcome expectancy of compliant 
decision-making, the perceived difficulty in making compliant decisions and the ethical 
judgements as the cognitive processes. So far, none of the studies in the domain of conflict of 
interests has considered these mental processes simultaneously. Thus, this study attempts to 
offer a wide-ranging snapshot of the process through which conflict of interests affects 
accounting professionals’ decision-making behaviour. To this end, triangulation of theories 
(Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Jackson, 2012) adds to the significance of this study – the social 
cognitive theory (Bandura, 1986) and the throughput model (Rodgers, 1997), both from the 
psychology discipline, have been used to explain the accounting professionals’ deviant 
decision-making behaviour.     
The difficulty in employing working professionals has remained one of the hindrances for 
conducting behavioural research in a professional accounting environment. Even the 
accounting scholars trained in psychology might dismiss research that is not carried out with 
the highly experienced professionals (Moore, Cain, Loewenstein and Bazerman, 2005). 
Resultantly, there remains a significant lack of research with the possibility of practical impact. 
Some researchers (Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1973; Camerer, 2001; Kahneman and Tversky, 
2000; Kahneman, 2003) emphasise that the experienced professionals are likely to display 
same decision-making biases as do the accounting students. However, some others (Libby, 
Bloomfield and Nelson, 2002; Moore, Cain, Loewenstein and Bazerman, 2005) suggest 
conducting research with the experienced professionals when the response under examination 
is strictly context-specific and is developed with individual’s experience. Since this study’s 
research questions demand answers in, strictly, the professional accounting context and the 
responses to conflict of interests are to be examined for reality-based dilemmas, the 
employment of accounting professionals for this study holds specific significance.   
The next section will outline the structure of this thesis.       
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1.8 Structure of the Thesis 
The remainder of the thesis is divided into six more chapters. Chapter 2 presents critical review 
of the literature relevant to managing conflict of interests in professional accounting firms. 
Chapter 3 is meant to develop the theoretical model in order to serve this study’s aim in relation 
to filling the gap identified through detailed review of the literature. Chapter 4 details the 
research paradigm, research methodology and the research methods adopted for seeking 
answers to this study’s research questions. Chapter 5 provides the data analysis procedures that 
have been applied to the empirical data. Chapter 6 includes discussions of the empirical results. 
Finally, Chapter 7 draws conclusions on the basis of empirical results and also includes the 
behavioural framework that has been developed as an outcome of this study. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
“Literature review serves as the foundation for entire research.” 
(Ellis and Levy, 2008) 
2.1 Introduction 
The research problem driving this study is the accounting professionals’ deviant decision-
making behaviour due to conflict of interests. The background information, as detailed in the 
previous chapter, revealed that this problem is largely pervasive due to the ineffective 
management of conflict of interests (Moore, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2010; Ayal and Gino, 2012; 
Bazerman and Gino, 2012; Clements, Neill and Stovall, 2012). There is a convincing evidence 
that conflict of interests in professional accounting firms is, actually, the risk (Davis, 1993; 
Gaa, 1994; Thagard, 2007; Bedard, Deis, Curtis and Jenkins, 2008; Johnson and Hansen, 2011; 
Florio, 2012; IESBA, 2015). In this regard, adoption of the behavioural ethics perspective is 
strongly supported by several scholars (e.g., Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2006; 
Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo, 2010; Moore, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2010, Bazerman and 
Gino, 2012). Therefore, this study intends to view conflict of interests in professional 
accounting firms through the lens of behavioural risk management. 
The second section includes the literature relevant to the critique of existing measures and 
regulations for managing conflict of interests. The third section reviews the literature informing 
the relationship between conflict of interests and deviant decision-making behaviour in 
professional accounting firms. The fourth section will include the literature relevant to the role 
of accounting professionals’ mental processes towards decision-making in the events of 
conflict of interests. Identification of gap(s) in the literature will be included in the fifth section, 
followed by a summary of this chapter in the sixth section.  
2.2 Critique of Measures and Regulations for Managing Conflict 
of interests 
Owing to the novelty of behavioural risk management perspective for addressing conflict of 
interests, there is a need to consolidate the extant literature relevant to the measures and 
regulations applied for managing conflict of interests in professional accounting firms. 
Accordingly, this section presents a review of the literature regarding critical take on the 
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weaknesses in existing measures and regulations and their limited effectiveness towards 
managing conflict of interests. The purpose is to highlight why, despite numerous measures 
and regulations, the accounting professionals’ deviant decision-making due to conflict of 
interests is still pervasive. Importantly, this critique will provide guidance about what needs to 
be done for addressing the research problem driving this study. 
2.2.1 Weaknesses in Existing Measures and Regulations 
The professional accounting firms are exposed to many measures and regulations for managing 
conflict of interests. These include professional accounting standards (Tepalagul and Lin, 
2014), quality control reviews and inspections (Bedard, Deis, Curtis and Jenkins, 2008) ethical 
codes of conduct (Clements, Neill and Stovall, 2012) ethics and compliance programs (Florio, 
2012), electronic decision aids (Dowling, 2009), the Accounting Consultation Units (Trotman, 
Wright and Wright, 2005; Bedard, Deis, Curtis and Jenkins, 2008), whistleblowing (Taylor, 
Zalkin and Curtis, 2013), disclosure of conflict of interests (Healy and Palepu, 2001), 
continuing professional development (Florio, 2012) and education and training (Williford and 
Small, 2013), etc. Existing regulations have, however, been largely criticised for not being able 
to address the accounting professionals’ independence in fact. 
Criticising disclosures as the regulatory measure, Cain, Loewenstein and Moore (2005) argued 
that, while disclosure promises something for everyone, these do not guarantee that the 
professionals have acted in the best interest of the public. They further reasoned that the 
professionals might provide biased advice when they know that the one being advised is aware 
of the conflict of interests. Arguably, disclosure of non-audit services might make the public 
more sceptic of audit opinion (Camerer, Loewenstein and Weber, 1989; Strack and 
Mussweiler, 1997) and it might be perceived that there was a lack of independence – in such 
instances, there might be independence in fact but not the independence in appearance (Moore, 
Tetlock, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2006). 
Electronic decision aids have also been criticised for the lack of their practical usefulness. For 
instance, the main barriers and costs associated with their implementation include over-reliance 
on systems recommendations, emphasis on ticking-the-box, training to use electronic systems, 
less cost efficiency for smaller engagements and restricted use due to the perceived difficulty 
(Dowling, 2009). Such barriers might cause a professional to misuse the system, such as, by 
selecting input parameters that will favour the desired outcome (Kachelmeier and Messier, 
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1990). 
Some also highlight the limited effectiveness of whistleblowing mechanisms as a measure to 
manage conflict of interests. In this regard, the usefulness of whistleblowing is believed to be 
largely affected by the individual factors such as perception of whistleblowing, moral 
reasoning, the individual’s sense of responsibility, locus of control, whistleblowing intentions 
and position in the firm (Kaplan and Whitecotton, 2001; Chiu, 2003; Tavakoli, Keenan and 
Cranjak-Karanovic, 2003; Curtis, 2006). Moreover, the propensity of an accounting 
professional to blow the whistle on wrongdoings is strongly affected by the context in which 
the wrongdoing occurs (Kaplan and Whitecotton, 2001; Ayers and Kaplan, 2003; Near, Rehg, 
Scotter Jr and Miceli, 2004). Furthermore, the organisational characteristics and the 
organisational culture also affect whistleblowing behaviour (Schultz, Johnson, Morris and 
Dyrnes, 1993; Hooks, Kaplan and Schlutz Jr, 1994; Kaplan and Whitecotton, 2001). Thus, if 
the right combination of individual, contextual and the organisational characteristics does not 
exist, whistleblowing is not expected to work in an intended way. 
Importantly, some emphasise that several contextual factors have an impact on the 
effectiveness of measures and regulations for managing conflict of interests. For instance, 
Bazerman and Gino (2012) and Clements, Neill and Stovall (2012) suggest that since 
normative tone is reflected through the codes of conduct, conflict of interests cannot be 
managed effectively unless the accounting firms have improved the codes of conduct for their 
provisions regarding prioritisation of interests. Furthermore, Florio (2012) and Williford and 
Small (2013) provided that the effectiveness of measures to manage conflict of interests 
depends on the strength of ethics and compliance programmes and that these should be 
executed under strong leadership. Additionally, Florio (2012) and Caldarelli et al., (2012) argue 
that for regulations and measures to work, it is necessary to establish such an organisational 
culture that reinforces ethical conduct and does not tolerate anything that casts doubts on the 
ethical standards. 
The aforementioned weaknesses in the existing measures and regulations highlight their limited 
usefulness for managing conflict of interests. A closer insight into the critique reveals that the 
main focus of existing measures and regulations on making the accounting professionals appear 
independent to the public (i.e. independence in appearance) is one of the reasons for prevalence 
of the professionals’ deviant behaviour. Ideally, even if there are no such weaknesses (which, 
in practice, seems highly doubtful), the instances of deviant decision-making are still likely to 
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prevail due to the reasons underlying limited effectiveness of existing measures and regulations 
– the following subsection elaborates this stance.  
2.2.2 Reasons for Limited Effectiveness of Existing Measures and 
Regulations  
In relation to the problem of accounting professionals’ deviant decision-making behaviour due 
to conflict of interests, research relevant to behavioural ethics provides an insight into the 
reasons for limited effectiveness of existing measures and regulations towards managing 
conflict of interests.  
Highlighting the insufficiency of existing regulations for addressing the issues related to 
professionals’ independence, Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu and Bazerman (2006) explained how the 
conflict of interests results in biased decision-making. They argued that since an accounting 
professional’s moral seduction is primarily facilitated by the unconscious psychological 
processes, increasing the regulations to strengthen their independence does not guarantee the 
elimination of conflict of interests. They further asserted that the regulations to address audit 
quality seem insufficient for addressing the issues related to independence because such rules 
are not the only ways to avoid conflict of interests. In this regard, Bazerman and Gino (2012) 
strongly asserted that the adoption of behavioural ethics approach is required to address the 
conflict of interests. 
Similarly, Cain, Loewenstein and Moore (2005), Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu and Bazerman (2006) 
and Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo (2010) found that conflict of interests leads to 
unintentional bias and that more than regulatory efforts are required. Specifically, there is a 
need to address biased decision-making behaviour in the events of conflict of interests. 
Moreover, Clements, Neill and Stovall (2012) argued that regulations such as the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act has remained only moderately successful in countering the effects of conflict of 
interests. They strongly asserted that in the absence of revolutionary changes, conflicts of 
interests are likely to remain in the accounting profession for an indefinite future. Studies 
regarding the impact of psychological barriers on ethical decisions involving conflict of 
interests (Chugh, Banaji and Bazerman, 2005) and those examining decision-making in the 
face of ethical dilemmas (Foot, 1967; Thomson, 1986; Unger, 1996; Greene et al., 2001; 
Casebeer and Churchland, 2003; Green, Ha and Bullock, 2010) also suggest that the existing 
safeguards, legislation and regulation have limited effectiveness for treating the devastating 
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consequences of conflict of interests. 
Some probe into more specific details of the reasons underlying the accounting professionals’ 
deviant behaviour due to conflict of interests. For instance, this problem is argued to be largely 
pervasive due to the ineffectiveness of regulations in dealing with the unconscious bias 
(Bazerman and Banaji, 2004; Cain, Loewenstein and Moore, 2005; Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu and 
Bazerman, 2006; Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo, 2010), the apparent lack of focus on the 
root causes of conflict of interests at the level of an individual professional (Bazerman and 
Gino, 2012; Moore, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2010; Ayal and Gino, 2012) and the lack of focus 
on psychological and cognitive barriers that an individual professional experiences in the face 
of conflicting interests (Nelson, 2004; Moore, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2010; Bazerman and Gino, 
2012).  
The aforementioned reasons for the limited effectiveness of existing measures and regulations 
highlight their restricted usefulness towards managing conflict of interests. Thus, one of the 
main reasons for the prevalence of accounting professionals’ deviant decision-making 
behaviour is believed to be the ineffectiveness of existing measures and regulations for dealing 
with accounting professionals’ actual objectivity and state of mind, i.e. their independence in 
fact. 
2.2.3 So, What Should Be Done? 
A comprehensive review of the literature regarding the critique of measures and regulations 
for managing conflict of interests provides that the problem of accounting professionals’ 
deviant decision-making behaviour is still largely pervasive. The weaknesses in existing 
measures and regulations and their limited effectiveness for managing conflict of interests are 
the core causes of the prevalence of said problem. It can, therefore, be concluded that the 
accounting professionals’ deviant decision-making is largely pervasive due to the ineffective 
management of conflict of interests in professional accounting firms. 
Particularly, the main focus of existing measures on the professionals’ independence in 
appearance (Nelson, 2004; Moore, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2010; Bazerman and Gino, 2012; 
Clements, Neill and Stovall, 2012) and minimal focus on their independence in fact (Bazerman 
and Banaji, 2004; Cain, Loewenstein and Moore, 2005; Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu and Bazerman, 
2006; Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo, 2010; Moore, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2010; Ayal and 
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Gino, 2012) are argued to be the potential barriers to the effectiveness of accounting regulation 
for addressing the deviant behaviour due to conflict of interests. In order to handle these 
barriers, Bazerman and Gino (2012) suggest adopting behavioural ethics approach. 
The aforementioned discussions set the foundation for the remainder of this chapter and 
provide guidance for what needs to be done for addressing the research problem driving this 
study. The analysis of critique suggests that one of the possible solutions to research problem 
could be the increased focus on accounting professionals’ independence in fact. This, arguably, 
will facilitate effective management of conflict of interests in professional accounting firms 
(Moore, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2010; Bazerman and Gino, 2012). Accordingly, this chapter is 
meant to review what already has been researched regarding the research problem, with 
specific emphasis on analysing the literature in relation to professionals’ independence in fact. 
Some scholars (e.g., Nelson, 2004; Chugh, Banaji and Bazerman, 2005; Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu 
and Bazerman, 2006; Moore, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2010; Ayal and Gino, 2012) suggest that 
the accounting professionals’ independence in fact can be addressed by understanding the 
relationship between conflict of interests and deviant decision-making behaviour and by 
examining the role of accounting professionals’ mental processes towards decision-making in 
the events of conflict of interests.  
2.3 Conflict of interests and Deviant Decision-Making Behaviour 
In the light of suggestions by various researchers (e.g., Nelson, 2004; Chugh, Banaji and 
Bazerman, 2005; Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2006; Moore, Tanlu and Bazerman, 
2010; Ayal and Gino, 2012), this section is meant to review the literature regarding the 
relationship between conflict of interests and accounting professionals’ deviant decision-
making. With particular reference to facilitating effective management of conflict of interests, 
the purpose is to focus on increased understanding of the accounting professionals’ 
independence in fact. 
Extant literature regarding the relationship between conflict of interests and deviant decision-
making behaviour has focused on the professionals’ independence and the dysfunctional 
consequences of impaired independence (For reviews, see Bedard, Deis, Curtis and Jenkins, 
2008; Tepalagul and Lin, 2014; Church et al., 2015). Since conflict of interests is an abstract 
concept, it has been conceptualised in the extant literature using different sources of conflicting 
interests and mostly as a situation representing a lack of professionals’ independence. 
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Similarly, deviant decision-making behaviour has been represented through a wide range of 
dysfunctional practices (such as falsification of working papers, inadequate paperwork, 
prioritisation of client satisfaction than the professional standards, maximisation of profit at the 
cost of audit quality and issuance of inappropriate audit opinion etc.) With particular reference 
to the research problem, the following four main strands of research relate conflict of interests 
originating from different sources to the accounting professionals’ decision-making behaviour; 
i. The impact of ‘commercialism-induced’ conflict of interests on accounting 
professionals’ deviant decision-making behaviour. 
ii. The impact of ‘structural arrangements-induced’ conflict of interests on accounting 
professionals’ deviant decision-making behaviour. 
iii. The impact of ‘workplace pressures-induced’ conflict of interests on accounting 
professionals’ deviant decision-making behaviour. 
iv. The impact of ‘misaligned rewards-induced’ conflict of interests on accounting 
professionals’ deviant decision-making behaviour. 
The following subsections review the literature that relates conflict of interests originating from 
the sources, cited above, to the accounting professionals’ decision-making behaviour. 
2.3.1 Commercialism-induced Conflict of interests 
Commercialism-induced conflict of interests denotes the origin of conflict of interests due to 
the shift in accounting firms from professionalism to commercialism (Pierce, 2007). Research 
in this domain examines the impact of ‘conflict of interests due to commercialism’ on the 
accounting professionals’ deviant decision-making behaviour. According to Boyd (2004), 
commercialism in accounting firms has its roots in the practice of opinion shopping5. The 
author discussed that as the organisations resorted to opinion-shop for audit services, 
accounting firms realised that the controllable variable at their disposal was the price – they 
had to offer audit services at a cheap price. In order to cut the cost of auditing, firms had two 
main option, i.e. to reduce the labour hours devoted to audit and to reduce the cost per labour 
hour. Accordingly, the accounting firms reduced their costs by dedicating highly limited hours 
                                                 
5 Opinion shopping is the companies’ practice of searching for an external auditor who would provide unqualified 
opinion. The ‘unqualified opinion’ is an auditor’s judgement that the company’s financial records are true and fair 
(Pierce, 2007). 
23 
to audit and non-audit services and by hiring the low-cost auditors (such as articling students 
or junior auditors) – in both the cases, the audit-quality deteriorated. Such commercial 
pressures gave rise to the conflict of interests for accounting professionals that induced them 
to deviate from the primary interest of serving in the best interest of the public.    
In his review of ethics and accounting firms, Pierce (2007) discussed that the increasing 
commercial pressures, such as due to the corporate merger movement of the 1960s, gave rise 
to the dysfunctional consequences for accounting firms. Such dysfunctional consequences 
included the prioritisation of client satisfaction and maximisation of profit. Some researchers 
(Boyd, 2004; McMillan, 2004; Reinstein and McMillan, 2004; Young, 2005; Pierce, 2007) 
agree that the corporate merger movement had put stress on the ability of accounting firms to 
retain professional integrity. Merging corporations retained one of the two previous auditors 
and resorted to opinion shopping. The accounting firms, resultantly, became commercialised 
and accounting professionals were perceived to be serving the clients’ interests. 
The merger activity within the accounting profession itself, in the 1970s and 1980s (such as 
the merger of big eight to form the then big five) also distorted their professionalism. The 
objective of such merger, according to Boyd (2004), was to achieve bigger revenues, the 
concentration of power and ability to push the competition out from consultancy and 
management advisory enterprises. Thus, the firms started organising them in business-like 
structures, with client satisfaction as their priority (Stumpf, Doh and Clark, 2002; Boyd, 2004).  
Further to the aforementioned devastating impacts of commercialism, several studies (e.g., 
Willett and Page, 1996; Brown, 2002; Boyd, 2004; Pierce and Sweeney, 2004) asserted that 
commercial pressures also deteriorated the audit quality. These studies indicate that the shift 
from professionalism to commercialism made accounting professionals deviate from their 
professional duties, which also implies deviation from compliant behaviour or from serving in 
the best interest of the public. Some researchers (Beattie, Brandt and Fearnley, 1999; Beattie 
and Fearnley, 2002; Stumpf, Doh and Clark, 2002; Boyd, 2004; McMillan, 2004; Reinstein 
and McMillan, 2004; Young, 2005; Pierce, 2007) posited that commercial pressures led 
accounting firms to provide non-audit services, which created conflict of interests for the 
professionals and resulted in their deviant behaviour. 
Therefore, commercialism is considered one of the causes of deviation from professionalism 
and it has been evidenced to lead to many dysfunctional consequences. Overall, the literature 
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suggests that commercialism-induced conflict of interests lead to the accounting professionals’ 
deviant decision-making behaviour that is characterised by dysfunctional practices, including 
the prioritisation of client satisfaction, the maximisation of the fee, the deterioration in audit 
quality and the deviation from professional duties. However, there still is a lack of empirical 
evidence to form definite conclusions about the relationship between conflict of interests and 
accounting professionals' deviant decision-making behaviour – this is also because 
commercialism represents just one of the sources of conflict of interests. 
2.3.2 Structural Arrangements-induced Conflict of interests 
Conflict of interests induced by structural arrangements denotes the origin of conflict of 
interests due to the accounting firms’ various organisational features such as long-term 
relationships with clients, employment of former auditors by the clients, provision of non-audit 
services and hiring and firing of accounting professionals by the clients (Boyd, 2004). Research 
in this domain examines the impact of ‘conflict of interests due to structural arrangements’ on 
the accounting professionals’ deviant decision-making behaviour.         
2.3.2.1 Conflict of interests due to Client-Firm Relation 
The close relationship of accounting firms with the clients’ management and their keenness to 
please the clients for ensuring a regular stream of income are believed to be the important 
reasons for impairment of professionals’ independence in relation to the conflict of interests 
(Arel, Brody and Pany, 2006). The Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants (IESBA, 2015) 
provides that due to a long-term relationship between the client and the firm, various threats 
such as self-interest threats (e.g., due to financial or other personal interest) and familiarity 
threats (e.g., firm’s preference to serve clients due to close ties with them) are likely to arise.  
The archival and behavioural studies have focused on the long tenure of the client-firm 
relationship as a potential source of conflict of interests and have examined their impact on 
accounting professionals’ deviant decision-making behaviour. Most of these studies have used 
deterioration in audit quality as a proxy for deviant behaviour. Audit quality, in turn, has been 
assessed with the help of the appropriateness or inappropriateness of the professionals’ 
decisions and judgements towards different concerns such as proposed audit adjustments 
(Hatfield, Jackson and Vandervelde, 2011), types of audit opinions (Geiger and Raghunandan, 
2002) and decisions on the purchased goodwill (Favere-Marchesi and Emby, 2005) etc. 
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In order to infer the effects of conflict of interests, archival approaches analyse data on the 
professionals’ previous decisions (Nelson, 2004). In this regard, Mautz and Sharaf (1961) 
found that the tenure of the auditor-client relationship is positively associated with conflict of 
interests and the subsequent reduction in audit quality. Similarly, some others (e.g., Deis and 
Giroux, 1992; Bedard and Johnstone, 2010; Daugherty, Dickins, Hatfield and Higgs, 2012) 
also argue that the longer audit tenure leads to poor audit quality and they suggested a rotation 
of the engagement partner. On the contrary, Geiger and Raghunandan (2002) examined the 
association between the type of issued audit opinion and the length of audit tenure – they found 
more audit reporting failures in the early years of client-firm relationship and suggested that 
partners’ rotation might not be beneficial. Similarly, Johnson, Khurana and Reynolds (2002) 
and Bamber and Iyer (2007) also agreed that the longer the auditor’s tenure, the better the 
financial reporting. Overall, archival studies remain inconclusive of the association of tenure 
of the client-firm relationship with that of the professionals’ deviant behaviour. 
Several behavioural studies have conducted experiments to examine the decision-making 
behaviour of accounting professionals (Nelson, 2004). For instance, Dopuch, King and 
Schwartz (2001) used experimental methods to examine the extent to which auditor 
independence is affected in different regimes of rotation and retention of accounting firms. 
They found that the auditors tend to be more biased in favour of the clients during the regimes 
that do not require rotation. Similarly, Favere-Marchesi and Emby (2005) reported that 
compared to new partners, the continuing partners are less likely to conclude that the purchased 
goodwill might be impaired. Moreover, Hatfield, Jackson and Vandervelde (2011) examined 
the impact of prior audit involvement and client pressure on the proposed audit adjustments 
and concluded that partners’ rotation had positive effects on audit quality.  Overall, behavioural 
research suggests that longer tenure of the client-firm relationship leads to poor audit quality.  
Although the literature remains inconclusive of the association between the tenure of client-
firm relationship and the audit quality, both the archival and behavioural research indicate that 
the possibility of conflict of interests in such situations is likely to threaten audit quality. 
However, there still is a lack of empirical evidence to form definite conclusions about the 
relationship between conflict of interests and the accounting professionals' deviant decision-
making behaviour.  
2.3.2.2 Conflict of interests due to Employment Opportunities with Clients 
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Prior to the collapse of Enron in 2001, it was a common practice of clients to hire the former 
accounting professionals. The main reasons for clients to do so were, arguably, to benefit from 
the professionals’ knowledge of clients’ business, their understanding of the financial reporting 
process and their awareness of the clients’ information systems (Beasley, Carcello and 
Hermanson, 2000). However, the employment of former members is believed to be the cause 
of impaired independence of the professional. Thus, the employment opportunities with clients 
might give rise to conflict of interests with the primary interest of the profession on one hand 
(i.e. serving in the best interest of public) and the secondary interest (i.e. serving in the best 
interest of the client) on the other. The practice of employing former accounting professionals 
was discouraged with the implementation of SOX in 2002 that prohibited clients from hiring 
their former auditors for up to a period of one year after an audit, termed the cooling off period.  
Nonetheless, employment with clients after cooling off period is still an issue of concern 
(Ahmad, 2015; Wickramasinghe, Hamid, Pirzada and Ahmad, 2015). 
Some survey-based and archival studies have focused on employment opportunities with 
clients as a potential source of conflict of interests and have examined their impact on 
accounting professionals’ deviant decision-making. Several earlier surveys-based studies 
(Imhoff, 1978; Firth, 1980, Koh and Mahathevan, 1993; Fearnley, Brandt and Beattie, 2002; 
Geiger, North and O’Connell, 2005; Lennox, 2005) suggest that employment opportunities 
with clients might induce the accounting professionals to serve the client’s interests due to their 
impaired independence. This indicates a possible positive relationship between ‘conflict of 
interests due to the employment opportunities with clients’ and the professionals’ deviant 
decision-making behaviour.  
Some other studies (Behn, Carcello, Hermanson and Hermanson, 1999; Beasley, Carcello, 
Hermanson and Lapides, 2000; Menon and Williams, 2004) agree that employing the former 
professionals is likely to result in the loss of independence and scepticism. Such employment 
opportunities might induce the professionals to prioritise clients’ interests. However, Geiger, 
North and O’Connell (2005) did not find evidence for relationship between the hiring of former 
accounting professionals and the aggressive financial reporting. Overall, archival studies about 
the relationship between ‘conflict of interests due to employment opportunities with clients’ 
and the professionals’ deviant decision-making remain inconclusive.  
The International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) provides that hiring of former 
professional accountants gives rise to the self-interest and familiarity threats. These threats 
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imply the presence of conflict of interests that gives rise to a deviation from serving the primary 
interest of the profession (Ahmad, 2015; Wickramasinghe, Hamid, Pirzada and Ahmad, 2015). 
However, there is a lack of empirical evidence to form definite conclusions about the 
relationship between conflict of interests and the accounting professionals' deviant decision-
making behaviour. Importantly, the extant literature (Johnson and Hansen, 2011; Ahmad, 2015, 
Wickramasinghe, Hamid, Pirzada and Ahmad, 2015) draws attention towards the Code of 
Ethics for Professional Accountants (IESBA, 2015), for addressing the issues surrounding 
conflict of interests and the professionals’ independence. 
2.3.2.3 Conflict of interests due to Provision of Non-Audit Services 
The provision of non-audit services is believed to result in an impaired independence of the 
professionals, due to the possibility of conflict of interests in such a situation. Based on the 
belief that provision of non-audit services harms the actual or perceived quality of an audit, the 
current rules under SOX do not allow accounting firms to offer non-audit services. However, 
under certain circumstances, the accounting firms are permitted to provide some non-audit 
services and due to which conflict of interests arises (Bedard, Deis, Curtis and Jenkins, 2008; 
Tepalagul and Lin, 2014; Church et al., 2015). In relation to this study’s research problem, the 
extant research has focused on non-audit services as a potential source of conflict of interests 
and has also examined their impact on accounting professionals’ deviant behaviour. Most of 
these studies have used deterioration in audit quality as a proxy for the professionals’ deviant 
behaviour. Audit quality, in turn, has been assessed with the help of different indicators such 
as the types of issued audit opinion, objective versus subjective decision-making and the 
prioritisation of public interest versus the clients’ interest etc. 
Frankel, Johnson and Nelson (2002) and Ruddock, Taylor and Taylor (2004) agreed that the 
higher fee for non-audit services leads to a conflict of interests and induces accounting firms 
to provide non-audit services. However, some researchers (Craswell, Stokes and Laughton, 
2002; Geiger and Rama, 2003; Skaife, LaFond and Mayhew, 2003; Defond and Francis, 2005; 
Callaghan, Parkash and Singhal, 2009) do not support significant association between the 
higher non-audit fee and the quality of audit opinions. Some others (Sharma and Sidhu, 2001; 
Kinney, Palmrose and Scholz, 2004) support this relationship in certain circumstances. 
According to Canning and Gwilliam (1999), provision of non-audit services leads to 
subjectivity, lack of independence and the prioritisation of clients’ interests. Likewise, 
Bazerman and Gino, (2012) suggested that provision of non-audit services leads to the biased 
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decision-making.  
Importantly, Beattie and Fearnley (2002) argued that provision of non-audit services gives rise 
to the self-interest threats (e.g., due to financial interest), self-review threats (e.g., when 
professionals have to review their own work), advocacy threats (e.g., when professionals 
promote client’s position), familiarity threats (e.g., due to close client-firm relations) and 
intimidation threats (e.g., due to the actual or perceived pressures such as when professionals 
feel pressurised to prioritise their clients’ interests). Again, this draws attention towards the 
Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants that adopts threats and safeguards approach6 
(Johnson and Hansen, 2011; IESBA, 2015) to address the issues surrounding conflict of 
interests and the professionals’ independence. 
Overall, the relationship between conflict of interests due to provision of non-audit services 
and the professionals’ deviant decision-making behaviour remain inconclusive. There is a lack 
of empirical evidence to form definite conclusions about the relationship between conflict of 
interests and the accounting professionals deviant decision-making behaviour – this is also 
because providing the non-audit services represents just one of the sources of conflict of 
interests. Notably, the extant literature (e.g., Beattie and Fearnley, 2002; Johnson and Hansen, 
2011) also supports the adoption of threats and safeguards approach, for addressing the conflict 
of interests in professional accounting firms.  
2.3.2.4 Conflict of interests due to Hiring and Firing of Firms by Clients 
The client’s audit committee is responsible to hire and fire the professional accounting firms. 
The audit committee, supposedly, works independently of the client’s management. In practice, 
however, the management exerts considerable influence on the hiring and firing decisions. 
Thus, the committee’s decision to hire and fire the professionals is largely affected by the 
management’s preferences (Lennox, 2003). The Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants 
(IESBA, 2015) provides that in situations where clients hold the power to hire and fire firms, 
various threats to compliance with fundamental principles of professional ethics are likely to 
arise. The main threats are the self-interest (e.g., the firms’ priority to remain hired), advocacy 
threats (e.g., when professionals promote client’s position) and intimidation threats (e.g., due 
                                                 
6 The threats and safeguards approach involves identification of possible threats to the fundamental principles of 
professional ethics (i.e. integrity, objectivity, professional competence and due care, confidentiality and the 
professional behaviour) and then applying appropriate safeguards to counter the effects of such threats (IESBA, 
2015). 
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to the actual or perceived pressures). The hiring and firing of accounting professionals by the 
clients is believed to create conflict of interests, that tends to impair the professionals’ 
independence (Abdel-Khalik, 2002; Bazerman, Loewenstein and Moore, 2002; Mayhew and 
Pike, 2004; O’Connor, 2004; O’Connor, 2006; Ronen, 2010; Bae, Kallapur and Rho, 2013).  
The extant research focuses on the hiring and firing of accounting professionals by the clients 
as a potential source of conflict of interests and examines its impact on the professionals’ 
deviant behaviour. In this regard, most of the studies have discussed conflict of interests in 
relation to the independence of accounting professionals. Using the issuance of negative audit 
opinion as a proxy for professionals’ decision-making behaviour, Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu and 
Bazerman (2006) found that the accounting firms have incentives to avoid the provision of a 
negative audit opinion about the clients who hire them. This implies that conflict of interests 
due to hiring and firing by clients leads to deviant decision-making behaviour.  Similarly, other 
studies (e.g., Levinthal and Fichman, 1988; Seabright, Levinthal and Fichman, 1992; 
Bazerman, Morgan and Loewenstein, 1997; Ronen, 2010; Bae, Kallapur and Rho, 2013) also 
held that hiring and firing by the clients tend to impair the professionals’ independence. In such 
situations, accounting professionals are perceived to be serving the interests of their clients. 
Overall, extant literature agrees that conflict of interests due to the clients’ hiring and firing of 
the firms lead to deviant decision-making behaviour. Therefore, the literature suggests that 
since clients have the power to hire and fire accounting firms, they are likely to have 
considerable influence on how the services are delivered. There, however, is a lack of empirical 
evidence to form definite conclusions about the relationship between conflict of interests and 
the accounting professionals' deviant decision-making behaviour.  
2.3.3 Workplace Pressures-induced Conflict of interests 
Workplace pressures-induced conflict of interests denotes the origin of conflict of interests due 
to various workplace pressures such as the commercial pressures (Pierce, 2007), time pressure 
(Sikka, 2004), obedience pressure (Davis, DeZoort and Kopp, 2006) and social pressure 
(Bazerman, Morgan and Loewenstein, 1997). Research in this domain examines the impact of 
‘conflict of interests due to various workplace pressures’ on the accounting professionals’ 
deviant behaviour. Researchers have used different proxies for deviant behaviour such as 
incomplete testing of samples and falsification of working papers (Kelley and Margheim, 1990; 
Malone and Roberts, 1996; Willett and Page, 1996; Sikka, 2004), premature signing-off on 
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audit assignments (Otley and Pierce, 1996), inadequate paperwork (Carcello, Hermanson and 
McGrath, 1992), under-reporting the audit hours (Dirsmith and Covaleski, 1985; McNair, 
1991; Anderson-Gough, Grey and Robson, 2001) and opinion shopping (Boyd, 2004). 
Pierce (2007) provided that conflict of interests due to workplace pressures lead to a wide range 
of dysfunctional practices that threaten the quality of audits and encourage the provision of 
non-audit services in the best interest of the clients. In both the instances, the primary interest 
of the accounting profession is believed to be compromised. Several researchers (Willett and 
Page, 1996; Brown, 2002; Boyd, 2004; Pierce and Sweeney, 2004; Pierce, 2007) associated 
commercial pressures faced by accounting firms to the deteriorated audit quality. Time pressure 
and the time budgets (McNair, 1991; Malone and Roberts, 1996; Willett and Page, 1996; 
Anderson-Gough, Grey and Robson, 2001; Sikka, 2004) and the obedience pressure (Davis, 
DeZoort and Kopp, 2006) are also believed to result in dysfunctional behaviour. The common 
theme underlying these studies is that various workplace pressures give rise to the conflict of 
interests that lead to dysfunctional practices.   
Moreover, the accounting professionals form close relationships with their clients and, thus, 
face immediate social pressures to comply with their wishes. In such situations, serving the 
client’s interests becomes more compelling than the future probabilistic disincentives 
(Bazerman, Morgan and Loewenstein, 1997). This suggests that it is, basically, the pressures 
underlying firm-client relations that tend to affect decision-making behaviour of the 
professionals. Several studies (Moore, Loewenstein, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2003; Moore and 
Loewenstein, 2004; Beattie, Fearnley and Brandt, 2005; Moore, Cain, Loewenstein and 
Bazerman, 2005; Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2006; Moore, Tanlu and Bazerman, 
2010) and the Audit Quality Inspection Annual Reports from 2011 - 2015 (Financial Reporting 
Council, 2016) reveal that various workplace pressures serve as the sources of secondary 
interests for the professionals. These secondary interests interfere with the primary interest of 
accounting profession and, resultantly, give rise to the conflict of interests. The extant research 
on individual decision-maker as a unit of analysis (e.g., Gonzalez, Dana, Koshino and Just, 
2005; Jepma and López-Solà, 2014) suggests that workplace pressures have their roots in fear 
of loss. 
Overall, there is an evidence of a positive relationship between conflict of interests due to 
various workplace pressures and the professionals’ deviant decision-making behaviour. 
Importantly, the literature also suggests that the pressures underlying structural arrangements 
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(such as the firm-client relation) act as a disincentive to compliant decision-making behaviour. 
Such workplace pressures have their roots in fear of loss and give rise to a conflict of interests 
for accounting professionals – there is a need to empirically investigate the effect of conflict of 
interests on decision-making behaviour in a professional accounting environment.   
2.3.4 Misaligned Rewards-induced Conflict of interests 
Misaligned rewards-induced conflict of interests denotes the origin of conflicting interests due 
to ‘the reward systems that are misaligned with the primary interest of accounting profession’. 
According to Amali (2010), the main motivators used by the firms for encouraging desired 
behaviour include goal setting, acknowledgement of employees’ achievements, delegation of 
authority and the monetary rewards. Research in this domain examines the impact of ‘conflict 
of interests due to various reward structures’ on the accounting professionals’ deviant decision-
making behaviour characterised, mainly, by the unethical behaviour.  
Pierce (2007) reported that a number of conflicts of interests in accounting firms originated 
within their marketing activities that were encouraged by the internal reward systems and the 
cultural norms of the firms. Likewise, Goto (2004) investigated the association of reward 
structures with ethical behaviour and found that the right reward structures were positively 
related to the ethical behaviour and negatively to the unethical behaviour. Similarly, Wyatt 
(2004) asserts that the firms’ internal culture of greed gives rise to the behavioural changes and 
that no legislation can solve the problem unless firms themselves make efforts. In this regard, 
Schminke, Arnaud and Kuenzi (2007) argued that it is necessary to encourage an environment 
where ethical behaviour is rewarded. Thus, in situations involving a conflict of interests, the 
motivational and control structures are of immense importance in aligning the goals of 
accounting professionals with that of the primary interest of the profession – this, arguably, 
will encourage the compliant decision-making behaviour.  
Fearnley, Hines, McBride and Brandt (2002) and Green and Zimiles (2013) provided that most 
of the conflict of interests in relation to reward systems involves financial motives, but may 
also involve advancement and recognition. Arguably, even if an accounting firm has a good 
reputation and high standards, individuals within the firm may feel pressurised to engage in 
behaviour that is not in accordance with the professional ethical standards. Amali (2010) 
provided that the immediate causes of unethical (or deviant) behaviours include incorrect 
implementation of motivators, simultaneous use of motivators and the absence of appropriate 
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controls in the workplace. This suggests that the misaligned incentives (i.e. incentives 
misaligned with primary interest of the accounting profession) give rise to the conflict of 
interests that increase the instances of unethical or deviant decision-making. Moreover, the 
misaligned incentives underlying reward systems act as a disincentive to compliant decision-
making behaviour. 
With particular reference to the role of misaligned incentives as a facilitator of deviant 
decision-making, several studies (Moore, Loewenstein, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2003; Moore and 
Loewenstein, 2004; Beattie, Fearnley and Brandt, 2005; Moore, Cain, Loewenstein and 
Bazerman, 2005; Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2006; Moore, Tanlu and Bazerman, 
2010) and the Audit Quality Inspection Annual Reports from 2011 - 2015 (Financial Reporting 
Council, 2016) reveal that misaligned incentives serve as the sources of secondary interests for 
the professionals. These secondary interests interfere with the primary interest of the profession 
and give rise to the conflict of interests. Extant research on individual decision-maker as a unit 
of analysis (e.g., Gonzalez, Dana, Koshino and Just, 2005; Jepma and López-Solà, 2014) 
suggests that the accounting professionals would respond differently to what they deem 
rewarding and to what they consider fearsome, i.e. they would react differently depending on 
whether the misaligned incentives are rooted in the temptation for gain or in fear of loss – the 
framing effect.  
Overall, the literature provides evidence that the conflict of interests due to incorrectly 
implemented rewards systems leads to the accounting professionals’ deviant decision-making 
behaviour. Nonetheless, more empirical evidence is still needed to form definite conclusions 
about the relationship between conflict of interests and the accounting professionals’ deviant 
decision-making behaviour. Furthermore, literature also reveals that the reward systems based 
on misaligned incentives with roots in temptation for gain and/or those with roots in fear of 
loss give rise to a conflict of interests for accounting professionals. With particular reference 
to the misaligned incentives, there is a need to empirically investigate the effect of conflict of 
interests on decision-making behaviour in professional accounting firms.  
2.3.5 Conflict of interests and Deviant Decision-Making: Overall Analysis   
A critical analysis of the literature asserts that, overall, there is a lack of empirical evidence for 
the relationship between conflict of interests and the accounting professionals’ deviant 
decision-making behaviour. The focus of extant literature on the four broad sources of conflict 
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of interests (i.e. commercialism, structural arrangements, workplace pressures and the 
misaligned rewards) does not provide sufficient insight into the root causes underlying these 
sources. The said root causes, according to the reviewed literature, are the workplace pressures 
with roots in fear of loss, the misaligned incentives with roots in temptation for gain and the 
misaligned incentives with roots in fear of loss. Interestingly, commercialism and the structural 
arrangements are also argued to be underpinned by the workplace pressures and the misaligned 
incentives. Moreover, the Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants provides that the 
structural arrangements give rise to five main threats (i.e. self-interest, intimidation, self-
review, familiarity and the advocacy threats) to fundamental principles of professional ethics.  
The aforementioned revelations indicate a logical connection among the four broad sources of 
conflict of interests (i.e. commercialism, structural arrangements, workplace pressures and the 
misaligned rewards), the root causes underlying the sources of conflicting interests (i.e. the 
workplace pressures with roots in fear of loss, the misaligned incentives with roots in 
temptation for gain and the misaligned incentives with roots in fear of loss) and the threats 
emanating from the structural arrangements (i.e. self-interest, intimidation, self-review, 
familiarity and the advocacy threats). In this regard, an in-depth insight into the Code of Ethics 
for Professional Accountants (IESBA, 2015) and the relevant literature (e.g., Beattie and 
Fearnley, 2002; Juhari, Mohd-Sanusi, Rahman and Omar, 2013; Ahmad, 2015) suggest that 
the root causes underlying the self-interest, self-review, advocacy, familiarity and intimidation 
threats are the misaligned incentives with roots in temptation for gain, that with roots in fear of 
loss and the workplace pressures with roots in fear of loss. Therefore, conflict of interests 
originates due to the threats to compliance with the fundamental principles of professional 
ethics – these threats serve as the sources of secondary interest and are underpinned by the 
misaligned incentives with roots in temptation for gain, the misaligned incentives with roots in 
fear of loss and the workplace pressures with roots in fear of loss.   
As highlighted in the review, there is a need for more empirical evidence for the relationship 
between conflict of interests and the accounting professionals’ deviant decision-making. In 
order to do so, the coherent operationalisation of conflict of interests is required since the extant 
literature is devoid of the much-needed focus on the root causes underlying conflict of interests. 
In this regard, application of the threats and safeguards approach has been suggested for 
addressing the conflict of interests (Johnson and Hansen, 2011; IESBA, 2015). Remarkably, 
this approach is of direct relevance to facilitate effective management of conflict of interests 
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since it follows a risk-based approach (Johnson and Hansen, 2011; Ahmad, 2015). Therefore, 
conflicts of interests due to various threats need to be empirically examined for their possible 
relationship with the accounting professionals’ deviant decision-making behaviour. It is 
expected that this approach will provide a better focus on the professionals’ independence in 
fact (Bazerman and Banaji, 2004; Cain, Loewenstein and Moore, 2005; Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz 
and Gonzalo, 2010; Moore, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2010; Ayal and Gino, 2012).  
2.4 Role of Mental Processes towards Decision-Making Behaviour  
This section is meant to review the literature regarding the role of accounting professionals’ 
mental processes towards decision-making behaviour in the events of conflict of interests. With 
particular reference to facilitating effective management of conflict of interests, the purpose is 
to focus on increased understanding of the accounting professionals’ independence in fact, so 
as to develop behavioural interventions for strengthening it. It is worth mentioning that the 
examination of mental processes is an area of cognitive psychology that is aimed at 
understanding the cognitive or information processing mechanisms from a psychological 
perspective (Cherry, 2016). As such, the distinction between psychological and cognitive 
processes tends to fade away within the domain of cognitive psychology – this is because, all 
the cognitive processes are underpinned by the psychological explanations (Newman and Just, 
2005; Lieberman, 2007). 
Extant literature regarding the role of accounting professionals’ mental processes towards 
decision-making behaviour is focused on the psychological and cognitive effects of conflict of 
interests on professional’s behaviour (e.g., Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2006; Guiral, 
Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo, 2010) and the conscious and unconscious aspects of decision-
making in situations involving conflict of interests (e.g., Cain, Loewenstein and Moore, 2005; 
Chugh, Banaji and Bazerman, 2005). Since conflict of interests is an abstract concept, it has 
commonly been conceptualised in the extant literature as a situation representing a lack of 
professional’s independence. Moreover, deviant decision-making has mostly been 
conceptualised as a behaviour that is not in conformity with the required professional ethical 
standards.  
2.4.1 Psychological and Cognitive Effects of Conflict of interests 
Regarding the cognitive psychology of conflict of interests, Bazerman, Loewenstein and Moore 
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(2002) provided that various perceptual biases, including the selective perception bias, 
escalation of commitment bias, plausible deniability and discounting of information bias act as 
the barriers to compliant decision-making. In this regard, Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu and Bazerman 
(2006) used moral seduction theory to emphasise the psychological effects of conflict of 
interests. They explained why accounting professionals are unaware of how morally 
compromised they have become due to conflict of interests. According to them, potential 
threats to the independence of auditors are posed by three structural features, i.e. hiring and 
firing of auditors by clients, auditors taking jobs with clients and simultaneous provision of the 
audit and non-audit services. They asserted that in the presence of these structural 
arrangements, auditors become morally seduced to serving their self-interests, due to some 
psychological barriers, including unconscious bias due to conflict of interests, selective 
perception, the barriers posed by workplace pressures and the barriers imposed by partners who 
prefer maximising the billable hours. Notably, these studies affirm that the structural 
arrangements affect decision-making behaviour through the agency of professionals’ mental 
processes. 
Likewise, Chugh, Banaji and Bazerman (2005) drew attention towards the impact of 
psychological barriers on ethical decisions involving conflict of interests. The authors asserted 
that ethical decisions are biased by the psychological barriers, including decision-makers’ 
stubborn view that since they are ethical, deserving and competent, they are not susceptible to 
conflict of interests. Such barriers increase the risk that an otherwise visible conflict of interests 
will not be recognised by that person. Closely related are the studies examining decision-
making in the face of ethical dilemmas (Foot, 1967; Thomson, 1986; Unger, 1996; Greene et 
al., 2001; Casebeer and Churchland, 2003; Green, Ha and Bullock, 2010) – the recurring theme 
of these studies is that the decision outcome in any given situation is affected by the decision-
maker’s subjective experience of given dilemmas or the conflict of interests’ situations. These 
studies have important implications for the need to empirically investigate the role of mental 
barriers on an accounting professional’s decision-making behaviour. 
In order to examine the role of perceptions towards the accounting professionals’ decision-
making in the face of conflict of interests, Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo (2010) conducted 
an experimental study with 80 experienced accounting professionals. They focused on the 
cognitive psychology of conflict of interests and developed a cognitive approach by connecting 
throughput model to the moral seduction theory. In agreement with the relevant ethical 
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decision-making research (e.g., Rodgers and Gago, 2001; 2006; Rodgers, 2006; 2009), they 
affirmed that decision-making in situations involving conflict of interests is an outcome of the 
interaction of information, perception, judgement and the decision choice. They found that 
conflict of interests affects judgement and decision-making through the agency of involuntary 
bias, including self-fulfilling prophecy effect, perceived litigation risk exposure and the 
perception of whistleblowing function. However, they pointed out their weak 
operationalisation of conflict of interests and suggested the need for more research to 
understand the cognitive effects of conflict of interests. 
Highlighting the significance of employees’ perceptions regarding ethical codes of conduct, 
some researchers (Ponemon, 1992; Windsor and Ashkanasy, 1995; Shafer, Morris and 
Ketchand, 2001; Jones, Massey and Thorne, 2003) assert that the employees form their 
perceptions of ethical climate and of how peers would do in a similar situation. Likewise, the 
role of ethical predispositions as the sources of bias in decision-making (Reiter, 1996; Bay, 
2002; McPhail, 2006) and cognitive moral development (Greene et al., 2001, 2004; Casebeer 
and Churchland, 2003; Ashkanasy, Windsor and Trevino; 2006) have also received attention. 
For instance, Ashkanasy, Windsor and Trevino (2006) found that the managers with low 
cognitive moral development who perceived that their organisations overlooked unethical 
behaviour made less ethical decisions. Most of the research pertains to general organisations 
and there is a need for empirical evidence regarding the role of cognitive processes, with 
particular reference to decision-making behaviour in a professional accounting environment. 
2.4.2 Conscious and Unconscious Aspects of Decision-Making  
The studies in this domain revolve around the idea of limitations on the conscious mind and 
the power of the unconscious mind, both of which are central to making ethical decisions 
involving conflict of interests. In this regard, Schneider and Shiffrin (1977) proposed a 
distinction between the controlled (conscious) and automatic (unconscious) processes in the 
brain. Where controlled processes represent the conscious deliberations (Greene et al., 2001; 
Casebeer and Churchland, 2003), automatic processes in the brain are much faster than 
conscious deliberations and occur with little or no awareness (Bargh, Chaiken, Raymond and 
Hymes, 1996; Bargh and Chartr, 1999). The distinction between conscious and unconscious 
processes has been given different labels, i.e. rational and experiential systems (Kirkpatrick 
and Epstein, 1992), type I and type II processes (Kahneman and Frederick, 2002) and reflective 
and reflexive (Lieberman, 2003). These studies imply that decision-making in the situations 
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involving conflict of interests is an outcome of both the conscious and the unconscious mental 
processes – there, however, is a lack of empirical evidence in this regard.  
Furthermore, differentiation between the controlled cognitive and the automatic affective 
processes prevails in the psychology (e.g., Zajonc, 1980; Zajonc, 1984; Zajonc and McIntosh, 
1992) and the neuroscience literature (e.g., Panksepp, 1998; LeDoux, 1999; Wagar and 
Thagard, 2004; Damasio, 2006). There is a growing evidence that behaviour is affected by both 
the controlled cognitive processes (Wolford, Miller and Gazzaniga, 2000) and the automatic 
affective processes (Schneider and Shiffrin, 1977; Bargh, Chaiken, Raymond and Hymes, 
1996; Bargh and Chartr, 1999). Moll et al. (2005) found that ethical decision-making draws on 
the integration of the processes in unconscious as well as the conscious regions of the brain. In 
this regard, Chugh, Banaji and Bazerman (2005) explained the phenomenon of bounded 
ethicality which implies that the ethical decisions involving conflict of interests are likely to 
introduce bounds on conscious thinking and the biases in unconscious thinking. There, 
however, is a need for more research in this regard. 
Overall, the provisions of extant literature have important implications to explain why in the 
events of conflict of interests, the deviations from compliant behaviour might occur even 
undesirably. Particularly, there is a need to examine the role of accounting professionals’ 
intentional and unintentional cognitive processes and also the role of biases towards their 
decision-making behaviour in situations involving conflict of interests. 
2.4.3 Role of Mental Processes towards Decision-Making: Overall Analysis 
A critical review of the literature regarding the role of accounting professionals’ mental 
processes towards decision-making behaviour in the events of conflict of interests highlighted 
two main concerns. First, there is a significant lack of empirical evidence for the role of 
accounting professionals’ cognitive processes towards decision-making in the events of 
conflict of interests. Secondly, there also is a lack of empirical evidence for the biasing role of 
conflict of interests towards accounting professionals’ decision-making behaviour. 
Particularly, the cognitive processes and biases need to be viewed in terms of their intentional 
(conscious) and unintentional (unconscious) influences on the professionals’ decision-making 
behaviour. Arguably, empirical evidence for the role of professionals’ mental processes 
towards decision-making behaviour will provide a better focus on their independence in fact – 
this is what the proponents (e.g., Bazerman and Banaji, 2004; Cain, Loewenstein and Moore, 
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2005; Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo, 2010) suggest for addressing the problem of deviant 
decision-making behaviour in professional accounting firms.  
Although the existing professional accounting literature does not provide clear guidance on the 
specific types of cognitive processes that should be examined, it does suggest the need to 
specifically focus on the professionals’ perceptual biases. It further suggests that the conflict 
of interests affects decision-making behaviour by giving rise to the interrelated cognitive 
processes (see Wagar and Thagard, 2004). Furthermore, the extant literature also guides 
towards the potential theories that can be used to understand the role of mental processes. The 
Throughput model (Rodgers and Gago, 2001; 2006; Rodgers, 2006; 2009; Guiral, Rodgers, 
Ruiz and Gonzalo, 2010), the moral seduction theory (Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu and Bazerman, 
2006) and their combination (Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo, 2010) have been employed 
in this regard. While throughout model seems relevant, the focus of moral seduction theory is 
more on the psychological explanations of mental processes – arguably, its close cognitive 
counterpart, i.e. social cognitive theory (Bandura, 2006) seems quite promising for examining 
the role of cognitive effects of conflict of interests. In this regard, Bazerman and Gino (2012) 
strongly suggest the adoption of the behavioural ethics approach. 
2.5 Gap(s) in the Literature  
The research problem driving this study is the accounting professionals’ deviant decision-
making behaviour due to conflict of interests. Literature has been critically reviewed to 
determine what has already been done regarding this research problem. In this regard, some 
interrelated significant gaps have been identified.  
Analysis of literature regarding the critique of existing measures and regulations for managing 
conflict of interests (Bazerman and Banaji, 2004; Cain, Loewenstein and Moore, 2005; Moore, 
Tetlock, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2006; Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo, 2010; Moore, Tanlu 
and Bazerman, 2010; Ayal and Gino, 2012) revealed the first gap, i.e. a considerable lack of 
research pertaining to the accounting professionals’ independence in fact. Thus, this study 
intends to address their independence in fact by facilitating understanding of the relationship 
between conflict of interests and deviant decision-making behaviour and of the role of 
accounting professionals’ mental processes towards their decision-making behaviour.  
The analysis of literature regarding the relationship between conflict of interests and deviant 
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decision-making behaviour (e.g., Bae, Kallapur and Rho, 2012; Daugherty, Dickins, Hatfield 
and Higgs, 2012; Green and Zimiles, 2013; Jepma and López-Solà, 2014; Wickramasinghe, 
Hamid, Pirzada and Ahmad, 2015) provide that there is a lack of empirical evidence to form 
definite conclusions about the relationship between conflict of interests and the accounting 
professionals’ deviant decision-making. Particularly, the conflict of interests due to various 
threats (to compliance with the fundamental principles of professional ethics) needs to be 
empirically examined for their possible relationship with the professionals’ deviant decision-
making behaviour. Accordingly, this study will provide empirical evidence for the relationship 
of ‘conflict of interests due to different threats’ with the accounting professionals’ deviant 
decision-making behaviour. 
The analysis of literature regarding the role of professionals’ mental processes towards 
decision-making behaviour (e.g., Green, Ha and Bullock, 2010; Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz and 
Gonzalo, 2010; Moore, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2010; Ayal and Gino, 2012; Bazerman and Gino; 
2012) highlights a significant lack of empirical evidence for the role of accounting 
professionals’ cognitive processes towards decision-making behaviour in the events of conflict 
of interests and also a lack of empirical evidence for biasing role of conflict of interests. 
Accordingly, this study will provide empirical evidence for the role of accounting 
professionals’ cognitive processes towards decision-making behaviour in the events of  conflict 
of interests and also for the biasing role of conflict of interests. 
Thus, in relation to the professionals’ independence in fact towards addressing their deviant 
decision-making behaviour due to conflict of interests, four interconnected gaps exist in the 
literature. First, there is a significant lack of research pertaining to the professionals’ 
independence in fact. Second, there is a lack of empirical evidence for the relationship between 
conflict of interests and the accounting professionals’ deviant decision-making behaviour. 
Third, there is a considerable lack of empirical evidence for the role of accounting 
professionals’ cognitive processes towards their decision-making behaviour in the events of 
conflict of interests. Fourth, the biasing role of conflict of interests towards accounting 
professionals’ decision-making behaviour needs to be empirically examined. These four gaps 
converge into one substantial gap, i.e. a lack of understanding about how conflict of interests 
operates at the level of an individual accounting professional, that needs to be filled-in in order 
to generate new knowledge for addressing the research problem. It is expected that the new 
knowledge will help address the accounting professionals’ independence in fact in a better 
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manner, which according to Moore, Tanlu and Bazerman (2010) and Bazerman and Gino 
(2012) will facilitate effective management of conflict of interests in professional accounting 
firms.  
In order to fill the above-mentioned main gap in the literature, this study is aimed at examining 
the process through which conflict of interests affects accounting professionals’ decision-
making behaviour. In order to serve this aim, the main objectives of this study are; 
1. To examine the relationship between conflict of interests and the accounting 
professionals’ likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour. 
2. To understand the role of accounting professionals’ cognitive processes towards their 
decision-making behaviour in the events of conflict of interests. 
3. To understand the biasing role of conflict of interests towards the accounting 
professionals’ decision-making behaviour. 
Notably, the literature does not provide a clear guidance on the specific types of cognitive 
processes that should be examined, it does suggest seeking guidance from various models and 
theories, including the throughput model of decision-making and the moral seduction theory 
or its close cognitive counterpart, i.e. the social cognitive theory. The theoretical framework, 
to be detailed in the next chapter, will specify the cognitive processes that are of particular 
relevance to this study’s aim and objectives.  
2.6 Summary 
The research problem driving this study is the accounting professionals’ deviant decision-
making behaviour due to conflict of interests. This chapter examined what already has been 
said or researched about the research problem and identified the gaps in the extant literature. 
Accordingly, literature relevant to the critique of existing measures and regulations for 
managing conflict of interests in professional accounting firms, the literature informing the 
relationship between conflict of interests and deviant decision-making behaviour in 
professional accounting firms and the literature pertaining to the role of accounting 
professionals’ mental processes towards deviant decision-making behaviour were discussed. 
These discussions led to the identification of gap(s) in the existing strands of research. So as to 
fill the gap for generating new knowledge in relation to the research problem, the corresponding 
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aim and objectives were also specified. 
The next chapter will develop a theoretical framework to address the identified gap. 
Particularly, the framework will serve as a filtering tool for selecting appropriate research 
questions and will also set the boundaries of the work, through specification of the cognitive 
processes that are of particular relevance to this study. 
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CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
“A theoretical framework is a frame of reference that is a basis for observations, definitions 
of concepts, research designs, interpretations and generalisations, much as the frame that 
rests on a foundation defines the overall design of a house” 
(LoBiondo-Wood and Haber, 1998, p. 141) 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter is meant to develop the theoretical framework for addressing the aim and 
objectives of this study. It serves as a filtering tool to set the boundaries of this work, through 
specification of the cognitive processes that are of particular relevance to this study. The 
theoretical model draws on integration of the social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1986; 2006; 
2008) with the throughput model of decision-making (Rodgers, 1997; Rodgers and Gago, 2001; 
2006; Rodgers, 2006; 2009; Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo, 2010), that provides a 
cognitive approach for understanding the process through which conflict of interests affects 
accounting professionals’ decision-making behaviour.  
The second section will introduce the social cognitive theory, followed by the throughput 
model of decision-making in the third section. The fourth section will discuss and justify the 
conceptual connections between the social cognitive theory and the throughput model. The 
theoretical model will be presented in the fifth section, followed by hypotheses development 
in the sixth section. Finally, the seventh section will summarise this chapter.   
3.2 Social Cognitive Theory 
The social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1986) explains how an individual acquires and maintains 
a certain behaviour. Particularly, the behaviour is determined on the basis of its reciprocal 
interaction with the environmental and the cognitive/personal factors. The environmental 
factors are characterised by the context in terms of facilitators and inhibitors of behaviour. 
Further, the cognitive factors are represented by the cognitive constructs (such as perceived 
self-efficacy, perceived outcome expectancy and the judgement). Thus, the social cognitive 
theory establishes that human behaviour is regulated through cognitive processes, in a given 
social context. It, therefore, provides an account of the sociocognitive determinants of 
behaviour. Bandura (1986, 2006, 2008) has repeatedly verified the viability of social cognitive 
43 
theory in explaining the reciprocity between the environment, the cognitive factors and the 
behaviour. The following constructs and provisions of social cognitive theory are of particular 
relevance to this study; 
i. Self-efficacy: This implies the confidence individuals have in their ability to take actions and 
to overcome the barriers (Bandura, 2006). When measured across magnitude, self-efficacy 
beliefs are conceptualised as perceived difficulty. The theory suggests that the higher the 
accounting professionals’ perceived difficulty in performing a given task, the lower is the 
likelihood of executing that task. Perceived difficulty represents a situational cognitive process, 
since it is specific to the given context (Bandura, 2006; 2008). 
ii. Expectancies: These are the values individual assigns to a given incentive or an outcome of 
performing a certain behaviour (Bandura, 1986). For instance, if the accounting professionals 
feel that positive outcomes of performing a certain behaviour will outweigh its negative 
outcomes, they are motivated to adopt such behaviour. Positive outcome expectancy also 
represents a situational cognitive process, as it is context-specific (Bandura, 2006; 2008). 
iii. Moral Judgement: Judgement involves evaluation of conduct or behaviour against the 
internal moral standards and the perceived situational circumstances. The said moral standards 
draw attention towards another important cognitive construct of social cognitive theory, i.e. 
individual’s ‘propensity to morally disengage’ which is the tendency to consider immoral 
behaviour as acceptable. The theory also provides that moral judgement represents a situational 
cognitive process and that professionals are likely to display moral behaviour if they form 
moral judgements (Bandura, 1996; 2002; 2006; 2008).  
iv. In person-environment reciprocal interaction, the individual’s cognitions, beliefs and ideas 
are modified by external factors from the environment. Similarly, an environment is also 
shaped by how individuals solve problems, form judgements or make decisions (Bandura, 
1986; 2008). The accounting professionals – their cognitive processes are in continuous 
interplay with the environment they work in. 
v. In person-behaviour reciprocal interaction, the cognitive processes and behaviour of an 
individual interact. For instance, accounting professionals’ perception that deviant behaviour 
is acceptable in their work environment is likely to induce them to deviate from compliant 
behaviour. Similarly, if the professionals’ deviant behaviour is encouraged, they are likely to 
modify their perception of what constitutes ethical or unethical behaviour (Bandura, 1986; 
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1996). 
vi. In environment-behaviour reciprocal interaction, external factors can change the behaviours 
or the way such behaviours are displayed. Similarly, behaviour can also modify the 
environment in which it is exhibited. For instance, workplace pressures to adopt deviant 
behaviour might induce an accounting professional to adopt it. Moreover, the way 
professionals behave is highly likely to affect the cultural and ethical values in their work 
environment (Bandura, 1986; 1996). 
The aforementioned concepts clarify that the cognitions or thought processes of an individual 
play a central role in performing any behaviour and that brain is an incredible network of 
information processing and interpretation. This suggests that the individual’s cognitive 
processes intervene between the environment and their behaviour, in a particular context 
(Conner, 2010). Figure 3.1 depicts the interactions between the behaviour, the environment 
and the cognitive factors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
Interestingly, the literature reviewed in the previous chapter can be fitted within the frame of 
social cognitive theory. For instance, the literature on a critique of measures and regulations 
for managing conflict of interests in professional accounting firms (i.e. weaknesses in the 
existing measures and regulations and the reasons for the limited effectiveness of existing 
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measures and regulations for managing conflict of interests) pertains to the environmental 
factors in social cognitive theory. Similarly, literature related to the impact of conflict of 
interests on accounting professionals’ deviant decision-making behaviour relates to the 
environmental factors and the behaviour concept in social cognitive theory. Moreover, 
literature regarding the role of accounting professionals’ mental processes towards decision-
making behaviour (i.e. psychological and cognitive effects of conflict of interests and the 
conscious and unconscious aspects of decision-making in situations involving conflict of 
interests) belongs to the cognitive factors in social cognitive theory. Most of the extant research 
falls in the domain of environmental factors and, as already elaborated in literature review 
chapter, more research is needed in relation to the cognitive factors. 
Overall, the discussions in this section suggest that when confronted with conflict of interests, 
the accounting professionals’ performance of the behaviour (i.e. compliant versus deviant) is 
affected by the environment/context and their cognitive processes. 
3.2.1 Social Cognitive Theory in Management Accounting and Auditing 
Research 
Many theories from cognitive psychology have been adopted in the management accounting 
and auditing research to study a variety of topics, including attention, judgement, decisions and 
social influence (Birnberg, Luft and Shields, 2006). For instance, Juhari, Sanusi, Rahman and 
Omar (2013) employed the theory of reasoned action7 for examining the impact of 
independence threats on auditors’ ethical judgements. Adopting the framework of cognitive 
moral development8, Brandon (2003) examined how auditing students’ ethical judgement is 
affected by their moral development and the client risk.  
Moreover, Iskandar and Sanusi (2011) employed social cognitive theory to assess the impact 
of self-efficacy and task complexity on audit judgement. Wongpinunwatana and Panchoo 
(2014) employed the constructs from social cognitive theory to propose the creation of self-
efficacy in internal auditors. Furthermore, Afifah, Sari, Anugerah and Sanusi (2015) adopted a 
cognitive approach to examine the ethical judgements. With reference to the ethics of 
professional scepticism in public accounting, Cabrera-Frias (2012) asserted the positive impact 
                                                 
7 The theory of reasoned action postulates that behavioural intent is caused by attitudes and subjective norms 
(Fishbein, 2008).  
8 The theory of cognitive moral development is underpinned by six stages in an individual’s moral development. 
For details, see Ashkanasy, Windsor and Trevino (2006).    
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of professional’s propensity to morally disengage on the adoption of unethical behaviour. 
Moreover, with specific reference to the conflict of interests in professional accounting firms, 
Charles (2011) and Agle, Hart, Thompson and Hendricks (2014) suggest the positive impact 
of professional’s positive outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making on their ethical 
judgements.  
In order to understand how conflict of interests leads auditors to avoid the issuance of warning 
signals to the stakeholders, Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo (2010) developed a cognitive 
approach by connecting the throughput model to the moral seduction theory. Likewise, Moore, 
Tetlock, Tanlu and Bazerman (2006) examined the structural arrangements that give rise to 
conflict of interests in a professional accounting environment. They examined the cognitive 
processes through which these structures exert their impact on the professionals’ judgement. 
Furthermore, Cohen and Bennie (2006) discussed the relevance of contingent factors model9 
for conducting the accounting ethics research.  
Since conflict of interests is ethical as well as social in nature (Finn, Chonko and Hunt, 1988; 
Mills and Bettner, 1992; Argandona, 2004), the social cognitive theory suggests looking at 
conflicting interests from the perspective of dynamic interaction between; (i) the environment 
(i.e. situations involving conflict of interests), (ii) the cognitive factors (i.e. perceived outcome 
expectancy, perceived difficulty and ethical judgement) and (iii) behaviour in the events of 
conflict of interests (i.e. compliant versus deviant). Social cognitive theory can potentially 
explain how the interplay of environmental factors, the cognitive factors and the behaviour 
affect the way an accountant behaves in the events of different conflict of interests (Bandura, 
1986; 2006; 2008). In this way, professional accounting firms can get useful insights about 
managing conflict of interests through the encouragement of desired behavioural change, by 
making adjustments to the environment or by influencing personal attitudes.  
Thus, it can be concluded that the cognitive theories, in general and the social cognitive theory, 
in particular, can inform a wide range of topics in accounting. Specifically, the promising 
usefulness of social cognitive theory for examining conflict of interests at the level of an 
individual accounting professional is evident due to its successful application for investigation 
                                                 
9 The contingent factors model is an ethical decision-making model that Jones (1991) proposed by integrating the 
earlier models (those proposed by Ferrell and Gresham, 1985; Hunt and Vitell, 1986; Rest, 1986: Trevino, 1986; 
Dubinsky and Loken, 1989). For details, see Cohen and Bennie (2006).  
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of decision-maker’s cognitive processes. This research will also add to the social cognitive 
theory by applying it, in combination with the throughput model, to the professional accounting 
context. 
3.3 Throughput Model  
The throughput model of decision-making (Rodgers, 1997) draws on the concept of process 
thinking which provides that decision-making behaviour is characterised by the interaction of 
four concepts, i.e. information, perception, judgement and the decision choice. This approach 
provides a constructive way of formulating thoughts into a successful strategy. The immediate 
usefulness of process thinking is that it can alert individuals of the particular pathway they use 
to arrive at a certain decision. Generally, success across the pathway journey is achieved when 
an individual and those governing individuals’ behaviour are aware of the obstacles and 
shortcuts they encounter during decision-making (Rodgers, 2006; Rodgers and Gago, 2006). 
The throughput model suggests that there are six main pathways to a decision, that vary by the 
weight a decision-maker puts on the information and the perception. 
 
As indicated in the figure 3.2, the throughput model suggests an interaction of the information 
(available to the individual), the perceptions (problem-framing and biases), the judgement 
(analysis) and the decision. Importantly, perceptions are a source of bias in different decision 
Perceptions 
(P) 
Information 
(I) 
Decision 
(D) 
Judgement 
(J) 
Unintentional Bias 
Analytical Pathway 
Intentional Bias 
 Unintentional Bias 
Figure 3.2: Throughput Model of Decision-Making 
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pathways. Perceptions as a direct driver of the decision (the P → D path) introduce intentional 
bias in decision-making and the other paths involving the role of perceptions (the P → J → D, 
I → P → D, P → I → J → D and I → P → J → D) introduce unintentional bias in decision-
making. The I → J → D path is, however, a bias-free path (Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo, 
2010). Given the different barriers to effective decision-making (such as time pressure, 
incomplete information, overload of confusing information, inability to manage available 
information, instability in the environment and the lack of expertise), only a particular pathway 
to decision choice might work better in any given situation (Rodgers and Gago, 2006; 2009). 
With reference to the decision-making behaviour in professional accounting firms, the relevant 
decision pathways, each of which is dominated by a different moral philosophy, are briefed 
below (Rodgers and Gago, 2001; 2006, Rodgers, 2006; 2009);   
i. P → D (The Expedient Pathway): The philosophy underlying this path is the ‘psychological 
egoism’ which suggests that in situations involving conflict of interests, the accounting 
professionals adopting this pathway to a decision are motivated to act in their perceived self-
interest. Decisions are driven on the basis of decision-makers’ predisposition or framing of the 
problem. All the information surrounding conflict of interests is disregarded and a decision is 
made without analysis. Several pressures (e.g., time pressure) prevent thorough analysis via 
judgement stage. 
ii. P→J→D (The Ruling Guide Pathway): The philosophy underlying this path is the 
‘deontology’ which implies that in situations involving conflict of interests, the accounting 
professionals adopting this pathway focus on the rights of individuals. They form judgements 
by implementing the decision rules that exist to guide individuals to a decision. The judgement 
and decisions are, primarily, driven by their perceived understanding of the rules of law. 
Factors, including incomplete information, inadequate understanding, conflicting information 
signals and undifferentiated alternatives cause an accounting professional to disregard the 
information surrounding conflict of interests.   
iii. I →P→D (The Revisionist Pathway): The philosophy underlying this path is the ‘ethical 
relativism’ which suggests that in situations involving conflict of interests, the accounting 
professionals adopting this pathway to a decision observe the actions of those around them. 
They try to determine group consensus on a given behaviour and their ethical values are defined 
by their feelings, firm’s culture and the environment. Accordingly, the information surrounding 
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conflict of interests is continuously revised. Without any consideration of the alternatives, 
professionals tend to make a decision on the basis of the perceptions they formulate from a 
given information.  
iv. I→J→D (The Analytical Pathway): The accounting standards require professionals to adopt 
analytical pathway to decision-making (Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo, 2010). The 
philosophy underlying this path is the ‘utilitarianism’ which suggests that in situations 
involving conflict of interests, the accounting professionals adopting this path are concerned 
about acting in the best interest of the public. They tend to follow a systematic approach in 
making use of the available information and subject it to a thorough analysis at the judgement 
stage.  
v. I→P→J→D (The Global Perspective Pathway): The philosophy underlying this path is the 
‘ethics of care’ which implies that in situations involving conflict of interests, the accounting 
professionals adopting this pathway to a decision take all the available information into 
consideration. They consider distinct viewpoints and use the available information to modify 
their perceptions about the issue at hand. Alternatives are considered while analysing the 
problem (i.e. judgement stage) and then the decisions are reached. 
Since this study seeks to examine the process through which conflict of interests affects 
decision-making behaviour, it will be relevant to use throughput model for understanding the 
pathways through which the decisions are made and how the bias might enter into these paths. 
This research will also add to the throughput model by applying it, in combination with the 
social cognitive theory, to a professional accounting context.  
3.3.1 Throughput Model in Decision-Making Research 
Throughput Modelling has been successfully applied to different fields, for understanding the 
dominant pathways engaged in decision-making. For instance, the extant research (e.g., Alloy 
and Tabachnik, 1984; Anderson, 1985; Rodgers and Gago, 2001) provides that since 
information typically is processed subjectively, it is considered interdependent with the 
perceptions of a decision-maker. Furthermore, in different decision-making situations, both the 
situational information and the decision maker’s prior beliefs about information jointly 
determine the perceptions (Rodgers and Gago, 2001). An earlier study by Anderson (1985) 
also provided that perception results from the integration of miscellaneous pieces of 
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information.  
With particular reference to the perceptual biases, Johnson-Laird (1980) asserted that prior to 
making a decision, an individual encodes information and develops a representation of the 
problem. Afterwards, the perceptions and judgement can influence the decision choice. 
Importantly, Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1982) suggested that both the automatic 
perceptive-like heuristics and the more deliberate information processing strategies (i.e. 
judgement) are involved in most of the decisions that individuals make. Moreover, Rodgers 
and Gago (2001) argued that certain factors, including unstable environment, uncertain 
information, time pressure and expertise of a decision-maker contribute to whether or to what 
extent bias may distort the judgement process. 
Conceptually, what individuals hold as valuable enters into their perception of information and, 
resultantly, their judgements about what the information is, what is acceptable, what evidence 
they believe in and what philosophical view is appropriate to address the issue at hand, are all 
influenced by what they hold valuable. In this regard, Rodgers (1997) found that when forming 
a decision, auditors’ perceptions preceded the information that would be used for forming a 
judgement and hence, the path P → I → J → D was found to be the most relevant. Thus, it was 
the perceptions that determined the rules and that P dominated I since the primary method of 
decision-making was via perception. The provisions of this research are useful in establishing 
the utmost importance of perceptual biases in the decision-making process. Rodgers and Gago 
(2001) called for the research studies that seek to validate the decision-maker’s cognitive 
processes with the throughput model.   
The accounting professionals often have to deal with a large quantum of complex information 
and, like any other individual, their ability to receive, perceive, analyse and to make a decision 
is limited. Within the framework of throughput model, although all the pathways contribute 
towards decision-making, generally more emphasis is placed on a single pathway. Within all 
the pathways, searches for information, biases and heuristics are made when making a decision. 
However, based on the pathway that dominates, process thinking may lead to the different 
decision choices. Accordingly, this approach might help professionals solve ethical dilemmas 
(such as in situations involving conflict of interests) by determining which pathways are more 
likely to lead to the compliant decision choices and those that lead to the deviant decisions 
(Rodgers and Gago, 2001). 
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Another important implication of the throughput model for managing conflict of interests is 
the concept of parallel cognitive processing. As opposed to the serial processing assumed in 
basic information processing and decision-making, the throughput model assumes parallel 
processing in that there are various simultaneous pathways that lead to a decision (Rodgers and 
Gago, 2001; Rodgers, 2006). In order to understand how conflict of interests lead the auditors 
to avoid the issuance of warning signals to stakeholders, Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo 
(2010) employed throughput model to explain the role of involuntary perceptual biases.  
The usefulness of the throughput model, therefore, is not limited to decision-making in any 
specific field but is applicable to a wide variety of contexts. Its ability to capture decision-
making process at the level of an individual accounting professional is of particular reference 
to this study’s research problem. 
3.4 Linking Social Cognitive Theory and Throughput Model 
There are many convincing reasons to believe that social cognitive theory and throughput 
model complement one another and that their combination can help address this study’s 
research problem in a comprehensive way. Given the complexity of conflict of interests in a 
professional environment, there is a growing trend amongst researchers (e.g., Moore, 
Loewenstein, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2003; Moore and Loewenstein, 2004; Guiral, Rodgers, 
Ruiz and Gonzalo, 2010; Moore, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2010) to use a combination of theories 
for understanding the phenomena regarding conflict of interests. 
According to social cognitive theory, the brain is the most incredible network of information 
processing during decision-making. The theory postulates that the input information (i.e. 
stimulus) is represented in the brain as cognitive elements that are processed to produce a 
certain behavioural outcome (Bandura, 2006; 2008). Similarly, the throughput model is a 
cognitive model that provides a way to decision maker for dealing with the information 
processed through various pathways to a decision (Rodgers, 2006). Thus, it is evident that both 
the social cognitive theory and the throughput model have closely related conceptual 
underpinnings and that there is a logical connection between both.           
One of the limitations of social cognitive theory is that it regards behaviour as an outcome of 
mainly the deliberative efforts and it largely ignores the impact of unconscious thought 
processes (Fishbein and Cappella, 2006; Fishbein, 2008; Conner, 2010). Furthermore, the 
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individual differences and the impact of emotional responses on the behaviour are largely 
ignored. Sutton (1998) provided that although the social cognitive models are meant to predict 
behaviour, they leave much of the variance in behaviour unexplained. As elaborated in the 
previous section, throughput model can overcome the said limitations due to its ability to 
explain the possibility of intentional as well as the unintentional bias in the decision-making 
process.  
Throughput model highlights the central role of perceptions in various pathways to decision-
making. These perceptions are viewed as the sources of unintentional and the intentional bias 
(Rodgers and Gago, 2001). The concept of perceptions, however, is very broad and could range 
from simple cognitive processes (such as recognition of a stimulus) to the complex functions 
(such as thinking, analysing and framing of complicated situations). Social cognitive theory 
can overcome this limitation by providing the specific constructs representing perceptions 
(such as outcome expectancy and perceived difficulty), that are of predominant importance in 
decision-making behaviour (Bandura, 2008). Arguably, the combination of throughput model 
and social cognitive theory tends to offer advantages in terms of better predictive and 
explanatory powers of the resulting models. 
Moreover, while social cognitive theory simply considers the reciprocal interactions of 
environment, cognitive factors and the behaviour; throughput model specifies the possible 
cause and effect directions. For instance, the throughput model provides the dominant 
pathways a decision maker might adopt towards decision-making in the event of conflicting 
interests (i.e. I → J → D, I → P → D, I → P → J →D, P → J → D and P → D). In this way, 
the integration of social cognitive theory and the throughput model allows moving beyond the 
description of ‘what’ to ‘why’ and ‘how’ – this makes relevance to the problem of accounting 
professionals’ deviant behaviour due to conflict of interests.    
Based on the aforementioned arguments, the social cognitive theory and the throughput model 
logically converge into the Stimulus-Organism-Response (S-O-R) Paradigm of behaviour, that 
constitutes the conceptual framework for this research. This paradigm (Holt et al., 2015) locates 
organisms’ cognitive representation of the world (O) in between the stimulus (S) and the 
response (R). It can, therefore, be argued that the combination of social cognitive theory and 
throughput model is the practical depiction of S-O-R paradigm which provides that ‘in the face 
of stimuli, organisms form cognitive representations (i.e. perceptions and judgements) of the 
world and respond through their conduct, actions or behaviour’. 
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With particular reference to this research, the S-O-R paradigm (Figure 3.3) reflects the 
following; 
i. S: Stimulus for an accounting professional derives from the internal and external context for 
managing conflict of interests. Accordingly, the stimulus is represented by the environmental 
factors (as per social cognitive theory) or equivalently the given situation (as per the 
information concept in the throughput model). 
ii. O: In the face of information in a given context (i.e. stimulus), the professionals form 
cognitive representations in terms of the; (i) perceptions towards a situation involving conflict 
of interests and (ii) judgement about the alternative decision choices in a given situation. Since 
the conflict of interests is social in nature (Finn, Chonko and Hunt, 1988; Mills and Bettner, 
1992; Argandona, 2004), the perceptions and judgement are essentially the sociocognitive 
processes.  
iii. R: The response is displayed as decision-making behaviour in reaction to the context-
specific conflict of interests. Broadly, it could either be the behaviour in accordance with the 
primary interest of accounting profession (i.e. compliant decision-making) or the behaviour in 
disagreement with the primary interest (i.e. deviant decision-making). With specific reference 
to the accounting ethics research, Cohen and Bennie (2006) provide that the context does matter 
in ethical decision-making. 
The units of analysis in this study are the accounting professionals. Both the social cognitive 
theory and the throughput model are very well-suited to examine the phenomena at an 
individual’s level. The next section will extend the conceptual framework (i.e. S-O-R 
Paradigm) to develop the theoretical model of this study. 
Organism faces conflict 
between primary and 
secondary interest(s) and 
experiences the cognitive 
processes 
- Perceptions 
- Judgement 
Stimulus 
(Environment) 
- Situations 
involving Conflict 
of Interests (i.e. 
Information)  
Response  
- Compliant 
Behaviour (i.e. 
serving the primary 
interest)  
- Deviant Behaviour 
(i.e. serving the 
secondary interests)  
Figure 3.3: Conceptual Framework (S-O-R Paradigm): Combination of Social Cognitive Theory 
& Throughput Model of Decision-Making 
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3.5 Theoretical Model 
The S-O-R paradigm (Holt et al., 2015) implies that behaviour is an outcome of the cognitive 
processes that emanate in response to the given situation involving conflict of interests. Within 
the bounds of this conceptual framework, the theoretical model will specify the variables (and 
the relationships between these) against each of the components, i.e. stimulus (information), 
the organism (cognitions) and the response (behaviour).     
3.5.1 Stimulus (Information) 
In the light of social cognitive theory, the stimulus can be interpreted in terms of the social 
context, i.e. circumstances that form setting for the process of managing conflict of interests. 
Thus, the stimulus represents the situational or environmental factors that affect cognitive 
processes of an individual which, in turn, influence the resulting behaviour (Bandura, 2008). 
Similarly, according to the throughput model, stimulus exerts its influence on decision-making 
behaviour through the information that is representative of the context for managing conflict 
of interests (Rodgers, 2006).   
Combining the provisions of both the social cognitive theory and the throughput model, it can 
be argued that stimulus or information is characterised by the context comprising of the 
situations involving conflict of interests. These conflicting interests represent the clash of 
accounting profession’s primary interest with the professional’s secondary interest(s). 
3.5.1.1 Primary Interest  
Broadly speaking, the primary interest in the accounting profession is about serving in the best 
interest of the public, including the investors, prospective investors, lending banks, credit 
agencies and government regulators (Oseni, 2011). Pierce (2007) and Clements, Neill and 
Stovall (2012) provide that the primary responsibility of professional accounting firms is to 
protect the public interest by reporting on the fairness of a client’s financial statements. 
Likewise, the Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants provides that compliance with the 
fundamental principles of accounting profession (i.e. integrity, objectivity, professional 
competence and due care, confidentiality and the professional behaviour) constitutes primary 
interest of the accounting profession (IESBA, 2015). 
3.5.1.2 Sources of Secondary Interests  
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A detailed review of the literature (e.g., Allen and Siegel, 2002; Moore, Loewenstein, Tanlu 
and Bazerman, 2003; Moore and Loewenstein, 2004; Beattie, Fearnley and Brandt, 2005; 
Moore, Cain, Loewenstein and Bazerman, 2005; Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2006; 
Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo, 2010; Moore, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2010; Juhari, Mohd-
Sanusi, Rahman and Omar, 2013) and some inspection reports, including the Audit Quality 
Inspection Annual Reports 2011 - 2015 (Financial Reporting Council, 2016) revealed three 
main sources of secondary interests for the accounting professionals. These sources are; (i) the 
misaligned incentives with roots in temptation for gain, (ii) the misaligned incentives with roots 
in fear of loss and (iii) the workplace pressures with roots in fear of loss. 
Furthermore, the Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants recognises various threats (i.e. 
self-interest, self-review, advocacy, familiarity and the intimidation threat) to compliance with 
the fundamental principles of accounting profession. These threats serve as the sources of 
secondary interests for the professionals (IESBA, 2015). The code itself and some studies 
relevant to the conflict of interests (e.g., Beattie and Fearnley, 2002; Juhari, Mohd-Sanusi, 
Rahman and Omar, 2013; Ahmad, 2015) indicate that the root causes underlying these threats 
are, primarily, the misaligned incentives with roots in temptation for gain and/or in fear of loss 
and the workplace pressures with roots in fear of loss.   
3.5.1.3 Conflict of interests: The Conflict between Primary & Secondary Interests 
This study defines conflict of interests as a situation involving a disagreement between the 
accounting profession’s primary interest and the professional’s secondary interest(s) which, 
in turn, leads to the likelihood of deviant behaviour.  
Conflict of interests is said to arise if the accounting professionals have an interest (i.e. 
secondary interest) that might interfere with their primary responsibility to protect the public 
trust (Clements, Neill and Stovall, 2012). Thus, conflict of interests refers to a range of 
scenarios that pose a risk that an individual in question will compromise professional 
judgement (Davis, 1993). Similarly, various threats serve as the sources of secondary interests 
that interfere with the primary interest of the accounting profession and give rise to the conflict 
of interests. In such situations, there is a risk of deviation from compliant behaviour (IESBA, 
2015). 
Therefore, within the bounds of social cognitive theory and throughput model, the stimulus 
represents context-specific information about different conflict of interests. With particular 
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reference to examining the process through which conflict of interests affects accounting 
professionals’ decision-making behaviour, the specific variable formalising the first 
component (i.e. stimulus) of the conceptual framework is ‘conflict of interests’ – the 
independent variable in the theoretical model. 
3.5.2 Organism (Cognitive Processes) 
With reference to managing conflict of interests, the social cognitive theory and the throughput 
model draw attention towards two broad categories of cognitive processes, i.e. the perceptions 
and the judgement. According to the throughput model, perception is about framing a problem 
according to one’s own view of the world. These perceptions introduce biases and shortcut 
strategies in the decision-making process (Rodgers, 2006). Likewise, social cognitive theory 
suggests that the positive outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making and the perceived 
difficulty in making compliant decisions are the two main perceptions of relevance to 
professionals’ behaviour in the face of conflicting interests. Similarly, the theory also asserts 
an indispensable role of the judgement (Bandura, 1986; 2006; 2008). Since the conflict of 
interests is ethical in nature (Finn, Chonko and Hunt, 1988; Mills and Bettner, 1992; 
Argandona, 2004), social cognitive theory and the throughput model suggest considering the 
ethical judgements towards decision-making behaviour. 
Thus, within the bounds of social cognitive theory and throughput model, the cognitive 
processes are characterised by the perceptions and the ethical judgement. With reference to 
examining the process through which conflict of interests affects accounting professionals’ 
decision-making behaviour, the specific variables formalizing the second component (i.e. 
organism – their cognitive processes) of the conceptual framework are the ‘positive outcome 
expectancy of compliant decision-making’, the ‘perceived difficulty in making compliant 
decisions’ and the ‘ethical judgement’ – the intervening variables in the theoretical model. 
3.5.3 Response (Behaviour) 
The response in the face of conflicting interests can be, broadly, categorised into either the 
deviant behaviour or the compliant behaviour. Specifically, the deviant decision represents the 
decision choice that is in nonconformity with the primary interest of accounting profession. 
Likewise, the compliant decision represents the decision choice that is in conformity with the 
primary interest of profession. Since this study’s research problem is about deviant behaviour 
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in the event of conflicting interests, deviant decision-making behaviour is of prime concern. 
Therefore, within the bounds of social cognitive theory and the throughput model, the response 
is characterised by the deviant decision-making behaviour. With particular reference to 
examining the process through which conflict of interests affects accounting professionals’ 
decision-making behaviour, the specific variable formalising the third component (i.e. 
response) of the conceptual framework is the ‘likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour’ 
– the main dependent variable in the theoretical model.  
There are two main reasons to include the ‘likelihood’ of decision-making behaviour (and not 
simply the ‘decision-making behaviour’) as a variable of interest. First, this study views 
conflict of interests through the lens of behavioural risk management and the risk situations 
pose uncertainty in terms of increase or decrease in the likelihood of occurrence (or non-
occurrence) of the intended behaviour, objectives, events, or consequences (see, ISO 
31000:2009). The definition of conflict of interests, as per this study, also focuses on the 
likelihood of deviant behaviour in the situations involving conflict between the primary and 
the secondary interest(s). Secondly, relevant behavioural research (Maddux, Sherer and 
Rogers, 1982; Ajzen, 1991; Parker, Manstead and Stradling, 1995; Terry and O’Leary, 1995; 
Schwarzer and Renner, 2000; Palfai, 2002; Garcia and Mann, 2003; Zebracki and Drotar, 2004; 
Sniehotta, Scholz and Schwarzer, 2005; Baker-Eveleth and Stone, 2008; Brown, Littlewood 
and Vanable, 2013; Cheng and Chu, 2013; Khan, Panatik, Saat and Perveen, 2013) strongly 
asserts that the individual’s perceived likelihood of engaging in a given behaviour (also termed 
the behavioural intention) is the most proximate predictor of their actual behaviour.  
To be further clarified in the subsequent chapters on research methodology and data analysis, 
a complementary analysis of empirical data will also be performed with the ‘likelihood of 
compliant decision-making behaviour’ as the dependent variable in the theoretical model. The 
figures 3.4 and 3.5 present the main and the complementary theoretical models. As evident 
through the figures, the theoretical model of this study is basically the mediation model that is 
meant to explain the process through which the ‘conflict of interests (the independent variable)’ 
exerts its impact on the ‘likelihood of decision-making behaviour (the dependent variable)’ in 
the professional accounting firms. The accounting professionals’ situation-specific cognitive 
processes, including the positive outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making, the 
perceived difficulty in making compliant decisions and the ethical judgement tend to serve as 
the said mediators. 
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Figure 3.4: Main Theoretical Model                                                                                                                                                 
(Note: The different colours are for differentiation and clarity purposes only) 
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3.6 Hypotheses Development 
Hypotheses have been classified into three groups. The first one relates the conflict of interests 
in professional accounting firms to the professionals’ likelihood of deviant decision-making 
behaviour. The second group is about the role of accounting professionals’ positive outcome 
expectancy, their perceived difficulty and the ethical judgements towards their decision-
making behaviour in the events of conflict of interests. Finally, the third group of hypotheses 
is about the role of perceptual biases in the professionals’ deviant decision-making behaviour. 
Statistical control regarding two variables, i.e. occupational self-efficacy and propensity to 
morally disengage will also be discussed in this section. 
While proposing the hypotheses, one of the challenges was to keep into consideration that 
conflict of interests is a broad term and that there could be many sources of such conflicting 
interests. Irrespective of the specific source(s), the literature has used the term ‘conflict of 
interests’ to include all the conflicting interests originating from different sources. Accordingly, 
the hypothesised relationships between conflict of interests due to different threats (i.e. due to 
self-interest threat, that due to intimidation threat, that due to a combination of self-interest and 
self-review threats and the conflict of interests due to a combination of self-interest, 
intimidation, self-review and familiarity threats) and the other variables of this study follow 
the same pattern. Furthermore, the topic of this study is quite novel and the extant literature 
lacks in empirical support to propose the source-specific relationships between conflict of 
interests and other variables in the study. However, as the research on this very topic 
progresses, researchers will be able to hypothesise relationships in accordance with the specific 
sources of conflict of interests.         
3.6.1 First Group of Hypotheses: Conflict of interests & Deviant Decision-
Making Behaviour 
In the events of conflict of interests, deviant behaviour assumes the form of various 
dysfunctional consequences, including the reduction in audit quality, premature signing off 
from audit assignment, considering insufficient sample size, biased sample selection and under-
reporting of the audit hours to avoid budget over-run (Boyd, 2004; Pierce and Sweeney, 2004; 
Davis, DeZoort and Kopp, 2006; Pierce, 2007). Importantly, Lehr, Lehr and Sumarah (2007) 
argued that the individuals always make ethical decisions in relation to their social context. 
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Commercial pressures due to the increased competition in the external audit market are one of 
the most cited sources of conflict of interests in a professional accounting environment. The 
literature provides that these conflicts of interests lead to reduced audit quality (Beattie, Brandt 
and Fearnley, 1999; Beattie and Fearnley, 2002; Boyd, 2004; McMillan, 2004; Reinstein and 
McMillan, 2004; Favere-Marchesi and Emby, 2005; Young, 2005; Pierce, 2007; Daugherty, 
Dickins, Hatfield and Higgs, 2012). Similarly, conflict of interests due to the higher fees for 
non-audit services (Craswell, Stokes and Laughton, 2002; Frankel, Johnson and Nelson, 2002; 
Kinney, Palmrose and Scholz, 2004; Ruddock, Taylor and Taylor, 2004) is found to result in 
the audit-quality threatening behaviours. Furthermore, the conflict of interests due to time 
pressure (Dirsmith and Covaleski, 1985; McNair, 1991; Malone and Roberts, 1996; Willett and 
Page, 1996; Anderson-Gough, Grey and Robson, 2001; Sikka, 2004) and obedience pressure 
(Davis, DeZoort and Kopp, 2006) are also argued to lead to the dysfunctional practices in 
professional accounting firms. 
Therefore, the extant literature regarding conflict of interests in accounting profession strongly 
suggests that conflicting interests tend to increase the likelihood of deviant decision-making 
behaviour. Accordingly, the following hypotheses have been proposed for the relationship 
between conflict of interests and the likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour; 
H1.1/1: Conflict of interests due to self-interest threat in professional accounting firms is 
positively related to the professionals’ likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour. 
H1.2/1: Conflict of interests due to intimidation threat in professional accounting firms is 
positively related to the professionals’ likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour. 
H1.3/1: Conflict of interests due to a combination of self-interest and self-review threats in 
professional accounting firms is positively related to the professionals’ likelihood of deviant 
decision-making behaviour. 
H1.4/1: Conflict of interests due to a combination of self-interest, intimidation, self-review and 
familiarity threats in professional accounting firms is positively related to the professionals’ 
likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour. 
Thus, the first group of hypotheses against this study’s first research question implies that in 
situations involving conflict of interests, the accounting professionals will have a high 
likelihood of engaging in deviant decision-making behaviour. 
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3.6.2 Second Group of Hypotheses: Role of Accounting Professionals’ 
Cognitive Processes 
This group of hypotheses is further divided into three subgroups corresponding to the three 
subgroups of the second group of research questions about the role of accounting professionals’ 
cognitive processes (i.e. the positive outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making, their 
perceived difficulty in making compliant decisions and their ethical judgement) towards 
decision-making behaviour in the events of conflict of interests.  
3.6.2.1 Relationship of Conflict of interests with Cognitive Processes 
This subsection includes hypotheses against the first subgroup of the second group of research 
questions. 
1. Conflict of Interests & Positive Outcome Expectancy  
As per the social cognitive theory, outcome expectancy is about the value an individual ascribes 
to a given outcome and incentives (Eldredge et al., 2011). Specifically, positive outcome 
expectancy represents the expectation that the positive outcomes of performing a given 
behaviour will outweigh its negative outcomes (Sniehotta, Scholz and Schwarzer, 2005). 
The reason to include positive outcome expectancy as a cognitive process of concern draws on 
literature establishing the significance of outcome expectancies in case of the context-specific 
behaviour (e.g., Maddux, Sherer and Rogers, 1982; Parker, Manstead and Stradling, 1995; 
Terry and O’Leary, 1995; Schwarzer and Renner, 2000; Palfai, 2002; Garcia and Mann, 2003; 
Zebracki and Drotar, 2004; Sniehotta, Schwarzer, Scholz and Schüz, 2005; Baker-Eveleth and 
Stone, 2008; Brown, Littlewood and Vanable, 2013; Cheng and Chu, 2013). Furthermore, as 
detailed in the previous sections, the relationship directed from Information (I) to the 
Perceptions (P) in the throughput model (Rodgers, 1997; 2006; 2009; Rodgers and Gago, 2001; 
2006; Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo, 2010) also provide strong reason to link conflict of 
interests (representing I) to the positive outcome expectancy (representing P). 
Since the perceptions, including the positive outcome expectancies, are subjective (Cvejic, 
Lloyd and Vollmer-Conna, 2016), different individuals could perceive the same situation 
differently. Accordingly, the set of hypotheses relating conflict of interests to the positive 
outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making does not specify any sign.  
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H1a/2.1: Conflict of interests due to self-interest threat in professional accounting firms is 
related to the professionals’ positive outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making. 
H1b/2.1: Conflict of interests due to intimidation threat in professional accounting firms is 
related to the professionals’ positive outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making.  
H1c/2.1: Conflict of interests due to a combination of self-interest and self-review threats in 
professional accounting firms is related to the professionals’ positive outcome expectancy of 
compliant decision-making. 
H1d/2.1: Conflict of interests due to a combination of self-interest, intimidation, self-review and 
familiarity threats in professional accounting firms is related to the professionals’ positive 
outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making. 
The hypothesised relationship between conflict of interests and the positive outcome 
expectancy implies that in the events of conflicting interests, the accounting professionals tend 
to form perceptions about the positive versus the negative outcomes of adopting a compliant 
decision-making behaviour. 
2. Conflict of interests & Perceived Difficulty 
Perceived self-efficacy is about the belief in one’s ability to accomplish a certain task, using 
the available resources. The self-efficacy beliefs are particularly important in the difficult or 
new situations (Sniehotta, Scholz and Schwarzer, 2005). When measured across the magnitude 
(i.e. the level of difficulty of the task), self-efficacy beliefs are conceptualised as the perceived 
difficulty. Particularly, self-efficacy in this sense reflects the individuals’ belief about the 
difficulty they can overcome, when asked to perform a certain behaviour (Bandura, 2006) or 
similarly, the level of difficulty an individual perceives is required to perform a given task (van 
der Bijl and Shortridge-Baggett, 2001).   
Literature asserting the significance of self-efficacy, in general and of the perceived difficulty, 
in particular, in case of the context-specific behaviours (e.g., Maddux, Sherer and Rogers, 
1982; Parker, Manstead and Stradling, 1995; Terry and O’Leary, 1995; Schwarzer and Renner, 
2000; Palfai, 2002; Garcia and Mann, 2003; Zebracki and Drotar, 2004; Sniehotta, Schwarzer, 
Scholz and Schüz, 2005; Baker-Eveleth and Stone, 2008; Brown, Littlewood and Vanable, 
2013; Cheng and Chu, 2013) highlights the importance of perceived difficulty as a cognitive 
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process of concern. Furthermore, as discussed in the previous sections, the relationship directed 
from Information (I) to the Perceptions (P) in the throughput model of decision-making 
(Rodgers, 1997; 2006; 2009; Rodgers and Gago, 2001; 2006; Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz and 
Gonzalo, 2010) also suggests linking conflict of interests (representing I) to the perceived 
difficulty (representing P).    
Since the perceptions, including the perceived difficulty, are subjective (Cvejic, Lloyd and 
Vollmer-Conna, 2016), two or more individuals could perceive the same situation differently. 
Therefore, the set of hypotheses relating conflict of interests to the perceived difficulty in 
making a compliant decision does not specify any sign. 
H2a/2.1: Conflict of interests due to self-interest threat in professional accounting firms is 
related to the professionals’ perceived difficulty in making a compliant decision. 
H2b/2.1: Conflict of interests due to intimidation threat in professional accounting firms is 
related to the professionals’ perceived difficulty in making a compliant decision.  
H2c/2.1: Conflict of interests due to a combination of self-interest and self-review threats in 
professional accounting firms is related to the professionals’ perceived difficulty in making a 
compliant decision. 
H2d/2.1: Conflict of interests due to a combination of self-interest, intimidation, self-review and 
familiarity threats in professional accounting firms is related to the professionals’ perceived 
difficulty in making a compliant decision. 
The hypothesised relationship between conflict of interests and the perceived difficulty implies 
that in the event of conflicting interests, the accounting professionals tend to form perceptions 
about the level of difficulty in making a desired compliant decision. 
3. Conflict of interests & Ethical Judgement 
As per the throughput model, the judgement implies subjective and deliberate information 
processing strategies (Rodgers and Gago, 2001). Within the bounds of social cognitive theory, 
the moral or ethical judgement is a self-regulatory mechanism (Bandura, 2001) which 
represents the judgement on what course of action is morally justifiable. Thus, judgement is 
about what ought to be done in a given situation (Cohen and Bennie, 2006). One of the principal 
assumptions that underlies auditing function and, thus, the professional judgement is that the 
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auditors will act ethically, especially in relation to their independence (Ponemon, 1993). 
According to Cohen and Bennie (2006), the ethical judgement in a professional accounting 
environment is about making a judgement on what constitutes the ethically correct course of 
action. When formulating a judgement, accounting professionals respond to the social factors 
and to the self-interest (Cohen and Bennie, 2006).  
The reason to include ethical judgement as a cognitive process of concern draws on literature 
establishing the significance of ethical judgements in the case of context-specific behaviours 
(e.g., Ponemon, 1993; Armstrong, Ketz and Owsen, 2003; Keim and Grant, 2003; Cohen and 
Bennie, 2006). Furthermore, as detailed in the previous sections, the relationship directed from 
Information (I) to the Judgement (J) in the throughput model (Rodgers, 1997; 2006; 2009; 
Rodgers and Gago, 2001; 2006; Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo, 2010) also provides a 
strong reason for linking conflict of interests (representing I) to the ethical judgement 
(representing J). Importantly, Lehr, Lehr and Sumarah (2007) argued that individuals always 
form ethical judgements in relation to their social context. 
During the formation of ethical judgement, information is processed in accordance with the 
decision rules as practised in one’s profession. These decision rules are encoded in the 
judgement stage where these rules provide guidance on processing (such as sorting, arranging, 
ranking and rating) the information (Rodgers and Gago, 2001). Usually, prior to making a 
decision, an individual encodes information and develops a representation for the problem 
(Johnson-Laird, 1980). The relationship between conflict of interests and ethical judgement is 
also evident in the research by Juhari, Mohd-Sanusi, Rahman and Omar (2013) who examined 
the impact of independence threats (including the self-interest, familiarity and self-review) on 
ethical judgements of the auditors – they found a significant relationship between these 
variables. 
The aforementioned arguments support the relationship between the conflict of interests and 
ethical judgement. Since the judgement implies subjective and deliberate information 
processing strategies (Rodgers and Gago, 2001), different individuals could form different 
judgements in the same ethical situation. Accordingly, the set of hypotheses relating conflict 
of interests to ethical judgement does not specify any sign. 
H3a/2.1: Conflict of interests due to self-interest threat in professional accounting firms is 
related to the professionals’ ethical judgement.  
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H3b/2.1: Conflict of interests due to intimidation threat in professional accounting firms is 
related to the professionals’ ethical judgement.  
H3c/2.1: Conflict of interests due to a combination of self-interest and self-review threats in 
professional accounting firms is related to the professionals’ ethical judgement. 
H3d/2.1: Conflict of interests due to a combination of self-interest, intimidation, self-review and 
familiarity threats in professional accounting firms is related to the professionals’ ethical 
judgement. 
The hypothesised relationship between the conflict of interests and ethical judgement implies 
that in the events of conflicting interests, the accounting professionals tend to form judgements 
about the ethicality of compliant decision choices. 
3.6.2.2 Relationship of Cognitive Processes with Deviant Decision-Making Behaviour 
This subsection includes hypotheses against the second subgroup of the second group of 
research questions. 
1. Positive Outcome Expectancy & Deviant Decision-Making Behaviour 
Both the social cognitive theory (Bandura, 2006; 2008) and the throughput model (Rodgers 
and Gago, 2001; 2006; Rodgers, 2006; 2009; Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo, 2010) 
provide a logical connection between the professionals’ positive outcome expectancy of 
compliant decision-making and their likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour. 
Sniehotta, Scholz and Schwarzer (2005) argued that if the positive outcome expectancies 
outweigh the negative outcome expectancies, the likelihood of one’s intention to adopt the 
desired behaviour increases. Similarly, Smith, Simpson and Huang (2007) provide that if the 
perceived negative outcome expectancies exceed the positive outcome expectancies of 
engaging in a specific behaviour, the likelihood of engaging in that behaviour decreases. Many 
other studies (e.g., Maddux, Sherer and Rogers, 1982; Parker, Manstead and Stradling, 1995; 
Terry and O’Leary, 1995; Schwarzer and Renner, 2000; Palfai, 2002; Garcia and Mann, 2003; 
Zebracki and Drotar, 2004; Sniehotta, Schwarzer, Scholz and Schüz, 2005; Baker-Eveleth and 
Stone, 2008; Brown, Littlewood and Vanable, 2013; Cheng and Chu, 2013) also establish 
positive relationship between the positive outcome expectancy of a task and its execution, in a 
wide variety of contexts. 
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Likewise, the relationship directed from the Perceptions (P) to the Decision (D) in the 
throughput model (Rodgers, 1997; 2006; 2009; Rodgers and Gago, 2001; 2006; Guiral, 
Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo, 2010) suggests that the professionals’ positive outcome 
expectancy (representing P) is linked to their likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour 
(representing D). Overall, the literature suggests that if the perceived positive outcomes of 
performing compliant behaviour exceed the negative outcomes of performing it, the likelihood 
of adopting compliant behaviour increases. Alternatively, if the perceived positive outcomes 
of performing a compliant behaviour exceed the negative outcomes of performing it, the 
likelihood of adopting deviant behaviour will decrease. Accordingly, the set of hypotheses 
relating the positive outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making to the likelihood of 
deviant decision-making behaviour is as follows; 
H1a/2.2: In the events of conflict of interests due to self-interest threat in professional accounting 
firms, the professionals’ positive outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making is 
negatively related to their likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour. 
H1b/2.2: In the events of conflict of interests due to intimidation threat in professional 
accounting firms, the professionals’ positive outcome expectancy of compliant decision-
making is negatively related to their likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour.  
H1c/2.2: In the events of conflict of interests due to a combination of self-interest and self-review 
threats in professional accounting firms, the professionals’ positive outcome expectancy of 
compliant decision-making is negatively related to their likelihood of deviant decision-making 
behaviour. 
H1d/2.2: In the events of conflict of interests due to a combination of self-interest, intimidation, 
self-review and familiarity threats in professional accounting firms, the professionals’ positive 
outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making is negatively related to their likelihood of 
deviant decision-making behaviour. 
The hypothesised relationship suggests that in the events of conflicting interests, the likelihood 
of deviant decision-making behaviour is high in the case of accounting professionals who tend 
to perceive the negative outcomes of performing compliant decision to outweigh its positive 
outcomes. Similarly, the likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour is low in case of the 
professionals who tend to perceive the positive outcomes of performing compliant decision to 
outweigh its negative outcomes.  
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2. Perceived Difficulty & Deviant Decision-Making Behaviour 
The throughput model of decision-making (Rodgers and Gago, 2001; 2006; Rodgers, 2006; 
2009; Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo, 2010) provides a logical connection between the 
accounting professionals’ perceived difficulty in making compliant decisions and their 
likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour. For instance, the path leading from the 
Perceptions (P) to the Decision (D) provides that the perceived difficulty (representing P) has 
an impact on the deviant decision-making behaviour (representing D). 
Similarly, the social cognitive theory (Bandura, 2006; 2008) also suggests a relationship 
between the accounting professionals’ perceived difficulty in making a compliant decision and 
their likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour. According to Bandura (2006), the lower 
the perceived difficulty in performing given task, the easier it is to perform it. Extant literature 
(e.g., Parker, Manstead and Stradling, 1995; Terry and O’Leary, 1995; Schwarzer and Renner, 
2000; Palfai, 2002; Garcia and Mann, 2003; Zebracki and Drotar, 2004; Sniehotta, Schwarzer, 
Scholz and Schüz, 2005; Baker-eveleth and Stone, 2008; Brown, Littlewood and Vanable, 
2013; Cheng and Chu, 2013) also suggests negative relationship between the perceived 
difficulty in performing a behaviour and its adoption, in a wide variety of contexts.  
Thus, the literature suggests that if the perceived difficulty in making a compliant decision is 
low, the likelihood of adopting the compliant behaviour will increase. Alternatively, if the 
perceived difficulty in making a compliant decision is high, the likelihood of adopting the 
deviant behaviour will increase. Accordingly, the set of hypotheses relating the perceived 
difficulty in making compliant decisions to the likelihood of deviant decision-making 
behaviour is as follows; 
H2a/2.2: In the events of conflict of interests due to self-interest threat in professional accounting 
firms, the professionals’ perceived difficulty in making a compliant decision is positively 
related to their likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour. 
H2b/2.2: In the events of conflict of interests due to intimidation threat in professional 
accounting firms, the professionals’ perceived difficulty in making a compliant decision is 
positively related to their likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour.  
H2c/2.2: In the events of conflict of interests due to a combination of self-interest and self-review 
threats in professional accounting firms, the professionals’ perceived difficulty in making a 
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compliant decision is positively related to their likelihood of deviant decision-making 
behaviour. 
H2d/2.2: In the events of conflict of interests due to a combination of self-interest, intimidation, 
self-review and familiarity threats in professional accounting firms, the professionals’ 
perceived difficulty in making a compliant decision is positively related to their likelihood of 
deviant decision-making behaviour. 
The hypothesised relationship implies that in the events of conflicting interests, the likelihood 
of deviant decision-making behaviour is high in the case of accounting professionals who tend 
to perceive high difficulty in performing the given compliant decision. Similarly, the likelihood 
of deviant decision-making behaviour is low in case of the professionals who tend to perceive 
less difficulty in performing the relevant compliant decision.  
3. Ethical Judgement & Deviant Decision-Making Behaviour 
The relationship between ethical judgement and decision-making behaviour in the accounting 
ethics research is mostly found in connection with the ‘contingent factors model’ proposed by 
Jones (1991). This model integrates the earlier models (including Ferrell and Gresham, 1985; 
Hunt and Vitell, 1986; Rest, 1986: Trevino, 1986; Dubinsky and Loken, 1989) of ethical 
decision-making (Cohen and Bennie, 2006). The contingent factors model indicates a positive 
relationship between the ethical judgement and the ethical (or compliant) decision-making. 
Similarly, extant literature (e.g., Trevino and Youngblood, 1990; Ponemon, 1992; Adams, 
Tashchian and Shore, 2001; Sullivan, 2004; Sauers, Ballantine and Kennedy, 2006) also 
suggests a positive relationship between ethical judgement and the compliant decision-making 
behaviour. The throughput model (Rodgers, 1997; 2006; 2009; Rodgers and Gago, 2001; 2006; 
Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo, 2010) also highlights the relationship directed from ethical 
judgement (representing J) to the likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour 
(representing D). 
Therefore, the literature suggests that if the accounting professionals form a judgement that 
compliant decision-making is the most ethical course of action, the likelihood of adopting 
compliant behaviour will increase. Alternatively, the professionals’ judgement that compliant 
decision-making represents the most ethical course of action decreases the likelihood of 
adopting deviant behaviour. Accordingly, a set of hypotheses relating ethical judgement to the 
likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour is as follows; 
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H3a/2.2: In the events of conflict of interests due to self-interest threat in professional accounting 
firms, the professionals’ ethical judgement is negatively related to their likelihood of deviant 
decision-making behaviour. 
H3b/2.2: In the events of conflict of interests due to intimidation threat in professional 
accounting firms, the professionals’ ethical judgement is negatively related to their likelihood 
of deviant decision-making behaviour.  
H3c/2.2: In the events of conflict of interests due to a combination of self-interest and self-review 
threats in professional accounting firms, the professionals’ ethical judgement is negatively 
related to their likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour. 
H3d/2.2: In the events of conflict of interests due to a combination of self-interest, intimidation, 
self-review and familiarity threats in professional accounting firms, the professionals’ ethical 
judgement is negatively related to their likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour. 
The hypothesised relationship implies that in the event of conflicting interests, the likelihood 
of deviant decision-making behaviour is low in the case of accounting professionals who tend 
to form a judgement that compliant decision choice is the most ethical course of action (i.e. the 
most ethical judgement). Similarly, the likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour is 
high in case of the professionals who tend to form a judgement that compliant decision choice 
is not the most ethical course of action or that deviant decision choice is the most ethical (i.e. 
the least ethical judgement). 
3.6.2.3 Interrelationships of Cognitive Processes 
This subsection includes hypotheses against the third subgroup of the second group of research 
questions. 
1. Positive Outcome Expectancy & Perceived Difficulty 
The proposed hypotheses for the relationship between the positive outcome expectancy of 
compliant decision-making and the perceived difficulty in making compliant decisions draws 
on literature establishing the impact of outcome expectancies on the self-efficacy. This is 
because, perceived difficulty is one of the dimensions or conceptualisations of self-efficacy, 
i.e. the one measured across the magnitude (van der Bijl and Shortridge-Baggett, 2001; 
Bandura, 2006). 
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Maddux, Sherer and Rogers (1982) examined the relationship between outcome expectancy 
and the self-efficacy. They found that the manipulations in outcome expectancy affected the 
self-efficacy beliefs. Specifically, the participants who perceived more favourable outcomes of 
performing the given behaviour (i.e. positive outcome expectancy) expressed more confidence 
and less perceived difficulty in performing that behaviour. Similarly, other studies (e.g., 
Borkovec, 1978; Teasdale, 1978; Kazdin, 1978; 1982; 1985; Corcoran, 1991; 1995; Eastman 
and Marzillier, 1984; Sniehotta, Scholz and Schwarzer, 2005; Lin, Ko and Wu, 2008; Williams, 
2010) also suggest that the positive outcome expectancy leads to the less perceived difficulty 
in performing the desired behaviour. Similarly, Wongpinunwatana and Panchoo (2014) 
conducted a study in the professional accounting context and found that the participants’ 
positive outcome expectancy of performing a given behaviour resulted in the increased 
confidence (i.e. the less perceived difficulty) to perform that behaviour.  
Thus, the literature from different disciplines suggests that the professionals’ perception that 
the overall positive outcomes of compliant decision-making will outweigh its overall negative 
outcomes (i.e. positive outcome expectancy) is expected to lead to the low perceived difficulty 
in making compliant decisions. Alternatively, the professionals’ perception that the overall 
negative outcomes of compliant decision-making will outweigh its overall positive outcomes 
(i.e. negative outcome expectancy) is expected to lead to the high perceived difficulty in 
making compliant decisions. Accordingly, following hypotheses have been proposed for the 
relationship between the positive outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making and the 
perceived difficulty in making a compliant decision; 
H1a/2.3: In the events of conflict of interests due to self-interest threat in professional accounting 
firms, the professionals’ positive outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making is 
negatively related to their perceived difficulty in making a compliant decision. 
H1b/2.3: In the events of conflict of interests due to intimidation threat in professional 
accounting firms, the professionals’ positive outcome expectancy of compliant decision-
making is negatively related to their perceived difficulty in making a compliant decision.  
H1c/2.3: In the events of conflict of interests due to a combination of self-interest and self-review 
threats in professional accounting firms, the professionals’ positive outcome expectancy of 
compliant decision-making is negatively related to their perceived difficulty in making a 
compliant decision. 
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H1d/2.3: In the events of conflict of interests due to a combination of self-interest, intimidation, 
self-review and familiarity threats in professional accounting firms, the professionals’ positive 
outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making is negatively related to their perceived 
difficulty in making a compliant decision. 
The hypothesised relationship implies that the lower perceived difficulty in making compliant 
decisions is expected in the case of the accounting professionals who expect that compliant 
decision-making has more positive than the negative outcomes. Similarly, higher perceived 
difficulty in making compliant decisions is expected in the case of the professionals who expect 
that compliant decision-making has less positive than the negative outcomes.  
2. Positive Outcome Expectancy & Ethical Judgement 
The relationship between the positive outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making and 
ethical judgement is found in connection with the literature suggesting positive relationship 
between the positive outcome expectancy and the likelihood of compliant or ethical decision-
making  (Maddux, Sherer and Rogers, 1982; Parker, Manstead and Stradling, 1995; Terry and 
O’Leary, 1995; Schwarzer and Renner, 2000; Palfai, 2002; Garcia and Mann, 2003; Zebracki 
and Drotar, 2004; Sniehotta, Schwarzer, Scholz and Schüz, 2005; Smith, Simpson and Huang, 
2007; Baker-eveleth and Stone, 2008; Brown, Littlewood and Vanable, 2013; Cheng and Chu, 
2013). With specific reference to the conflict of interests, Charles (2011) and Agle, Hart, 
Thompson and Hendricks (2014) suggest the positive impact of professional’s positive 
outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making on the formation of ethical judgements. 
Furthermore, the relationship path from the Perceptions (P) to the Judgement (J) in the 
throughput model (Rodgers, 1997; 2006; 2009; Rodgers and Gago, 2001; 2006; Guiral, 
Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo, 2010) also provides a reason to believe that the positive outcome 
expectancy (representing P) has an effect on the ethical judgement (representing J). Overall, 
the literature suggests that if the perceived positive outcomes of performing compliant 
behaviour exceed the negative outcomes of performing it, highly ethical judgements are 
expected to be formed. Alternatively, if the perceived negative outcomes of performing 
compliant behaviour exceed the positive outcomes of performing it, less ethical judgements are 
expected to be formed. Accordingly, the set of hypotheses relating positive outcome 
expectancy of compliant decision-making to the ethical judgement is as follows; 
H2a/2.3: In the events of conflict of interests due to self-interest threat in professional accounting 
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firms, the professionals’ positive outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making is 
positively related to their ethical judgement. 
H2b/2.3: In the events of conflict of interests due to intimidation threat in professional 
accounting firms, the professionals’ positive outcome expectancy of compliant decision-
making is positively related to their ethical judgement. 
H2c/2.3: In the events of conflict of interests due to a combination of self-interest and self-review 
threats in professional accounting firms, the professionals’ positive outcome expectancy of 
compliant decision-making is positively related to their ethical judgement. 
H2d/2.3: In the events of conflict of interests due to a combination of self-interest, intimidation, 
self-review and familiarity threats in professional accounting firms, the professionals’ positive 
outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making is positively related to their ethical 
judgement. 
The hypothesised relationship implies that in the event of conflicting interests, the accounting 
professionals will form highly ethical judgements if they expect the positive outcomes of 
compliant decision-making to outweigh its negative outcomes. Similarly, the accounting 
professionals will form less ethical judgements if they expect the negative outcomes of 
compliant decision-making to outweigh its positive outcomes.  
3. Perceived Difficulty & Ethical Judgement 
The relationship between the perceived difficulty in making compliant decisions and the ethical 
judgement is found in conjunction with the literature suggesting negative relationship between 
the perceived difficulty and the likelihood of compliant or ethical decision-making (e.g., 
Maddux, Sherer and Rogers, 1982; Parker, Manstead and Stradling, 1995; Terry and O’Leary, 
1995; Schwarzer and Renner, 2000; Palfai, 2002; Garcia and Mann, 2003; Zebracki and Drotar, 
2004; Sniehotta, Schwarzer, Scholz and Schüz, 2005; Bandura, 2006; Baker-eveleth and Stone, 
2008; Brown, Littlewood and Vanable, 2013; Cheng and Chu, 2013). With specific reference 
to the conflict of interests, research by Iskandar and Sanusi (2011) and Afifah, Sari, Anugerah 
and Sanusi (2015) indicate the negative impact of professional’s perceived difficulty in making 
a compliant decision on the formation of ethical judgements. 
Furthermore, the relationship path from the Perceptions (P) to the Judgement (J) in the 
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throughput model (Rodgers, 1997; 2006; 2009; Rodgers and Gago, 2001; 2006; Guiral, 
Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo, 2010) also provides a reason to believe that the perceived 
difficulty in making compliant decisions (representing P) has an effect on the ethical judgement 
(representing J). Literature suggests that if the perceived difficulty in making a compliant 
decision is high, less ethical judgements are expected to be formed. Alternatively, if the 
perceived difficulty in making a compliant decision is low, highly ethical judgements are 
expected to be formed. Accordingly, the set of hypotheses relating the perceived difficulty in 
making compliant decisions to the ethical judgement is as follows; 
H3a/2.3: In the events of conflict of interests due to self-interest threat in professional accounting 
firms, the professionals’ perceived difficulty in making a compliant decision is negatively 
related to their ethical judgement. 
H3b/2.3: In the events of conflict of interests due to intimidation threat in professional 
accounting firms, the professionals’ perceived difficulty in making a compliant decision is 
negatively related to their ethical judgement. 
H3c/2.3: In the events of conflict of interests due to a combination of self-interest and self-review 
threats in professional accounting firms, the professionals’ perceived difficulty in making a 
compliant decision is negatively related to their ethical judgement. 
H3d/2.3: In the events of conflict of interests due to a combination of self-interest, intimidation, 
self-review and familiarity threats in professional accounting firms, the professionals’ 
perceived difficulty in making a compliant decision is negatively related to their ethical 
judgement. 
The hypothesised relationship implies that in the event of conflicting interests, the accounting 
professionals will form highly ethical judgements if they perceive that the compliant decisions 
are easy to undertake. Similarly, the accounting professionals will form less ethical judgements 
if they perceive that the compliant decisions are difficult to undertake. 
3.6.3 Third Group of Hypotheses: Biasing Role of the Conflict of interests 
This group of hypotheses draws heavily on the research asserting an indispensable role of the 
perceptual biases towards decision-making in a professional accounting environment. With 
particular reference to the role of bias in decision-making involving conflict of interests, the 
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literature (Moore, Loewenstein, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2003; Moore and Loewenstein, 2004; 
Moore, Cain, Loewenstein and Bazerman, 2005; Tyler, 2005; Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu and 
Bazerman, 2006) asserts that the presence of some structural arrangements in professional 
accounting firms serves as the potential threats to the independence of auditors. These 
arrangements include hiring and firing of auditors by clients, auditors taking jobs with clients 
and simultaneous provision of audit and non-audit services. In the presence of such structural 
arrangements, auditors might become morally seduced to serving their self-interest – they 
experience cognitive barriers such as the unconscious bias. According to Moore, Tanlu and 
Bazerman (2010), conflict of interests results in unconscious bias and may also lead an 
accounting professional to commit intentional corruption, due to the direct impact of the 
perceptions on decision-making. 
Similarly, Chugh, Banaji and Bazerman (2005) argued that the ethical decisions are biased by 
the psychological barriers on individuals’ mind that lead them to assume that they are not 
susceptible to conflict of interests. Such barriers increase the risk that otherwise visible conflict 
of interests will not be recognised by an individual. Furthermore, the throughput model 
suggests that the positive outcome expectancy and the perceived difficulty (denoting the 
perceptions, P) serve as the sources of bias in different decision pathways. The perceptions as 
a direct driver of decision (i.e. the P → D path) introduce intentional bias in the decision-
making. The other paths involving the role of perceptions (i.e. the P → J → D, I → P → D, P 
→ I → J → D and I → P → J → D) introduce unintentional bias in the decision-making process. 
The significance of such perceptions implies that the professionals tend to disregard the 
adoption of the analytical pathway to decision (i.e. I → J → D) – the one that professional 
accounting standards require (Rodgers, 2009; Rodgers and Gago, 2006; Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz 
and Gonzalo, 2010). 
Based on the aforementioned studies, following hypotheses have been proposed to signify the 
biasing role of conflict of interests; 
H1.1/3: In the events of conflict of interests due to self-interest threat in professional accounting 
firms, the professionals’ deviant decision-making behaviour will be prone to bias due to the 
interference of their perceptions with the analytical pathway to deviant decision.  
H1.2/3: In the events of conflict of interests due to intimidation threat in professional accounting 
firms, the professionals’ deviant decision-making behaviour will be prone to bias due to the 
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interference of their perceptions with the analytical pathway to deviant decision.   
H1.3/3: In the events of conflict of interests due to a combination of self-interest and self-review 
threats in professional accounting firms, the professionals’ deviant decision-making behaviour 
will be prone to bias due to the interference of their perceptions with the analytical pathway to 
deviant decision.   
H1.4/3: In the events of conflict of interests due to a combination of self-interest, intimidation, 
self-review and familiarity threats in professional accounting firms, the professionals’ deviant 
decision-making behaviour will be prone to bias due to the interference of their perceptions 
with the analytical pathway to deviant decision.  
The hypothesised role of the bias due to accounting professionals’ perceptions (i.e. positive 
outcome expectancy and/or perceived difficulty) implies that decision-making is expected to 
be prone to bias due to the likely interference of the said perceptions with the analytical 
pathway to deviant decision. The said interference is about the significant role of positive 
outcome expectancy and/or the perceived difficulty in driving the ethical judgements and/or 
the decisions. Based on the suggestions of Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo (2010), it can be 
argued that the accounting professionals’ perceptual biases make them disregard the analytical 
pathway to decision-making and, resultantly, their likelihood of deviant behaviour increases.  
3.6.4 Control Variables 
Occupational self-efficacy (OSE) and propensity to morally disengage (PMD) are the 
dispositional cognitive processes that have been included as control variables in the tested 
model. 
3.6.4.1 Occupational Self-Efficacy & Deviant Decision-Making Behaviour 
This research considers the professionals’ compliant decision-making behaviour as the desired 
one and according to Stajkovic and Luthans (1998), individuals with high self-efficacy exert 
more effort to perform the desired behaviour. The extant literature suggests that an individual’s 
general occupational self-efficacy is positively related to the ethical behaviour and negatively 
to the unethical or deviant decision-making behaviour (Palmer, 2013). Specifically, a number 
of studies provide that the individuals high in their dispositional trait of occupational self-
efficacy tend to perform the ethical behaviour, in a wide variety of contexts (Chen, Gully and 
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Eden, 2001; MacNab and Worthley, 2008; Palmer, 2013; Agle, Hart, Thompson and 
Hendricks, 2014). With particular reference to the professional accounting firms, Iskandar and 
Sanusi (2011) and Afifah, Sari, Anugerah and Sanusi (2015) suggest the negative effect of 
professional’s occupational self-efficacy on the adoption of unethical behaviour. 
Therefore, a negative relationship is expected between the professionals’ occupational self-
efficacy and their likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour. This implies that the high 
occupational self-efficacy is expected to lead to the lower likelihood of deviant decision-
making behaviour. Accordingly, the professionals’ occupational self-efficacy has been 
statistically controlled by including it in the theoretical model.  
3.6.4.2 Propensity to Morally Disengage & Deviant Decision-Making Behaviour 
The extant literature provides that an individual’s propensity to morally disengage is negatively 
related to the ethical behaviour and positively to the unethical or deviant decision-making 
behaviour (Moore et al., 2012). Many studies provide that the individuals high in their 
dispositional trait of propensity to morally disengage adopt unethical behaviour, in a wide 
variety of contexts (Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara and Pastorelli, 1996; Bandura, 1999; 2002; 
Bandura, Caprara and Zsolnai, 2000; Moore, 2007; Moore et al., 2012). With particular 
reference to the ethics of professional scepticism in public accounting, Cabrera-Frias (2012) 
asserted the positive impact of professional’s propensity to morally disengage on the adoption 
of unethical behaviour. 
Therefore, a positive relationship is expected between the professionals’ propensity to morally 
disengage and their likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour. This implies that the high 
propensity to morally disengage is expected to lead to a higher likelihood of deviant decision-
making behaviour. Accordingly, for all the categories of conflicting interests, the accounting 
professionals’ propensity to morally disengage has been statistically controlled by including it 
in the theoretical model.  
3.7 Summary 
This chapter developed the theoretical model in an attempt to fill the gap identified through 
detailed analysis of literature in the previous chapter. The said model drew on the integration 
of social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1986) with the throughput model of decision-making 
(Rodgers, 1997). The second section of chapter detailed the social cognitive theory, followed 
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by an explanation of the throughput model in the third section. The fourth section included a 
conceptual framework that justified the link between the social cognitive theory and the 
throughput model. The study’s theoretical model was presented in the fifth section, followed 
by hypotheses development in the sixth section.  
The next chapter will discuss the research paradigm, the methodology and the methods that 
have been adopted for seeking answers to this study’s research questions.  
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH PARADIGM, METHODOLOGY 
AND METHODS 
“I keep six honest serving-men (they taught me all I know); their names are what and why 
and when and how and where and who” 
Rudyard Kipling 
4.1 Introduction 
The research paradigm, methodology and methods are meant to address a wide range of what, 
why, when, how, where and who questions, including what philosophical assumptions underlie 
the research? why should the study be conducted in a certain way? when did the research take 
place? how did it happen? where did it take place? and who was involved? (Ellis and Levy, 
2008). This chapter is meant to discuss and justify the paradigm underpinning this study, the 
methodology adopted for seeking answers to the study’s research questions and the specific 
methods used for data collection and analysis. The second section on research paradigms 
includes discussions about the approaches to research, the postpositivism paradigm and the 
assumptions and rationale for post-positivist perspective towards this study. The third section 
on research methodology discusses the experiment methodology and provides a rationale for 
its adoption. The research methods for data collection and analysis have been detailed in the 
fourth section. Finally, the fifth section will summarise this chapter.  
4.2 Research Paradigms 
Research paradigm is about the philosophical issues underpinning a research. It represents a 
set of common beliefs and agreements, shared between the scientists, about how the problems 
should be understood and addressed. Thus, every research is based on underlying philosophical 
assumptions about what constitutes valid research and which methods are appropriate for the 
development of knowledge in that research study (Collis and Hussey, 2009; 2014; Kuhn and 
Hacking, 2012). The paradigm is, therefore, a perspective that researchers adopt to look at the 
research problem. Due to their crucial role towards the adoption of a particular research 
approach, the philosophical assumptions need to be specifically identified (Creswell, 2014).  
Burrell and Morgan (1979) suggested using paradigm at the following three levels; 
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• Philosophical level, where the term paradigm is used to reflect basic beliefs about the 
world in terms of the nature of reality and knowledge. 
• Social level, where the term paradigm is used to provide guidance about how a research 
should be conducted. 
• Technical level, where the term paradigm is used to specify the techniques and methods 
that ideally should be adopted when conducting a research. 
Different approaches exist within the research paradigms (Collis and Hussey, 2014). According 
to Creswell (2014), the overall research approach refers to the plans and procedures that 
originate in broad assumptions and converge to the detailed methods of collecting, analysing 
and interpreting the research data. In this regard, Collis and Hussey (2014) suggested thinking 
of positivism10 and interpretivism11 as two extremes on a continuum of research paradigms, 
with different research approaches associated with these paradigms. One of the distinctions is 
proposed to be the ‘quantitative approaches corresponding to positivism’ versus ‘qualitative 
approaches corresponding to interpretivism’12. According to Newman and Benz (1998) and 
Creswell (2014), the quantitative and qualitative approaches represent two ends of a 
continuum, with a mixed methods approach at the middle as it incorporates elements of both 
the quantitative and qualitative approaches.  
In the case of quantitative research, the researcher has an impersonal role in research and the 
main purpose of the enquiry is to understand phenomena and to construct knowledge. The 
theories are tested by examining relationships between variables. However, the researcher has 
a personal role in the case of qualitative research where the main purpose of enquiry is to 
explain phenomena and to discover knowledge (Stake, 1995; Collis and Hussey, 2009). 
Furthermore, where quantitative research is deductive and begins with a well-defined research 
design, there qualitative is inductive and the research questions, mainly, evolve during the 
study (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2010; Lindlof and Taylor, 2010). A 
                                                 
10 Positivism paradigm is based on the assumption that social reality is singular and objective and is not affected 
by the act of investigating it (Collis and Hussey, 2014). 
11 Interpretivism paradigm is based on the assumption that social reality is in our minds and is subjective and 
multiple. The reality, therefore, is affected by the act of investigating it (Collis and Hussey, 2014).  
12 Collis and Hussey (2014) pointed out that the referring to research approach as quantitative or qualitative might 
be misleading such as, when a researcher collects qualitative data that can be quantified for statistical analysis. In 
this case, although the overall approach is quantitative but might be misunderstood as being qualitative. 
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quantitative approach to research involves the collection of quantitative data (or qualitative 
data that can be quantified) and statistical analysis and the qualitative approach collects 
qualitative data that is analysed using interpretative methods (Collis and Hussey, 2014; 
Creswell, 2014). Some researchers (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Jackson, 2008; Collis and 
Hussey, 2009; Saunders, Thornhill and Lewis, 2009; Creswell, 2014) argue that complete 
understanding of the research problem requires a combination of quantitative and the 
qualitative approaches. They suggest using mixed methods to avail the advantages of both the 
approaches.  
As suggested by Creswell (2014), the decision to adopt a quantitative approach for this study 
has been informed by the philosophical assumptions underpinning this study, the strategies of 
inquiry implemented for addressing the research questions and the research methods for 
collecting, analysing and interpreting data. Thus, the reciprocal intersection of research 
paradigm, research methodology and the research methods have guided the quantitative 
approach to this research.  
4.2.1 Postpositivism Paradigm 
Although this study takes postpositivism paradigm, a brief account of closely related positivism 
will help understand how postpositivism originated and how it is connected to this study. 
Traditional positivism originated in natural sciences and had its roots in ‘realism’ philosophy 
which holds that reality exists independent of the observer – for instance, whether God exists 
or not is not affected by an individual’s decision to believe or to not (Barnes, Wright and 
Brandon, 2013).  
Under positivism paradigm, researchers’ belief about the world and the nature of knowledge 
rests on the assumption that social reality is singular and objective and that it is not affected by 
the act of investigating it (Collis and Hussey, 2014; Creswell, 2014). Positivism informs most 
of the research in natural sciences and assumes single objective truth which is discoverable 
through careful observation and measurement and can be proven through repeated measures 
(Littlejohn and Pegler, 2007). Research drawing on positivism employs pre-existing theories 
that provide the basis of explanation and prediction of phenomena.  
Positivism invited criticisms when the trends in research changed and the traditional scientific 
methods established by natural scientists (and used by positivists) seemed inadequate to meet 
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the needs of social scientists. Critics argued that it is impossible to separate people from the 
social contexts they exist in and that complete understanding of the people requires examining 
the perceptions they hold of their behaviour. They further asserted that the highly structured 
research designs under positivism constrain the results of research. Moreover, researchers bring 
in their interests and values to the research as they are a part of it and further that complex 
phenomena cannot be, sufficiently, captured using a single measure (Collis and Hussey, 2014). 
In response to such criticisms on positivism, postpositivism paradigm emerged in the 1950s - 
60s (Creswell, 2014). 
Postpositivism has its roots in natural as well as the social sciences. It represents thinking that 
developed after positivism (hence the term postpositivism). This paradigm challenges the 
traditional idea of ‘knowledge as an absolute truth’. Post-positivists believe that knowledge is 
conjectural because absolute truth can never be found (Phillips and Burbules, 2000). With 
particular reference to this research, postpositivism recognises that when studying the 
behaviour of humans, one cannot be positive about the claims of knowledge (Creswell, 2014).  
4.2.2 Assumptions of Postpositivism  
So that the researchers can identify their research orientation, it is necessary to understand the 
philosophical assumptions that underpin research paradigms. The main assumptions relate to 
the ontological, epistemological and methodological positions (Creswell, 2014).  
4.2.2.1 Ontological Assumption 
Ontology is the branch of philosophy that is concerned with the nature and structure of the 
world. It specifies the nature and form of reality and what can be known about it (Wand and 
Weber, 1993). This assumption corresponds to the philosophical level suggested by Burrell 
and Morgan (1979), where the paradigm is used to reflect basic beliefs about the world. 
Postpositivism assumes critical realist ontology which provides that reality does exist 
independent of observers’ thinking, but cannot be understood perfectly (Guba, 1990; Littlejohn 
and Pegler, 2007). Since postpositivism holds that knowledge is conjectural and not an absolute 
truth, the evidence established by researchers is imperfect (Creswell, 2014). Positivists’ realism 
also advocates the existence of an objective social reality that exists external to the researcher, 
but the reality is rigidly believed to be singular that can be perfectly understood. Critical realists 
believe that observation is imperfect and has errors and further that the theories can be revised. 
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The post-positivists, therefore, do not believe in the existence of absolute truth and are critical 
of a researcher’s ability to know the reality with complete certainty (Trochim, 2006). 
4.2.2.2 Epistemological Assumption 
The epistemological assumption is about what constitutes valid knowledge and what 
relationship exists between the researcher and that researched (Collis and Hussey, 2009; 2014). 
This assumption corresponds to the social level suggested by Burrell and Morgan (1979), 
where the paradigm is used to provide guidance about how a research should be conducted. 
Postpositivism assumes empiricist epistemology which holds that valid knowledge is derived 
using a scientific method of enquiry. Post-positivists begin with a testable hypothesis and make 
the claims. The collected data may either support the theory or negate it, in which case the 
required revisions are made to the theory and additional tests conducted. Importantly, post-
positivists must examine the methods and conclusions for bias, because being objective is an 
essential feature of competent enquiry (Creswell, 2014). Positivists also believe that valid 
knowledge is the one that is derived from objective evidence about observable and measurable 
phenomena and that the researcher is distant from the phenomena under study. However, 
contrary to the post-positivists’ belief, positivists are quite rigid in their beliefs about single 
reality (Littlejohn and Pegler, 2007). 
4.2.2.3 Methodological Assumption 
The methodological assumption is associated with the process of research. This assumption 
corresponds to the technical level suggested by Burrell and Morgan (1979), where the paradigm 
is used to specify the techniques and methods that ideally should be adopted when conducting 
a research. 
Post-positivists tend to be deterministic and believe the causes to be determinants of the effects. 
They study problems that reflect the need to identify and measure the causes that affect 
outcomes. Furthermore, post-positivists are also reductionists and test the ideas by reducing 
these into small discrete sets such as the variables corresponding to the research questions and 
hypotheses (Creswell, 2014). Practically, post-positivists follow deductive approach and 
collect data by recording observations or by using the participants’ self-reported data. Thus, 
knowledge is shaped with the help of data, evidence and rational considerations (Philips and 
Burbules, 2000). Post-positivists state that they ‘do not prove a hypothesis’ but ‘fail to reject a 
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hypothesis’ – thus, where post-positivists are concerned about falsifying hypotheses, there 
positivists verify hypotheses (Philips and Burbules, 2000; Littlejohn and Pegler, 2007; 
Creswell, 2014). 
4.2.3 Rationale for adopting Postpositivism Paradigm 
The choice of philosophical paradigm is largely based on the research questions (Simons and 
Merchant, 1986; Abernethy, Chua, Luckett and Selto, 1999). Littlejohn and Pegler (2007) 
provide that research questions define the ontology, epistemology and methodology of a study 
but not vice versa. Overall, this study’s research questions are aimed at understanding the 
process through which conflict of interests affects accounting professionals’ decision-making 
behaviour. The following discussions elaborate how the postpositivism is well-suited to serve 
the aim of this study; 
First, this study examines the intermediary role of cognitive processes (i.e. positive outcome 
expectancy, perceived difficulty and ethical judgement) in the relationship between conflict of 
interests and deviant decision-making behaviour. The said cognitive processes have been 
measured as the self-reported perceptions that represent reality, but at the same time cannot be 
substituted for absolute truth – there is a difference between ‘reality’ and ‘perception of reality’ 
(Churchland, 1979, Littlejohn and Pegler, 2007). Resultantly, imperfect evidence can be 
established which implies that the knowledge so gained will be conjectural and the evidence 
established by the researcher will be imperfect (Creswell, 2014). This process corresponds to 
the ontological assumptions underlying postpositivism.  
Second, postpositivism assumes empiricist epistemology which provides that valid knowledge 
is derived using a scientific method of enquiry (Littlejohn and Pegler, 2007; Collis and Hussey, 
2009; 2014). This study also begins with the hypothesised relationships drawn from the social 
cognitive theory and the throughput model of decision-making. The collected data may either 
support or negate the theory in which case required revisions can be proposed for the theory 
and additional tests can be conducted by the future researchers. Similarly, in accordance with 
the post-positivists’ epistemological assumptions, this study also considers ‘objectivity of 
researcher’ an essential feature of competent enquiry (Creswell, 2014) and thus, the methods 
and conclusions will be examined for bias. 
Third, the methodological assumptions underlying postpositivism endorse a deductive 
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approach to research and a collection of data by recording observations or by using scales for 
participants’ self-reports. This study also follows deductive logic and the data have been 
collected using the Likert-type scales and items for self-reported perceptions and behaviour. 
Furthermore, this study claims to strive towards the post-positivists’ stance, i.e. falsifying a 
hypothesis and not the positivists’ stance, i.e. verifying a hypothesis (Philips and Burbules, 
2000; Littlejohn and Pegler, 2007; Creswell, 2014).  
Fourth, the accounting professionals’ cognitive processes serve as the endogenous variables in 
this study. In the era dominated by positivism, researchers had to predict behaviours by 
focusing on the positive and negative reinforcements of behaviour and any intervening 
processes (such as perceptions and thinking) were ignored, since those could not be measured 
with absolute certainty. However, there is no such restriction for post-positivists who study 
behaviour and are concerned with developing numeric measures of observations on the 
cognitive processes (Creswell, 2014). This study seeks to examine the perceptions, judgements 
and perceptual biases in situations involving a conflict of interests – according to Bisman 
(2010), post-positivists’ critical realism has the potential to investigate the cognitive processes. 
Finally, the criticisms on positivism also provide a rationale for adopting postpositivism 
paradigm for this study. In agreement with postpositivism, this study goes beyond traditional 
positivism and acknowledges that it is not possible to separate people from the social contexts 
which they operate in – just as the researchers bring in their interests and values to research, 
the accounting professionals work in a dynamic social setting (that is imbued with norms, 
codes, procedures and regulations etc.) which affects their conduct. The philosophical 
assumptions of postpositivism allow examination of individuals’ decision-making behaviour 
that this study intends to understand. Consistent with the post-positivists’ philosophical 
assumptions (Healy and Perry, 2000), this study adopts a quantitative approach for examining 
the cognitive mechanisms underlying the accounting professionals’ behaviour.  
4.3 Research Methodology  
According to Leedy and Ormrod (2005), research methodology is about the steps that are 
undertaken to derive reliable and valid answers to research questions and is the general 
approach a researcher takes to conduct the study. Similarly, Collis and Hussey (2014) provided 
that methodology denotes an overall approach to the process of research, encompassing a body 
of methods. Importantly, research paradigms provide a framework for determining the research 
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design, which denotes the choices made in terms of ‘methodology’, and the ‘methods’ used for 
addressing the research questions (Collis and Hussey, 2009; 2014). Likewise, Littlejohn and 
Pegler (2007) regard paradigm a tool that researchers use to design their study. In this regard, 
the main categories of research designs include the quantitative, qualitative and the mixed 
methods designs. Quantitative designs are aimed at maximising objectivity, replicability and 
generalizability of the findings and these designs are usually interested in predictions.  
Qualitative designs attempt to explore and understand the thoughts, experiences and 
perspectives of the participants. The mixed methods designs tend to draw on the strengths of 
both the quantitative and qualitative designs and are well-suited to address the research 
questions demanding rigorous examination (Harwell, 2011). 
During the late 19th and the 20th century, the research designs associated with quantitative 
approaches were those that originated in psychology and invoked postpositivism paradigm. 
Remarkably, postpositivism facilitates studying human behaviour and is concerned with 
developing numeric measures of observations on the cognitive processes (Creswell, 2014). 
Therefore, as suggested by Bryman (2006), the decision to adopt quantitative research design 
has been informed by philosophical assumptions and the nature and purpose of this study. 
4.3.1 Experiments 
From within the quantitative research designs, the experiment has been adopted as a 
methodology to serve the aim and objectives of this study. According to Creswell (2014), 
experiments are the strategies of inquiry within quantitative research design and are used to 
identify causal relationships between the variables. The independent variable is manipulated to 
observe its effect on the dependent variable (Green, Ha and Bullock, 2010; Cozby and Bates, 
2011; Imai, Tingley and Yamamoto, 2013; Collis and Hussey, 2014). Over time, experiments 
have emerged as a powerful design to test scientific theories (Splawa-Neyman, Dabrowska and 
Speed, 1990).  
Experiments could either be true experiments or the quasi-experiments (Morgan, Gliner and 
Harmon, 2000; Shadish, Cook and Campbell, 2001; DiNardo, 2008; Cozby and Bates, 2011). 
True experiments are characterised by random assignment of the participants to experimental 
groups. In the case of quasi-experiments, assignment to groups is not purely random and is 
based on other criteria such as experience or income of the participants (Morgan, Gliner and 
Harmon, 2000). Moreover, experiments can either be conducted in the natural setting of the 
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participants – i.e. field experiments or in the artificial environment created to simulate natural 
setting – i.e. laboratory experiments (Cozby and Bates, 2011). In recent years, there has been 
an increasing trend of web-based experiments (also termed online laboratory) in psychology 
and social sciences (Bainbridge, 2007). The web-based experiments enable researchers to reach 
more diverse samples and to recruit a large number of participants (Kramer, Guillory and 
Hancock, 2014). For instance, Salganik, Dodds and Watts (2006) used web-based design to 
collect data from over 14,000 participants. 
In the case of nonexperimental quantitative research methodologies (such as surveys), both the 
independent and dependent variables are measured and are not suitable when a researcher is 
interested in the cause and effect relationships. Moreover, the nonexperimental methodologies 
are frequently prone to the problem of confounding variables which, in turn, harms the internal 
validity of research findings. However, experimental designs (especially those conducted in 
artificial settings) attempt to eliminate the influence of confounding variables, by eliminating 
certain variables or keeping some others constant and, thus, reduce ambiguity in the 
interpretation of results (Cozby and Bates, 2011). Alongside the manipulated independent 
variable(s), the quasi-experiments allow examining naturally occurring variables such as the 
personal attributes of participants (Morgan, Gliner and Harmon, 2000). To be elaborated in the 
later section on research methods, the nature of this study needs the controls for potential 
confounding variables and also considers the personal attributes of the participants. 
However, the experimental methodology also invites several criticisms. The common criticism 
is that they only reveal, but do not explain the causal relationships. This criticism, however, 
fades away with the inclusion of mediating variables that tend to reflect on the process 
underlying observed causation (Green, Ha and Bullock, 2010). Furthermore, the experiments 
are believed to have a limited external validity, which poses restrictions on the replication of 
research in different settings and with different participants (Cozby and Bates, 2011). This 
study relates to a particular setting (i.e. professional accounting firms) and also the particular 
participants (i.e. accounting professionals) – therefore, external validity is not expected to be 
much of an issue for the future research related to the professionals from accounting firms. 
Moreover, this study attempts to mitigate the problem of limited external validity, by 
controlling for the main potential confounding variables. 
The quantitative strategies have evolved over time and include complex experiments with 
many variables (as in Brandon, 2003; Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo, 2010; Juhari, Mohd-
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Sanusi, Rahman and Omar, 2013). Researchers have begun using structural equation models 
that include many causal paths and determine the strength of multiple variables (Creswell, 
2014). Taking into consideration the philosophical assumptions underlying this study and the 
context and purpose of the study, the aforementioned discussions justify experimental 
methodology as the most appropriate strategy of inquiry for this research.   
4.3.2 Rationale for Adopting Quasi-Experiment 
In order to address the research questions, this study adopts repeated measures web-based 
quasi-experiment as a specific methodology. 
In the repeated measures or within-subject experimental designs, all the participants are 
assigned to all the manipulations of the independent variable. Comparisons are made within 
the same group of participants (Collis and Hussey, 2014). This approach is beneficial over the 
independent groups or between-subjects design because the individual differences among the 
participants are same across all the manipulations and thus, any differences in the dependent 
variable(s) can be attributed to the changes in the independent variable (Cozby and Bates, 
2011). Moreover, the use of repeated measures is suitable when the purpose is to expose the 
participants to a wide variety of conditions, in order to examine the differences in their 
responses (Shadish, Cook and Campbell, 2001). One of the objectives of this study is to 
understand how different categories of conflicting interests affect decision-making and, 
therefore, comparisons across the same person are required to better understand the 
phenomenon.     
Web-based experiments invited criticism that they have weaker experimental controls than the 
traditional laboratory ones – for instance, the participants might not take the experiment 
seriously and that they might make wrong claims about their demographics. However, some 
others (e.g., Reips, 1996; Hartshome, 2007) disregard such criticisms and asserted that the 
laboratory experiments can also be affected by the same problems. Schoeffler et al. (2013) 
compared the laboratory and web-based results of a particular experiment and did not find any 
significant differences between the results. To be elaborated in the later section on research 
methods, the robustness of this study’s experiment is expected to overcome the limitations 
associated with the web-based experiments.   
Just as the nonexperimental methods, quasi-experiments are sometimes criticised for the 
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possibility of confounding bias which is believed to challenge the internal validity of research 
findings (DiNardo, 2008). Such bias, however, can be controlled by using various statistical 
techniques such as multiple regression. This study uses path analysis which is an advancement 
of multiple regression (Streiner, 2005) and, thus, confounding bias has been taken care of.  
Moreover, there are other advantages of quasi-experiments that are of direct relevance to this 
study. For instance, Derue, Nahrgang, Hollenbeck and Workman (2012) provide that quasi-
experiments allow researchers to use any manipulations they want to.  Furthermore, these 
incorporate features from both the experimental and the non-experimental designs in that both 
the manipulated and the measured variables can be brought in. In this way, quasi-experiments 
tend to maximise the internal and the external validity. This study’s theoretical framework 
stresses the need for both the manipulated and the measured variables. Therefore, quasi-
experiment is the most appropriate to address this concern.  
4.4 Research Methods  
Research methods are the specific tools and techniques used for data collection, analysis and 
interpretation. In order to ensure that the research design corresponds to the philosophical 
assumptions of research paradigm, a researcher needs to adopt a cohesive approach when 
choosing the research methods (Littlejohn and Pegler, 2007; Collis and Hussey, 2009; 2014; 
Creswell, 2014). In accordance with the postpositivism paradigm and the experimental 
methodology, this study adopts quantitative research methods – the type of data to be collected 
has been specified in advance, the data to be analysed is in numeric form and the statistical 
results will be interpreted for the findings and conclusions.  
The ‘method plan’ for this experimental study is based on the suggestions by Wimmer and 
Dominick (2013) and Creswell (2014). Accordingly, the research methods will include 
discussions on research context, research population, sampling frame, sampling, experimental 
vignettes, operationalization of variables, instrumentation, threats to validity, administration of 
experiment and finally the statistical technique(s) for data analysis. 
The table 4.1 highlights the main differences between the quantitative, qualitative and the 
mixed methods. 
 
 
 
90 
Table 4.1 Differences between Quantitative, Qualitative and Mixed Methods (Adapted from Creswell, 2014) 
 
4.4.1 Research Context 
Careful site selection holds utmost importance for successful theory testing. Researchers 
should be considerate of various important issues such as the availability of data, suitability of 
the organisation and the appropriateness of the units of analysis (Anderson and Widener, 2007). 
Availability of the participants and available resources are important considerations when 
designing the study (Wimmer and Dominick, 2013). In order to address this study’s research 
problem, the Big Four professional accounting firms (Deloitte, EY, KPMG and PwC) in the 
UK have been chosen for the empirical part of study. There are many compelling reasons that 
make the Big Four in the UK an appropriate research context. 
First, Big Four represents the largest international professional networks and offer a wide range 
of audit and non-audit services, including consultation, advisory, actuarial, assurance, 
corporate finance and legal services. A vast majority of audits for publicly traded and many 
private companies are done by the Big Four. Reportedly, the Big Four firms audit 99% of the 
companies from FTSE 100 and 96% from the FTSE 250 index (Christodoulou, 2011). Given 
the wide range of services being offered to a number of big companies, it becomes apparent 
DIFFERENTIATING 
CRITERIA 
Quantitative Methods Qualitative Methods 
Mixed 
Methods 
Collection Predetermined Emerging methods 
Predetermined 
and emerging 
Type of Questions 
Instruments based 
questions, closed-ended 
Open-ended questions 
Closed- and 
Open-ended 
questions 
Examples 
Attitude data, census 
data, performance data 
and observational data 
Audio-visual data, 
document data, interview 
data and observation data 
Multiple forms 
of data 
Analysis Statistical analysis Text and image analysis 
Statistical and 
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that the Big Four play an important role in capital markets. The efficiency of the capital markets 
relies on audited statements of the companies whose stocks are being traded publicly. Hence, 
the Big Four have a unique role of serving in the best interest of the shareholders, despite their 
relationship with the clients’ management. The Big Four have returned to the consultancy 
business and the worry is that conflict of interests might be an issue of more concern, due to 
continuous growth in the provision of non-audit services (Agnew, 2015; Loxton, 2015).    
Secondly, the mismanagement of conflict of interests in the Big Four is still an active issue of 
concern.  In June 2015, EY was fined £250,000 over the failure to disclose a conflict of 
interests. For the similar reasons, PwC was fined $25m in August 2014 and Deloitte was fined 
$10m in June 2013 (Agnew, 2015). Similarly, on account of flawed audits, Deloitte was 
recently fined 1.81m Euros, EY for 2.23m, KPMG was fined 1.25m and PwC for 85,000 Euros 
(Loxton, 2015). Such cases pertaining to the Big Four raise curiosity about the possible flaws 
in their conduct. In its annual review of the Big Fours audits, the Financial Reporting Council 
found many areas that needed to be addressed for improvement (Irvine and Doherty, 2015).                 
Thirdly, the Big Four are considered the trendsetters in the professional accounting world and 
their policies also have an impact on other accounting firms.  
Fourth, lack of empirical evidence for the impact of conflict of interests on the accounting 
professionals’ decision-making, in general and in the UK, in particular, is another reason for 
choosing the Big Four from within the UK. There have been increasing calls for understanding 
the interaction of conflicting interests with decision-making in the professional accounting 
firms (Moore, Loewenstein, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2003; Moore and Loewenstein, 2004; 
Moore, Cain, Loewenstein and Bazerman, 2005; Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2006; 
Moore, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2010).         
Finally, as the researcher is based in the UK, it is feasible to conduct and administer the 
empirical study in this country. 
4.4.2 Research Population, Sampling Frame and Sampling 
Identification of research populations allows creating a sampling frame which then leads to the 
derivation of the sample for empirical data collection (Saunders, Thornhill and Lewis, 2009). 
Population represents the full set of cases from which a sample is to be drawn (Bryman and 
Bell, 2007). According to Collis and Hussey (2009), population denotes a precisely defined 
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body of individuals or objects under consideration. Professionals from the Big Four accounting 
firms in the UK represent the population for this study.  
Sampling frame has to be defined after identification of the research population. According to 
Saunders, Thornhill and Lewis (2009), a sampling frame is a complete list of all the cases in 
the target population. Often the sampling frames are derived from reliable databases, as it is 
essential to have an accurate sampling frame. In order to identify the sampling frame, Register 
of Statutory Auditors was used. This register contains information on the audit firms and the 
statutory auditors in the UK. It provides contact details of the ‘Recognized Supervisory Body 
(RSB)’ with which an audit firm is registered and the contact details of registered audit firms 
and the professionals. The sampling frame derived from the register comprised of a list of the 
professionals from the Big Four accounting firms in the UK (Register of Statutory Auditors, 
2015).  
Sampling is done when it is not possible to include the entire population in the study and there 
are time or budget constraints involved (Saunders, Thornhill and Lewis, 2009). The sample 
represents a segment of the population that is chosen for empirical investigation (Bryman and 
Bell, 2007). The two main sampling techniques are the ‘representative or probability sampling’ 
and the ‘judgemental or non-probability sampling’. With an intent to keep sampling error to a 
minimum, probability sampling involves selecting a random sample such that each unit in the 
population has an equal chance of being selected. There are various techniques of probability 
sampling, including simple random, systematic random, stratified random, cluster and 
multistage sampling. Non-probability sampling involves non-random selection of sample such 
that each unit in the population does not have an equal chance of being selected. Various 
techniques of non-probability sampling include quota sampling, snowball sampling, purposive 
sampling, theoretical and the convenience sampling (Bryman and Bell, 2007; Saunders, 
Thornhill and Lewis, 2009). 
Given the difficulty in recruiting accounting professionals, this study adopted convenience 
sampling technique. The sample, therefore, includes all those professionals who were willing 
to participate. Specifically, a list of total 3295 professionals (i.e. the sampling frame) was 
created using the ‘Register of Statutory Auditors’. The register does not provide email 
addresses of the professionals and, thus, the addresses had to be googled for. Out of these, a 
total of 2283 addresses could be arranged and the list of contactable professionals reduced to 
this number. Technically, the resultant list of contactable professionals did not constitute an 
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accurate sampling frame, but according to Saunders, Thornhill and Lewis (2009), the precise 
sampling frame is a matter of concern in the case of probability sampling. As this study is based 
on convenience sample – a non-probability technique, the exact sampling frame was not 
required. 
The decision to include all the available professionals in the sample was also based on 
interviews conducted with four professionals (Appendix 1), one each from the Big Four 
accounting firms. The interviewees were asked to describe their firms’ audit engagement 
process with specific reference to the factors considered when accepting a client, the 
composition of audit engagement teams and the decision-making process during engagements. 
Overall, the responses revealed that the entire process engages participants from all the levels 
in the firm (including junior auditors, senior auditors, partners, management board and the 
support staff). This implies that ideally the sample of participants for my research should 
include personnel from all the levels/designations because everyone in an audit firm is, directly 
or indirectly, involved in making the decisions that demand them to act in the best interest of 
the public.  
4.4.3 Experimental Vignettes 
The quasi-experiment of this study comprises of four separate vignettes (Appendix 2). 
Vignettes are the stories that represent hypothetical scenarios in order to elicit perceptions, 
preferences, judgement and the expected behaviour (Caro et al., 2012). Vignettes are useful 
within both the quantitative and qualitative research on relatively the sensitive topics (Gourlay 
et al., 2014). According to Taylor (2006), vignettes are suitable for research on professional 
ethics and judgement. However, the extent to which hypothetical behaviour represents the 
actual behaviour is sometimes subjected to criticism (Caro et al., 2012). Some researchers have 
examined the extent to which hypothetical behaviour, as reported in vignette studies, is 
representative of the actual behaviour. In this regard, some (e.g., Peabody et al., 2000; Peabody 
et al., 2004; Telser and Zweifel, 2007) found that hypothetical behaviour matched favourably 
with the actual behaviour. Although Eifler (2007) found mixed evidence, but did not rule out 
the usefulness of vignettes. Moreover, Juhari, Mohd-Sanusi, Rahman and Omar (2013) 
successfully used experimental vignettes for examining the impact of independence threats on 
the auditors’ ethical judgement.  
Importantly, the appropriate design of experiments is based on the nature of research questions 
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and hypotheses and the types of variables to be manipulated and measured (Wimmer and 
Dominick, 2013). The four vignettes used in this study’s experiment have been informed by; 
(i) the Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants, (ii) the literature and (iii) the interviews 
conducted with four professionals (Appendix 1), one each from the Big Four accounting firms. 
To be elaborated later on, a pilot study was conducted in order to improve the vignettes. Hence, 
the experiment employed for empirical data collection is quite robust.  
4.4.3.1 Relevance of the Code of Ethics to Vignettes’ Scenarios    
The Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants was developed by IESBA and approved by 
IFAC. This code provides a conceptual framework for designing the experimental vignettes. 
This code adopts ‘threats and safeguards approach’ for strengthening compliance with the 
fundamental principles of professional ethical conduct. Various accountancy bodies (including 
the National Association of State Boards of Accountancy – NASBA, American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants – AICPA, Association of Accounting Technicians – AAT, 
Certified Institute of Management Accountants – CIMA, Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England and Wales – ICAEW and the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants – 
ACCA) are the proponents of the said approach (Johnson and Hansen, 2011).  
The code provides that the compliant behaviour is essentially about the compliance with five 
fundamental principles of professional ethics, i.e. integrity, objectivity, professional 
competence and due care, confidentiality and the professional behaviour. Particularly, 
compliance with the fundamental principles constitutes the primary interest of accounting 
profession. The code recognises various threats, i.e. self-interest, self-review, advocacy, 
familiarity and intimidation threat to compliance with the fundamental principles. The so 
recognised threats serve as the sources of secondary interest, which interfere with the primary 
interest and give rise to the conflict of interests. These conflicting interests lead to the risk of 
deviation from compliant behaviour. In order to counter the likely devastating impact of 
conflicting interests, various safeguards have been created by the profession, legislation and 
the work environment (IESBA, 2015).  
With reference to the scenarios used in vignettes, figure 4.1 presents the Code of Ethics for 
Professional Accountants, in action. 
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The threats and safeguards approach requires the practitioners to identify the threats and then 
to determine if appropriate safeguards are available for eliminating or reducing the identified 
threats to an acceptable level. The aim of this approach is to ensure that the ethical behaviour 
is not compromised (Johnson and Hansen, 2011; IESBA, 2015). With reference to this study’s 
vignettes, the code provides that conflict of interests originates when the threats clash with the 
fundamental principles of professional ethics.  
4.4.3.2 Relevance of Literature to Vignettes’ Scenarios 
As highlighted in the chapters on literature review and theoretical framework, an insight into 
the literature and some inspection reports revealed three main sources of secondary interests 
for the accounting professionals. These sources are; (i) the misaligned incentives with roots in 
temptation for gain, (ii) misaligned incentives with roots in fear of loss and (iii) the workplace 
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Figure 4.1: Code of Ethics for professional Accountants, in action 
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pressures with roots in fear of loss. Very interestingly, the said three sources coincide with the 
threats to compliance with the fundamental principles of professional ethics. 
The Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants itself and the literature relevant to conflict of 
interests in professional accounting firms (e.g., Allen and Siegel, 2002; Moore, Loewenstein, 
Tanlu and Bazerman, 2003; Moore and Loewenstein, 2004; Beattie, Fearnley and Brandt, 
2005; Moore, Cain, Loewenstein and Bazerman, 2005; Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu and Bazerman, 
2006; Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo, 2010; Moore, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2010; Juhari, 
Mohd-Sanusi, Rahman and Omar, 2013) indicate that the root causes underlying self-interest, 
self-review, advocacy, familiarity and intimidation threats are, primarily, the misaligned 
incentives with roots in temptation for gain, the misaligned incentives with roots in fear of loss 
and the workplace pressures with roots in fear of loss.   
With reference to this study’s vignette scenarios, literature provides that the conflict of interests 
arises due to the interference of secondary interests (i.e. the threats due to ‘misaligned 
incentives with roots in temptation for gain’, those due to ‘misaligned incentives with roots in 
fear of loss’ and the threats due to ‘workplace pressures with roots in fear of loss’) with the 
primary interests of the professions (i.e. the fundamental principles of professional ethics). 
Specifically, the conflict of interests (i.e. independent variable in this study) can be manipulated 
by using different threats.     
4.4.3.3 Relevance of Interviews to Vignettes’ Scenarios   
One of the reasons to conduct interviews with four professionals from the Big Four (Appendix 
1) was to inform vignettes’ scenarios in terms of the most frequent sources of secondary 
interests in a professional accounting environment. The interviews suggested that although the 
final outcome of an audit is the ‘issuance of audit opinion’, there are many stages involved in 
forming that opinion – decisions are taken at all the stages and any deviant behaviour is likely 
to be reflected in the final audit report. Therefore, the compliant behaviour is required at all the 
stages that lead to the formation of an audit opinion. Similarly, any non-audit services must not 
let professionals undermine the public interest. Therefore, the vignettes should include different 
instances of the compliant and deviant decisions, instead of focusing only on the audit opinion.   
When asked about the reasons that might lead a professional to not do complete justice to their 
primary responsibility of serving in the best interest of the public, the interviewees talked about 
various misaligned incentives and pressures. Interestingly, the responses coincide with the 
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provisions of the Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants and that of literature. According 
to them, the incentives and disincentives that are not aligned with serving the primary interest, 
increase the risk that professionals might not be able to do complete justice to their primary 
responsibility, despite their very good intentions. The incentives and disincentives talked about 
by the interviewees can be, conveniently, categorised into the three main classes, i.e. the 
misaligned rewards with roots in temptation for gain, the misaligned rewards with roots in fear 
of loss and the workplace pressures with roots in fear of loss. Thus, the vignettes were designed 
to account for these three different sources of conflict of interests. 
In order to better understand the impact of conflict of interests on professionals’ decision-
making, the interviewees were asked to share their personal experiences. Following are some 
of the responses of the interviewees, verbatim; 
 
“Although I have never experienced personally, but I am aware that some auditors receive 
under-the-table payment for cooperating with clients’ attempt to manipulate financial 
transactions” 
 
“……but if I am an engagement partner and I hold some percentage in the shares of our 
client then I will naturally have in mind that if qualified audit opinion13 is issued, the share 
price is likely to fall and I might suffer a loss on my investment” 
 (Interviewee 1) 
 
“I am not sure but have heard that some clients try to bribe senior management of the firm, 
for cooperation” 
 
“While I can’t be sure what exactly the criteria are, but ‘how well the clients are treated’ and 
‘positive feedback about the engagement team’ are considered when we are rewarded. In 
such situations, conflict might arise between serving the client or the public” 
(Interviewee 2) 
“I would say that compared to the rewards, pressures are a stronger factor that gives rise to 
                                                 
13 Qualified opinion is an auditor’s (or auditing firm’s) judgement that the company’s financial information is 
limited in scope and that some of the accounting procedures do not conform to the generally accepted accounting 
principles (Pierce, 2007).  
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conflict of interests for auditors and partners on the engagement team” 
“……however, I will not get tempted by misaligned bonus because my good reputation is 
very dear to me” 
(Interviewee 3) 
“Any conflict of interests at the personal level is often difficult to manage due to human 
nature, especially in the cases such as future job prospects with a client or personal 
affiliation with an employee in the client company” 
"I believe that conflicts of interests are natural, but also negative in a sense that they put 
desired behaviour to risk" 
 (Interviewee 4) 
With reference to the vignette scenarios, the responses reveal that conflict of interests abounds 
in the audit profession and are usually a natural phenomenon, especially when they are caused 
by environmental factors, including the misaligned rewards and workplace pressures. 
Accordingly, the vignette scenarios should also include a combination of various threats to 
examine their likely impact on the professionals’ decision-making behaviour. Consistent with 
the literature and the theoretical framework, the interviews added strength to the argument that 
‘the presence of a conflict of interests does not guarantee deviant behaviour but put compliant 
behaviour at risk’. Therefore, the vignettes can better address this study’s research questions, 
with a focus on ‘the impact of conflict of interests on the likelihood of deviant or compliant 
behaviour’. 
4.4.3.4 Composition of Vignette Scenarios 
This study’s experiment comprises of four vignettes (Appendix 2) that have been informed by 
the Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants, the relevant literature and the interviews 
conducted with four professionals from the Big Four accounting firms.  
The hypothetical scenarios for all the four vignettes have been derived from Ethical Dilemmas 
Case Studies developed by the UK and Ireland’s Consultative Committee of Accountancy 
Bodies, 2011. These case studies make perfect relevance to this study because the conceptual 
framework driving these is the Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants. Hence, all the 
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ethical dilemmas are based on the ‘threats and safeguards approach’ that is one of the 
informants of the vignettes. Importantly, all the case studies are followed by a clear guidance 
on the compliant versus deviant decision in given dilemma situations and the same have been 
included in the vignettes. Thus, the decision on what constitutes compliant or deviant behaviour 
in any given situation is not susceptible to researcher’s bias. Notably, all the vignettes are 
intentionally designed to be simple because ‘task complexity’ has been treated as one of the 
controls – thus, any changes in response to different vignettes cannot be attributed to the 
difficulty level of the task. 
Vignette 1 represents the situation involving a ‘conflict of interests due to self-interest threat’, 
with temptation for gain as an underlying stimulus of secondary interest. Vignette 2 represents 
the situation involving a ‘conflict of interests due to intimidation threat’, with workplace 
pressure as an underlying stimulus of secondary interest. Vignette 3 includes the situation 
involving a ‘conflict of interests due to a combination of self-interest and self-review threats’, 
with fear of loss as an underlying stimulus of secondary interest. Finally, vignette 4 represents 
the situation involving a ‘conflict of interests due to a combination of self-interest, intimidation, 
self-review and familiarity threats’ – the temptation for gain, workplace pressure and the fear 
of loss simultaneously act as the underlying stimuli of secondary interest(s). Some researchers 
(Moore and Loewenstein, 2004; Beattie, Fearnley and Brandt, 2005; Moore, Cain, Loewenstein 
and Bazerman, 2005; Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2006; Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz and 
Gonzalo, 2010; Moore, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2010; Juhari, Mohd-Sanusi, Rahman and Omar, 
2013) have, directly or indirectly, followed the same sort of approach to examine the ethical 
concerns in a professional accounting environment. 
4.4.4 Operationalisation of Variables  
Operationalisation is about defining the research variables as measurable factors. It is meant to 
specify the exact definition of each variable and, thereby, to improve the quality of the results 
and the robustness of the design (Shuttleworth, 2008). In an experimental design, the 
independent variable is operationalised in terms of the manipulation used to create it. The 
dependent variables are operationalised by constructing scales or rules for categorisation of the 
observed behaviour (Wimmer and Dominick, 2013). All the variables of this study have been 
operationalised in accordance with the relevant accounting and psychology literature. 
Each of the four vignettes comprises of one independent variable (i.e. conflict of interests), 
100 
three intervening variables (i.e. positive outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making, 
perceived difficulty in making a compliant decision and ethical judgement), one dependent 
variable (i.e. likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour) for main analysis and other 
dependent variable (i.e. likelihood of compliant decision-making behaviour) for 
complementary analysis.  
Two control variables (i.e. the occupational self-efficacy and the propensity to morally 
disengage) have also been measured as part of the experiment. 
4.4.4.1 Conflict of interests (CoI) 
Conflict of interests is the independent variable which has been manipulated through different 
threats to compliance with the fundamental principles of professional ethics, in four different 
ways. The vignette 1 involves conflict of interests due to self-interest threat – CoI-1, vignette 
2 includes conflict of interests due to intimidation threat – CoI-2, vignette 3 involves conflict 
of interests due to a combination of self-interest and self-review threats – CoI-3 and vignette 4 
is about conflict of interests due to a combination of self-interest, intimidation, self-review and 
familiarity threats – CoI-4 (IESBA, 2015). The threats are not specifically named in the 
vignettes, but underlie the hypothetical scenarios used in each of the vignettes.  
4.4.4.2 Likelihood of Deviant Decision-Making Behaviour (DD) 
DD has been operationalised as the likelihood of making a deviant decision. The deviant 
decision represents the decision choice that is in nonconformity with the primary interest of the 
accounting profession. For instance, (i) the acceptance of offered 70% discount, (ii) agreeing 
to perform the task assigned (irrespective of the lack of competence), (iii) not disclosing the 
minor weaknesses in internal control system of the client and (iv) not reporting the matter to 
tax authorities, represent deviant decision choices in case of vignette 1, vignette 2, vignette 3 
and vignette 4, respectively.  
4.4.4.3 Likelihood of Compliant Decision-Making Behaviour (CD) 
CD has been operationalised as the likelihood of making a compliant decision. The compliant 
decision represents the decision choice that is in conformity with the primary interest of the 
accounting profession. For instance, (i) refusing to accept the offered 70% discount, (ii) 
refusing to perform the task assigned (on account of the lack of competence), (iii) admitting 
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the negligence in the initial evaluation of internal control system of the client and (iv) reporting 
the matter to tax authorities, represent compliant decision choices in case of vignette 1, vignette 
2, vignette 3 and vignette 4, respectively.  
4.4.4.4 Positive Outcome Expectancy of Compliant Decision-Making (POE) 
POE has been operationalised as the professionals' expectation that the overall positive 
outcomes of compliant decision-making will outweigh its overall negative outcomes. For 
instance, the professionals’ expectation that; (i) the overall positive outcomes of declining the 
offered 70% discount will outweigh its negative outcomes, (ii) the overall positive outcomes 
of refusing to perform the task will outweigh its negative outcomes, (iii) the overall positive 
outcomes of disclosing their negligence in initial evaluation will outweigh its negative 
outcomes and that (iv) the overall positive outcomes of disclosing the past undisclosed income 
to tax authorities will outweigh its negative outcomes, represent POE in case of vignette 1, 
vignette 2, vignette 3 and vignette 4, respectively. 
4.4.4.5 Perceived Difficulty in Making Compliant Decisions (PD) 
PD has been operationalised as the professionals' perceived difficulty in making a compliant 
decision. For instance, the professionals perceived levels of difficulty in; (i) refusing to 
accept the offered 70% discount, (ii) refusing to perform the task, (iii) accepting their 
negligence in initial evaluation of the internal control system of the client and (iv) disclosing 
the past undisclosed income to tax authorities, represent PD in case of vignette 1, vignette 2, 
vignette 3 and vignette 4, respectively. 
4.4.4.6 Ethical Judgement (EJ) 
EJ has been operationalised as the participants’ judgement about the ethicality of decision 
choices. The professionals’ judgement that ‘the given compliant decision choice is the most 
ethical course of action’ represents the ‘most ethical judgement’. Likewise, their judgement 
that ‘the given deviant decision choice is the most ethical one’ represents the ‘least ethical 
judgement’. Furthermore, ‘less ethical judgement’ is said to be formed if professionals regard 
both the decision choices (compliant and deviant) as ethically appropriate.  
4.4.4.7 Occupational Self-Efficacy (OSE) 
OSE has been introduced in the study’s model as the control variable and represents the 
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dispositional trait of an individual. OSE has been operationalised as the professional’s 
perceived ability to successfully cope with the occupation-related challenges and tasks. Since 
OSE has been included as a dispositional factor, it remains context free. Thus, OSE for a 
particular participant will be same across all the experimental vignettes. 
4.4.4.8 Propensity to Morally Disengage (PMD) 
PMD has been introduced in the study’s model as the control variable and represents the 
dispositional trait of an individual. PMD has been operationalised as the professional’s 
tendency to consider the unethical/immoral behaviour as ethically/morally acceptable. Since 
PMD has been included as a dispositional factor, it remains context free. Thus, PMD for a 
particular participant will be same across all the experimental vignettes.   
4.4.5 Research Instrumentation 
Research instrument refers to the measurement device (e.g. questionnaires, scales, personal 
inventories, self-checklists and aptitude test etc.) used in research. Instrumentation refers to the 
overall course of action adopted in developing, testing and using the research instrument 
(Biddix, 2009). The use of online products for designing research instruments is getting 
increasingly common (Sue and Ritter, 2012). The research instrument (Appendix 2) used for 
this study’s data collection has been developed using Qualtrics, which is one of the leading 
online data collection software.  
4.4.5.1 Ethical Considerations 
Researchers must take into consideration the ethical concerns surrounding their studies. It is 
essential to adopt ethical practices and to anticipate the likely ethical issues (Creswell, 2014). 
All the stakeholders of the research, including the participants, researcher and the researcher’s 
organisation must not suffer any discomfort, embarrassment, damage or loss of property 
(Cooper and Schindler, 2006). 
Data collection was conducted in accordance with the Anglia Ruskin University’s Research 
Ethics Policy. Prior to approaching the participants, the policy requires researchers to seek 
ethical approval for their pilot studies and research projects. All the researchers are required to 
comply with the laws and codes of practice applicable to their area of research. The researchers 
must also undertake compulsory research ethics training. Accordingly, in order to acquire 
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ethical approval for commencing data collection process, research ethics application form was 
filled in and submitted to the research ethics panel of the university’s business school. Because 
this study involves human participants and offered an incentive (to be won through lucky 
draw), it was required to submit the participant information sheet and the participant consent 
form.  
In the first section of participant information sheet, researchers are required to provide the 
participant(s) up with an overview of the research project. Specifically, the sheet includes the 
title of the project, brief summary of research, the reason of invitation, the likely benefits of 
participating, participant’s right to refuse participation, informing participants of the ethical 
approval and the contact details of researcher. The second section of information sheet provides 
details regarding what the participants will be asked to do, confidentiality and anonymity, any 
possible risks, the intended use of data to be collected and the complaints procedure. Data for 
this study was collected using web-based experiment and, therefore, the contents of the 
participant information sheet were incorporated in the cover email of the research instrument.  
The participants’ consent form is meant to ask the participants for confirming their willingness 
to participate. Specifically, the form requires undertaking for their agreement to participate, 
awareness about their role and that they have been provided up with the information sheet. 
Data for this study was collected using web-based experiment and the participants were 
instructed in the cover email to enter the experiment (via the link provided in the email) only 
if they consented to participate. The consent form was, therefore, incorporated in the cover 
email of the research instrument.  
As per the university’s research ethics policy, three compulsory trainings were undertaken prior 
to the data collection process, i.e. Introduction to Research Ethics & Integrity, Epigeum – 
Intellectual Property (IP) in the Research Context and Epigeum – Ethics 2: Working with 
Human Subjects. The research ethics panel reviewed the application form, the participant 
information sheet and the participant consent form. Afterwards, the ethical approval was 
granted to commence data collection for the study. 
4.4.5.2 Instrument Layout 
The layout of a research instrument is important in order to increase the response rate. 
Construction of a good instrument is about the general appearance, clarity of instructions, the 
questions asked and the ordering of questions. The purpose is to make the instrument appealing 
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to the respondents. Furthermore, the flow of questions is one of the important considerations 
regarding the instrument layout. The acquisition of clear responses largely depends on the 
simplicity of visual appearance and the wording of instrument’s contents. Starting research 
instrument with the most important questions in relation to the cover letter is often 
recommended (Dillman, Smyth and Christian, 2008). Similarly, the respondents should be able 
to fill in the responses easily and the layout of research instrument should be attractive enough 
to convince them for participation (Saunders, Thornhill and Lewis, 2009). In this regard, the 
Tailored Design Method (Dillman, Smyth and Christian, 2014) has been used as a guidance 
tool towards the layout of this research’s instrument. 
Keeping in mind the utmost significance of the overall layout of research instruments, due 
consideration was given to make it attractive and clear to the participants. The cover email 
introduced the nature and purpose of the study, the likely benefits of participation and the 
participant’s right to free consent etc. As this cover email was a part of this study’s instrument, 
the contents of the email were also pilot tested and improved for their clarity.  
The research instrument (which was accessible through a link provided at the end of cover 
email) started with the title of the study, followed by to-the-point instructions regarding the 
approximate time to completion (i.e. 15 – 20 minutes) and the ability to complete the study in 
parts. The option to save the study and to continue it from where the respondents last left it, 
contributed towards the increased response rate. The first phase of instrument asked for the 
data on four demographic variables, followed by the measurement of control variables. The 
second phase comprised of four experimental vignettes along with the measurements on 
study’s intervening and dependent variables against each of the vignettes. Prior to concluding 
the research instrument with a note of thanks, comments box was also included for the 
participants.   
The entire research instrument utilised only the ten mini pages/screens and the appearance was 
kept professional and simple. In order to utilise as little space as possible, some customised 
formats were used – for instance, horizontal positioning for multiple choice questions and the 
drop-down list for the answers to matrix form questions was implemented. In accordance with 
the provisions of Dillman, Smyth and Christian (2008; 2014) and Saunders, Thornhill and 
Lewis (2009), the research instrument was revised over several times – this will be detailed in 
the pilot testing section. 
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4.4.5.3 Manipulation of Independent Variable 
As briefed in the earlier section on the operationalisation of variables, conflict of interests is 
the independent variable which has been manipulated through different threats to compliance 
with the fundamental principles of professional ethics. The vignette 1 involves conflict of 
interests due to self-interest threat – CoI-1, vignette 2 includes conflict of interests due to 
intimidation threat – CoI-2, vignette 3 involves conflict of interests due to a combination of 
self-interest and self-review threats – CoI-3 and vignette 4 is about conflict of interests due to 
a combination of self-interest, intimidation, self-reviewn and familiarity threats – CoI-4.  
Conflict of interests has been treated as a categorical variable as it comprises of the levels 
divided into distinct categories (Field, 2009; Cozby and Bates, 2011). For one particular 
vignette, conflict of interests represents a binary variable comprising of two categories, i.e. 
‘presence of that particular conflict of interests’ and ‘its absence’. 
4.4.5.4 Measurement of Demographic Variables 
The study required the collection of data on four demographic variables, i.e. participant’s rank 
in the firm, gender, years of work experience and their age. All the demographic variables were 
measured as simple responses to the questions asking about data on these variables. Such 
questions represent the category of questions, termed closed questions, that allow the 
respondent to choose from predetermined answers (Collis and Hussey, 2009). The closed 
questions are easier to answer and are quicker because they involve minimal writing and are a 
matter of choosing from the given options (Saunders, Thornhill and Lewis (2009). 
Specifically, the predetermined answers against participant’s rank comprised of the 
management board, partner, director, statutory auditor and the other rank to choose from. 
Gender asked for the respondent’s indication of male or female. The answers against the years 
of work experience were divided into six ranges to choose from, i.e. 1 – 5, 5 – 10, 10 – 15, 15 
– 20, 20 – 30, 30 – 40, 40 – 50 and above 50. Finally, age was measured by allowing participants 
to choose from the five slots, i.e. 20 – 30, 30 – 40, 40 – 50, 50 – 60 and above 60. The 
demographic variables have been measured in accordance with the extant research comparable 
to this study. All the demographic variables have been treated as categorical since these 
variables comprise of the entities divided into distinct categories. Specifically, the participant’s 
rank, years of work experience and their age are all the nominal variables as these comprise of 
more than two categories. Gender is, however, a binary variable as it comprises of two 
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categories (Field, 2009; Cozby and Bates, 2011).  
4.4.5.5 Measurement of Control, Intervening and Dependent Variables  
The study required collection of data on two control variables representing two distinct 
dispositional traits (i.e. occupational self-efficacy – OSE and propensity to morally disengage 
– PMD), three intervening variables (i.e. positive outcome expectancy of compliant decision-
making – POE, perceived difficulty in making compliant decisions – PD and ethical judgement 
– EJ), one dependent variable for the main analysis (i.e. likelihood of deviant decision-making 
behaviour – DD) and one dependent variable for complementary analysis (i.e. likelihood of 
compliant decision-making behaviour – CD).   
Data on all the control, intervening and the dependent variables were collected using the rating 
questions. Typically, the rating questions are meant for opinion data collection. In this regard, 
the Likert or Likert-type rating scales and items are most frequently used – respondents are 
required to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement with a statement or a set of 
statements, usually on a four- to seven-point rating scale. Other opinion data such as the level 
of belief in truthfulness or untruthfulness, the level of confidence and the level of difficulty etc. 
are also measured using rating scales. Furthermore, positive as well as negative statements can 
be used in rating questions (Saunders, Thornhill and Lewis, 2009). There are many advantages 
of using rating scales – for instance, it allows the ease of answering the asked questions and 
occupies less space on a research instrument, by listing all the statements in one set (Collis and 
Hussey, 2009).  
• Control Variables 
OSE was measured using a short version of the Occupational Self-Efficacy Scale, proposed by 
Rigotti, Schyns and Mohr (2008). It includes a total of six statements that were presented to 
research participants on a 5-point response scale ranging from 1 (not at all true) to 5 
(completely true). The scale has adequate psychometric properties and demonstrates excellent 
goodness-of-fit indexes, acceptable scale reliability, convergent validity and the discriminant 
validity (Rigotti, Schyns and Mohr, 2008; Damasio 2014).  
PMD was measured using a short version of the Propensity to Morally Disengage Scale, 
proposed by Moore et al. (2012). The scale includes a total of eight statements that were 
presented to research participants on a 5-point response scale ranging from 1 (strongly 
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disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The scale has adequate psychometric properties and 
demonstrates excellent goodness-of-fit indexes, acceptable scale reliability, convergent 
validity and the discriminant validity (Moore et al., 2012; Kouchaki and Smith, 2013).  
The lower scores on both the occupational self-efficacy and the propensity to morally 
disengage scales indicate less of the respective trait. 
• Intervening Variables 
All the intervening variables have been measured against each of the four vignettes involving 
different categories of conflict of interests (i.e. CoI-1, CoI-2, CoI-3 and CoI-4).  
PD has been measured as the self-reported level of perceived difficulty/ease in making 
compliant decisions. 5-points Likert item has been used with ‘1’ representing the perception of 
difficulty level in making compliant decisions as ‘very easy’ and ‘5’ as ‘very difficult’. 
Similarly, POE has been measured as the self-reported level of agreement/disagreement with 
the expectation that the overall positive outcomes of compliant decision-making will outweigh 
its negative outcomes. 5-points Likert item has been used with ‘1’ representing ‘strong 
disagreement’ and ‘5’ the ‘strong agreement’. Moreover, EJ has been measured as the 
participants’ judgement about the ethicality of compliant decision choices in all the vignettes. 
Three broad decision choices are included with varying levels of ethicality on a continuum, 
with one of these representing the ‘least ethical, i.e. deviant decision’ (coded ‘1’), another 
representing the ‘less ethical decision, i.e. neither deviant not compliant’ (coded ‘2’) and the 
third the ‘most ethical, i.e. compliant decision’ (coded ‘3’). 
• Dependent Variables 
Both the dependent variables (i.e. DD and CD) have been measured against each of the four 
vignettes. DD has been measured using 5-points Likert item with ‘1’ representing deviant 
decision-making as ‘extremely unlikely’ and ‘5’ as ‘extremely likely’. Similarly, CD has been 
measured using 5-points Likert item with ‘1’ representing compliant decision-making as 
‘extremely unlikely’ and ‘5’ as ‘extremely likely’. 
It is worth discussing that the use of single-item measures for cognitive and behavioural 
constructs has been empirically justified by Hoeppner, Kelly, Urbanoski and Slaymaker 
(2011). They found that the single-item measures of self-efficacy outperformed the multiple-
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item measure in predicting future behaviour. Similarly, Petrescu (2013) suggests that the 
concrete and easy-to-understand constructs can successfully be measured using only one item 
and that the behavioural constructs based on single-item measures can reliably be included in 
structural equation models. Other researchers (Schimmack, 2009; Zimmerman et al., 2006; 
Gebauer, Broemer, Haddock and von Hecker, 2008; Rossiter and Bergkvist, 2009) also agree 
that the use of single-item measures in case of the context-specific variables is almost as 
effective as is the multiple items measure of the same variable. Therefore, the use of single-
item measures for this study’s context-specific and straightforward cognitive and behavioural 
constructs (i.e. PD, POE, EJ, DD and CD) is justifiable. 
4.4.5.6 Treatment of Control, Intervening and Dependent Variables 
Likert scales and items used for measuring all the control, intervening and the dependent 
variables have been treated as continuous variables that yield interval data.  
Cozby and Bates (2011) provide that the Likert scales used for measuring personality traits 
yield interval data. Accordingly, this study’s control variable, i.e. OSE and PMD have been 
treated as continuous variables. Similarly, justification to use intervening (POE, PD and EJ) 
and the dependent variables (DD and CD) as continuous variables comes from a very robust 
study conducted by Rhemtulla, Brosseau-Liard and Savalei (2012). Accordingly, any variable 
comprising of five to seven categories (as are POE, PD, DD and CD) can be conveniently 
treated as a continuous variable. Similarly, for variables comprising of two to four categories 
(as is EJ), it is acceptable to treat them as continuous variables for a sample size between 100 
to 150 – this study’s sample size is 105 against each of the manipulations of the independent 
variable and is 420 in total, i.e. 105*4.  
4.4.5.7 Pilot Study 
The research instrument used for empirical data collection was finalised on the basis of a pilot 
study comprising of two stages. Biddix (2009) provides that pilot testing is an important 
component in instrumentation and is primarily aimed at testing for the manipulation checks, 
the usability of the research instrument and its validity and reliability.  
In the case of experiments, pilot testing is of immense importance so as to improve the format, 
to obtain feedback before starting an extended data collection, for rectifying any misunderstood 
questions and to improve the scales of measurement or the questions (Dillman, Smyth and 
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Christian, 2008; Creswell, 2014). According to Cozby and Bates (2011), pilot studies should 
be conducted after the researcher has finally decided on all the specific aspects of the procedure. 
Usually, the participants in a pilot study are questioned about their experience following the 
experiment. Bell (2005) suggested that when doing pilot testing, researchers should consider 
various concerns such as the time taken to complete the study, clarity of instructions, possible 
ambiguity in the questions, appropriateness of the layout and any possible objectionable 
questions. Furthermore, participants might also be asked to comment on the study.   
Importantly, pilot testing allows carrying out manipulation checks (Creswell, 2014). A 
manipulation check is an attempt to directly measure whether the manipulation of independent 
variable has the intended effect on participants. If a researcher gets the insignificant 
relationship between the independent and the dependent variable, then manipulation checks are 
a good way to ensure if insignificance is due to the ineffective manipulations (Cozby and Bates, 
2011).  
Following the suggestion by Dillman, Smyth and Christian (2008) that pilot testing should start 
with a review of the research instrument by knowledgeable analysts and colleagues, the 
instrument was first presented to both the supervisors of this research for their feedback. Based 
on their comments, some changes were introduced in the contents of research instrument which 
was then considered ready for being subjected to pilot testing. The main issues of concern were 
to ensure the feasibility of data collection through web-based experiment, the content of 
experimental vignettes, manipulation check, to assess the clarity of instructions and questions 
included in the research instrument and the total time taken to complete the study. 
The first stage of pilot testing was conducted with a total of thirty participants, including five 
professional auditors and three assurance managers from the professional accounting firms, 
fifteen ACCA students and seven accounting students. A separate section was included at the 
end of the instrument to check for the manipulations of independent variable. Specifically, the 
manipulation checks involved asking the participants for their confirmation that they 
understood the different situations involved in the given vignettes. Comments were also invited 
about the concerns highlighted in the previous paragraph. The instrument was revised on the 
basis of feedback received at this stage. Some comments, verbatim, of the participant are as 
follows; 
“The body of the cover email is too long and provides unnecessary details.” 
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(Participant 1) 
“……but I think in the end it’s little bit repetitive. Usually, people have no time these days, so 
it can cause them a little bit of an issue.” 
(Participant 5) 
“I would give 65 out of 100 points to your experiment. Best of luck!” 
 (Participant 15) 
“In the beginning, the study is a little bit confusing but then it is very good and clear.” 
 (Participant 20) 
Overall, the participants suggested some changes in the wording of some questions and advised 
reducing some repetitiveness. The positive comments (which have not been presented above) 
suggested that the manipulations were working in an intended way and that the format and 
layout of research instrument were very interesting for the participants. 
After introducing the required changes in research instrument, it was subjected to the second 
stage of pilot testing with a total of 17 professionals from the Big Four accounting firms in the 
UK. This stage was meant to ensure that the changes introduced in research instrument have 
made a positive difference. A manipulation check was not required at this stage and only the 
comments were invited. Some of the comments, verbatim, of the participants follow; 
“You have chosen very good examples.” 
(Participant 3) 
“Interesting dilemmas that aren’t that easy to answer” 
(Participant 10) 
“I think the questionnaire has been drafted really well. I thoroughly enjoyed participating in 
this study” 
(Participant 13) 
“Scenarios are understood, but in one or two of them there may be some issues of materiality 
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which are not allowed for in your answer options” 
(Participant 16) 
The comments of the participants in the second stage of pilot testing prompted few changes in 
the composition of vignette scenarios. The required changes were introduced and the improved 
version of research instrument was re-reviewed by both the supervisors of this research. The 
final version of this study’s research instrument has been presented in the Appendix 2.  
4.4.6 Administration of Experiment 
After the research instrument has been designed, pilot-tested and improved accordingly, it is 
ready to be subjected to data collection (Dillman, Smyth and Christian, 2008; Saunders, 
Thornhill and Lewis, 2009). A well-designed research instrument is just one part of an attempt 
to achieve higher response rates and the implementation procedures are equally important. 
These procedures include, but are not limited to, multiple contacts with the respondents, the 
content of reminder emails and/or letters, personalisation, incentives and the good 
communication skills etc. Based on Tailored Design Method (Dillman, Smyth and Christian, 
2014), the strategy of multiple contacts was used to achieve higher response rates.  
As indicated earlier on, Qualtrics software was used to create the research instrument and to 
distribute it to the respondents. The software tracks records of the emails sent, those bounced, 
the studies started and those finished. In the first step, research instrument was emailed to a 
total of 2283 professionals serving at the Big Four accounting firms. Out of these, 110 emails 
bounced (on account of invalid email addresses) and 2173 got sent, out of which only 591 
emails got opened. Out of the 591 opened emails, 165 participants opted out (through a link 
provided at the end of cover email), 36 refused to participate (through direct reply to the cover 
email), 97 started the study and 52 of them finished it. The Qualtrics support team was 
contacted to investigate the possible technical reasons for only the 591 emails being opened 
up. According to the team, there could be two possible reasons for this – first, the remaining 
emails (i.e. 2173 – 591 = 1582) might have ended up in the spam folder of participants or, 
secondly, the participants deliberately did not open the email. All the email addresses were 
official and the strict data protection policies in the professional accounting firms lead to strict 
filter controls in their email servers. 
Three weeks after the first emails, the second step involved sending a reminder email. This 
112 
time a total of 2040 emails were sent, excluding those who finished the survey and those who 
opted out or refused [i.e. 2283 (total) – 165 (opted out) – 36 (refused) – 52 (finished) = 2040]. 
As before, the same 110 emails were bounced and 1927 got sent, out of which only 341 got 
opened. Given the fact that only 341 emails were opened, it can be said that due to the strict 
data protection and e-mail filtering rules, the majority of the emails was getting directed to the 
spam folder of intended people. It might, therefore, be assumed that a total of 591 emails 
reached the inboxes and the rest ended up in spam. This time, 37 started the study and 20 
finished it, while a total of 26 refused to participate in the study. 
Two weeks after the second step, it was decided for the third step that reminders should be sent 
to those who started the study but did not finish it (a total of 62 participants). Resultantly, 33 
of them finished the survey, 12 refused to proceed further and 18 did not respond. Thus a total 
of 105 responses were received [i.e. 52 (step 1) + 20 (step 2) + 33 (step 3) = 105]. Based on 
the previous relevant experimental research, the aim was to collect data from at least 100 
professionals. The options to contact the professionals by phone or mail were ruled out because 
the Register of Statutory Auditors, which was used to make a list of professionals, provides the 
contact details of the head offices only. The head offices were contacted, but they refused to 
provide any further details about the participants. Furthermore, due to the time and budget 
constraints, more time could not be allocated to data collection.  
Table 4.2: Participants’ Response Rate 
Assuming that only 591 professionals opened the cover email of research instrument and that 
Response Rate 
Respondents 
First 
request 
Second 
Request 
Third 
Request 
Total 
Complete Responses 52 20 33 105 
Opt out & Refusal Responses 201 26 12 239 
Total 253 46 45 344 
Response Rate (Based on 591 Opened 
Emails) 
43% 8% 8% 58% 
Response Rate (Based on 2173 Sent 
Emails) 
12% 2% 2% 16% 
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the rest of the emails ended up in spam, the total response rate is high, i.e. 58%. When 
calculated for the 2173 sent emails (i.e. 2283 – 110 bounced), the total response rate is still 
acceptable, i.e. 16%. Based on the provisions by Dillman, Smyth and Christian (2008) and 
Saunders, Thornhill and Lewis (2009), the total response rate for this study is acceptable. 
Furthermore, according to Bryman and Bell (2007), the low response rate is acceptable and 
expected in the case of research based on convenience sampling. 
Table 4.3: Demographics of Research Participants 
Rank Frequency Percentage 
Management Board 5 5% 
Partners 83 79% 
Director 8 8% 
Statutory Auditors 9 9% 
Total 105 100% 
Work Experience (Years) Frequency Percentage 
1 – 20 20 19% 
20 – 30 42 40% 
30 -40 41 39% 
40 -50 2 2% 
Total 105 100% 
Age (years) Frequency Percentage 
20-30 7 7% 
30-40 7 7% 
40-50 38 36% 
50-60 48 46% 
> 60 5 5% 
Total 105 100% 
Gender Frequency Percentage 
Male 85 81% 
Female 20 19% 
Total 105 100% 
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The demographics of respondents are presented in table 4.3. The majority of the participants 
have a higher rank in their respective firm, i.e. 79% are partners, have higher work experience, 
i.e. 79% have more than 20 years of work experience, 82% are more than 40 years old and 81% 
are male. So that there are no or minimal threats to the validity of the research findings, 
interpretation of the results will take into consideration the demographics of participants. 
Accordingly, generalisations of the findings will be made with caution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Respondents by Firm 
As shown in the figure 4.2, the respondents from each of the Big Four have fairly equal 
distribution in the study’s sample. Out of the total 105 respondents, 22 belonged to Deloitte, 
27 to EY, 30 to KPMG and 26 are from PricewaterhouseCoopers.  
4.4.7 Threats to Validity 
It is extremely important to take into consideration the internal and external threats to the 
validity of an experiment, that raise questions about the researcher’s ability to conclude that 
the independent variable (its manipulation or intervention) affects an outcome and not some 
other factors. Internal threats to validity are the experimental treatments, procedures or the 
experiences of the participants that threaten the ability of a researcher to draw correct inferences 
from the data. External threats are said to arise when a researcher incorrectly generalises the 
findings of research. It is essential for a researcher to take appropriate actions in an attempt to 
mitigate or to eliminate the internal and external threats to validity (Creswell, 2012; Creswell, 
2014).  
The possible internal threat to the validity of this study’s experiment could have been the 
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selection threat which arises if the participants are selected on the basis of a particular 
characteristic that could lead them to display particular outcome – for instance, choosing the 
brighter students who would perform better at comprehension task (Creswell, 2012). In an 
attempt to minimise this possible threat, selection of the participants was not based on any 
particular criteria (Creswell, 2014). 
Similarly, Creswell (2012) suggested the following possible external threats to validity: (i) 
interaction of selection and treatment (i.e. the limited characteristics of the participants does 
not allow the researcher to generalize findings to those who lack in such characteristics), (ii) 
interaction of setting and treatment (i.e. the characteristics of the settings does not allow the 
researcher to generalize findings to those in other settings) and (iii) the interaction of history 
and treatment (i.e. the time-bound nature of the experiment does not allow the researcher to 
generalize findings to the past or future situations). For this study’s experiment, the possible 
external threat could have been the interaction of selection and treatment. In an attempt to 
address this possible threat, the researcher restricted claims about the individuals or groups to 
which the study’s findings cannot be generalised (Creswell, 2014).   
4.4.8 Statistical Technique 
This section will introduce Partial Least Squares (PLS) path analysis and will provide rationale 
for its adoption as a statistical technique for data analysis.   
4.4.8.1 PLS Path Analysis 
Recently, there has been burgeoning trend in accounting research to use the multidisciplinary 
perspectives and methods, for examining a wide range of research topics (Henri, 2007). In 
order to match these developments, there is a need for better model specifications to represent 
the relationships derived from theories. Moreover, methodological rigour is also required for 
testing the models (Ittner and Larcker, 2001; Chenhall, 2005). Path analysis, which is an 
extension of multiple regression, is one such technique that is suitable for analysing 
complicated models involving the chains of relationships (Streiner, 2005). It is a multivariate 
analysis technique that allows simultaneous analysis of more than two variables. Multiple 
measurements on the research participants can, therefore, be analysed instantaneously (Hair, 
Black, Babin and Anderson, 2010).    
The main purpose of statistical techniques, including path analysis, is to determine if the 
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patterns of collected data could have occurred by chance rather than by the causes proposed by 
the theory. It is important that the chosen techniques must be in alignment with the theory being 
tested and the particular needs of a research (Lowry and Gaskin, 2014). Path analysis is a 
special case of structural equation modelling (SEM) and can be regarded a technique to analyse 
the structural relationships between observed variables. While SEM works with latent variables 
in order to account for the measurement error, path analysis assumes that all the variables are 
measured without error (Shin, 2008; Kazár, 2014). Since this study includes variables that have 
been measured using single indicators, the variables are treated as the observed – hence, path 
analysis has been adopted as data analysis technique. 
It is important to justify the choice of a particular statistical technique, by providing the 
rationale for its adoption. This choice is based on the nature of research questions and/or 
hypotheses, the number of independent and dependent variables, the number of variables 
controlled, consideration of whether the variables will be measured on an instrument as a 
continuous score or as a categorical score and whether the scores are normally distributed. The 
said factors help in determining which statistical test is the most suited for addressing the 
research questions (Rudestam and Newton, 2007; Creswell, 2014). Importantly, the 
assumptions of chosen statistical test must be taken into consideration (Field, 2009; Creswell, 
2014).  
Within path analysis, it is common to use both the ‘covariance-based method (CB)’, that 
represents constructs through factors and the ‘variance or partial least squares-based method 
(PLS)’, that represents the constructs through components. CB method often ends with the 
‘factor indeterminacy’ which implies that it produces more than one solution that are all 
mathematically sound, but provides no means to determine which of the several solutions 
pertains to the hypothesis being tested. However, the PLS method avoids the factor 
indeterminacy problem by composing constructs from the factor scores and then using these in 
subsequent calculations. PLS adopts an iterative approach for obtaining the parameter 
estimates and does not assume that the dependent variables conform to any particular 
distribution. Importantly, CB method relies on the assumption of normal distribution, while the 
PLS method does not assume normality and is also preferable in the instances of non-
homogeneity of variance and for the small sample sizes. Thus, PLS allows more flexibility in 
analysing the theoretical models (Lowry and Gaskin, 2014).  
This study’s theoretical model draws on the social cognitive theory and the throughput model, 
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that are less developed for this study’s area of research. The goal of this research is the 
explanation (and some predictions) and it includes not-too-large sample size. Most of the 
variables follow a non-normal distribution, as observed through the descriptive statistics. 
Importantly, heteroscedasticity is presumed in the case of this study’s path model since the 
theory underlying this study expects the variability in the dependent variables to be unequal 
across the different values of a predictor (Field, 2009). Moreover, the empirical study is based 
on a rather complex structural model which also includes interaction effects and intends to 
compare alternate models.  
Table 4.4: Guidelines for Choosing between PLS- and CB-Path Analysis [Based on Hair, Ringle and Sarstedt 
(2011) and Lowry and Gaskin (2014)] 
Importantly, most of the established theoretical models, such as those drawing on Social 
Cognitive Theory, are too complex to be tested fully with traditional statistical techniques. The 
advanced statistical techniques, such as PLS based path analysis, are very useful for the 
Criteria PLS CB  
Theory Less Developed, Strong Strong  
Research Goal Theory Development and Prediction 
Theory Testing 
and 
Confirmation 
Sample Size 
Can Handle Small Sample Sizes (Minimum: 10 Times 
the Largest Number of Paths Leading towards 
Endogenous Constructs) 
Larger Sample 
Sizes Are 
Required 
Distributional 
Assumption 
Non-Parametric (Distribution Free) 
Parametric 
(Normal 
Distribution) 
Heteroscedasticity Suitable 
Assumes 
Homogeneity 
Structural Model Complex Less Complex 
Includes 
Interaction Effects 
Preferable Very Difficult 
Alternate Models Yes Yes, Preferable 
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behavioural researchers. Such techniques allow testing the big picture of theory and offer 
advantages for causal modelling (Lowry and Gaskin, 2014). It must, however, be considered 
that path analysis cannot establish causality but can only prove or disprove a model that 
postulates causal relationships among the variables. In this way, path analysis is not a model-
building approach, but a model-testing one (Streiner, 2005).  
Thus, following the guidelines by various experts (e.g., Rudestam and Newton, 2007; Field, 
2009; Hair, Ringle and Sarstedt, 2011; Creswell, 2014; Lowry and Gaskin, 2014), the statistical 
technique this study adopts to analyse the empirical data is the PLS-based path analysis. After 
having identified and justified the adoption of particular statistical technique, the next step is 
to identify the statistical package that is well equipped to perform the chosen technique (Field, 
2009; Creswell, 2014). In order to perform the PLS-based path analysis, this study utilises 
SmartPLS 3 that is one of the leading PLS-SEM software programs. The SmartPLS 3 works 
with Partial Least Squares (PLS) path modelling algorithm and offers many data analysis 
functions (Hair, Ringle and Sarstedt, 2011; 2013). This study used SmartPLS 3 to assess the 
structural model through examination of the coefficients of determination, the path coefficients, 
the effect size, the predictive relevance, the goodness of model fit and multicollinearity. The 
bootstrapping procedure was performed to test the research hypotheses. Furthermore, 
complementary analysis (i.e. testing alternate model) and multi-group analysis were also 
performed using this statistical software. The application and usefulness of SmartPLS 3 will 
become evident in the next chapter on data analysis.  
4.4.8.2 Current Debate on PLS Path Modelling 
In the light of current debate on usefulness and application of PLS path modelling, this 
subsection is meant to provide further justification for adopting PLS path analysis as a 
statistical technique.  
It is necessary to emphasise that path analysis should not be confused with the more advanced 
path modelling and it is necessary to be aware of the basic difference and similarity between 
the two. The extant literature tends to use the terms PLS path modelling (PLS-PM) and PLS 
structural equation modelling (PLS-SEM) interchangeably (McIntosh, Edwards and 
Antonakis, 2014; Rönkkö et al., 2016; Sarstedt et al., 2016; Hair et al., 2017; Nitzl and Chin, 
2017). PLS-PM is a statistical analysis technique applied to the two main components of a 
model, i.e. the measurement model that shows relationships between latent variables and their 
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indicators and the structural model that relates latent variables to one another. Path analysis, 
on the other hand, is an extension of multiple regression and includes only the structural model 
but not the measurement model. In this sense, path analysis can be viewed as a special case of 
path modelling – the one in which all the variables/ constructs are treated as observed and unit-
weighted since these are measured using only the single indicators (Shin, 2008; Kazár, 2014). 
Nonetheless, PLS-based path analysis and path modelling share the same algorithm, i.e. 
variance-based partial least squares method (Lowry and Gaskin, 2014).  
The current debate on PLS path modelling starts with Rönkkö et al. (2016) pointing out the 
lack of rigorous methodological support for indicator weighting system14 utilised for the 
measurement model in path modelling. They assert that approximating the latent variables 
using multiple indictors leads to the inconsistent and biased estimations. They further 
highlighted the lack of methodological support for the claims such as the suitability of PLS for 
small samples and non-normal data. Sarstedt et al. (2016) responded to their criticism by 
conducting a rigorous simulation study. They found that PLS does not lead to bias for 
estimating data from a composite model and that the bias in estimation can only occur when 
using the composite-based PLS to estimate the common factors models15 and vice versa. Hair 
et al. (2017) have also responded and provided further evidence that, when the underlying 
population is based on composite model, PLS leads to unbiased and consistent estimators. 
Furthermore, PLS was evidenced to yield high statistical power – some earlier studies (e.g., 
Hui and Wold, 1982; Lohmöller, 1989; Schneeweiss, 1991; Hwang, 2009; Hwang et al., 2010; 
Marcoulides, Chin and Saunders, 2012) also suggest support for this stance. Sarstedt et al. 
(2016) and Hair et al. (2017) reaffirmed the successful application of PLS to sample sizes over 
100. Even more recently, Nitzl and Chin (2017) supported the adoption of PLS path models in 
managerial accounting research drawing on small sample sizes and when the purpose of study 
is, primarily, the prediction or exploration.  
Thus, the criticisms on PLS primarily pertain to the estimation of measurement model and, 
according to Sarstedt et al. (2016), Hair et al. (2017) and Nitzl and Chin (2017), hold under the 
assumption of common factor models only. Following the provisions of current debate, this 
study’s path analysis is essentially based on the composite model logic, since the 
variables/constructs in the study’s model have been measured using single composite 
                                                 
14 for details of the indicator weighting system, see Henseler et al., 2014. 
15 for details of the composite and common factor models, see Sarstedt et al., 2016. 
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indicators that fully explain the construct it purports to measure. Moreover, only the structural 
model is a matter of concern in case of path analysis which implies that the criticisms that are 
more specifically related to measurement model are not applicable to this research. Although 
the extent to which the criticisms on path modelling are readily applicable to path analysis is 
not completely clear, it is necessary to be considerate of the current debate because both the 
techniques share same PLS algorithm. One of the main concerns of Rönkkö et al. (2016) is the 
lack of evidence for superiority of PLS to the other statistical techniques – this, however, does 
not imply inferiority of PLS, per se. Until recently, only a small number of researchers 
(Goodhue, Thompson and Lewis, 2013; McIntosh, Edwards and Antonakis, 2014; Rönkkö et 
al., 2016) has been critical of PLS. In fact, PLS is regarded as one of the most fully developed 
system for path analysis with composites (McDonald, 1996; Hair et al., 2017). Therefore, it 
can be concluded that the adoption of PLS path analysis for this research is completely 
justifiable. 
4.5 Summary 
This chapter discussed and justified the adoption of postpositivism paradigm that underpins 
this study, the experiment methodology adopted and the methods used for data collection and 
analysis. Specifically, the postpositivism paradigm was explained and contrasted with 
positivism in the section regarding philosophical assumptions. Next, the details about the 
experimental study were included in the section on research methodology. Finally, the section 
on research methods included the details of this study’s context, population, sampling frame, 
sampling, experimental vignettes, operationalisation of this study’s variables, research 
instrumentation, administration of experiment, threats to validity and the statistical technique 
for data analysis. The decision to adopt an overall quantitative approach for this study was 
informed by the reciprocal intersection of research paradigm with the research methodology 
and methods and the nature of the research problem.  
The data analysis procedures will be detailed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5: DATA ANALYSIS 
“The goal is to turn data into information and information into insights”. 
Carly Fiorina 
5.1 Introduction 
The application of data analysis procedures to empirical data produces the results that yield 
insights for permitting the conclusions as possible answers to the research questions (Ellis and 
Levy, 2008). This chapter provides a detailed account of data analysis procedures that have 
been applied to the empirical data. The second section includes an examination of data for the 
outliers, missing values and the normality assumption. The third section details the descriptive 
statistics to summarise the research data. Model assessment procedures have been included in 
the fourth section, followed by hypotheses testing in the fifth section. The multi-group analysis 
will be discussed in the sixth section and the complementary analysis in the seventh section. 
Finally, this chapter will be summarised in the eighth section. 
The main model comprises of 1 independent variable (i.e. conflict of interests), 3 intervening 
variables (i.e. the positive outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making, perceived 
difficulty in making compliant decisions and ethical judgement) and 1 dependent variable (i.e. 
likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour). An additional complementary model has 
also been tested, which comprises of the same independent and intervening variables, but the 
dependent variable has been replaced with the ‘likelihood of compliant decision-making 
behaviour’. Both the main and complementary models have been run in four subsets, 
considering one category of conflict of interests at a time (i.e. CoI-1: conflict of interests due 
to self-interest threat, CoI-2: that due to intimidation threat, CoI-3: that due to a combination 
of self-interest and self-review threats and CoI-4: conflict of interests due to a combination of 
self-interest, intimidation, self-review and familiarity threats).   
5.2 Data Examination 
In order to gain a better understanding of data, it is essential to first examine it (Hair, Black, 
Babin and Anderson, 2010). The process of data examination includes procedures such as 
identification of the missing values, detection of outliers and testing for the normality 
assumption (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007).  
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5.2.1 Missing Values 
The research instrument did not allow the participants to skip answering any of the questions 
included (i.e. by implementing the option of ‘compulsory response’ in Qualtrics software used 
for data collection). Furthermore, partially completed instruments were discarded and have not 
been included in the analysis. Therefore, there are no missing values in the empirical data being 
analysed.  
5.2.2 Outliers 
Empirical data for this study does not contain any extreme outliers as it has been collected 
using the Liker-items and scales that define the lower and upper bounds any data value can 
take. Therefore, the participants’ choice to answer at the extremes is not representative of an 
outlier behaviour (Treiblmaier and Filzmoser, 2011).   
5.2.3 Normality 
Normal distribution of data is signified by most of the data values or scores distributed equally 
around the central value, i.e. mean. Deviations from normal distribution might occur either due 
to the lack of symmetry (termed skewness) or due to the extreme scores (termed kurtosis) in 
the distribution of data around its mean. Positive skewness is characterised by most of the data 
values clustered below the mean and a very few far above it. Likewise, negative skewness is 
characterised by most of the data values clustered above the mean and a very few far below it. 
Positive kurtosis is termed ‘leptokurtic distribution’ which is characterised by a low number of 
extreme scores, with most of these clustered closely around the mean and, graphically, the 
distribution appears to have thick tails. Moreover, negative kurtosis is termed ‘platykurtic 
distribution’ which is characterised by a high number of extreme scores, with most of these far 
dispersed around the mean and, graphically, the distribution appears to have thin tails (Field, 
2009; Westfall, 2014; Gould and Moav, 2016). 
Since this study’s data arise from more than one variable, it is subject to multivariate analysis 
that requires data values to be normally distributed and the violation of which renders the 
results of parametric statistical tests invalid. Ideally, the data should be normally distributed 
which means that the skewness and kurtosis should be zero in their values. If a distribution has 
skewness and/or kurtosis less than or more than zero then it is said to be deviating from a 
normal distribution (Field, 2009; Hair, Black, Babin and Anderson, 2010). In order to deal with 
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non-normality, some transformations can be applied to data in order to make its distribution, 
approximately, normal. However, not everyone agrees that the transformation of data is a good 
idea. Alternatively, robust tests can be used that have considerable benefits over transforming 
the data – ‘Trimmed Mean’ and ‘Bootstrap’ are examples of robust testing16. Similarly, using 
the programs that work with non-parametric data are good to consider (Field, 2009; Hair, 
Ringle, Sarstedt and Ringle, 2014).  
The empirical data will be assessed for normality assumption using the criteria specified by 
Hair, Ringle, Sarstedt and Ringle (2014) and Adams and Bogranskaya (2015). Accordingly, 
any distribution with skewness and kurtosis greater than +1 or lower than -1 (i.e. -
1>skewness>+1 and -1>kurtosis>+1) is regarded non-normal. Specifically, kurtosis greater 
than +1 indicates that distribution is too peaked and a value less than -1 indicates that it is too 
flat. Moreover, skewness greater than +1 or less than -1 indicates highly skewed distribution, 
that between -1 and -0.5 or between 0.5 and 1 indicates moderately skewed distribution and 
the skewness between -0.5 and 0.5 indicates, approximately, symmetric or normal distribution. 
Normality assumption will be detailed in the following section on descriptive statistics.  
5.3 Descriptive Statistics 
As opposed to the inferential statistics that are used to draw conclusions about data, the 
descriptive statistics are meant to describe and summarise the research data. The main 
descriptive statistics include the mean and median as the measures of central tendency, standard 
deviation and the minimum & maximum values as the measures of dispersion or spread and 
the skewness and kurtosis as the measures of shape or distribution.  
The mean represents average score and the median is the middle score when data scores are 
arranged in order of ascending magnitude. The disadvantage of the mean is that it is affected 
by the outliers and skewness, while the median is not. However, the reason mean is preferred 
as a measure of central tendency is that it takes into account all the values in the data set, while 
the median may ignore many. Therefore, both the mean and median will be included in the 
descriptive statistics. The measures of dispersion including standard deviation and range are 
required to assess how well the measure of central tendency (mean or median) represents the 
data. The smaller standard deviation implies that data points are closer to the mean and that the 
                                                 
16 For details of ‘Trimmed Mean’, see Hair, Ringle and Sarstedt, 2011. Bootstrap will be introduced in the later 
section.   
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mean is a good representative of data. The range is also the measure of dispersion and 
represents the difference between the largest (maximum) and the smallest (minimum) scores. 
The range reveals if there is low or high variation in the responses or data on the dependent 
variable (Field, 2009).  
The following subsections include descriptive statistics for each of the variables in this study. 
5.3.1 Likelihood of Deviant Decision-Making Behaviour (DD) 
The likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour (DD) has been measured as the self-
reported likelihood of making a deviant decision in the events of four categories of conflict of 
interests (i.e. CoI-1, CoI-2, CoI-3 and CoI-4).  The DD has been measured using 5-points Likert 
item with ‘1’ representing deviant decision-making as ‘extremely unlikely’ and ‘5’ as 
‘extremely likely’.  
Descriptive statistics revealed that in the case of CoI-1 and CoI-3, the minimum value is 1 
which represents DD as extremely unlikely and the maximum value is 4 which represents the 
DD as likely. In the case of CoI-2 and CoI-4, the minimum value is 1 which represents DD as 
extremely unlikely and the maximum value is 5 which represents the DD as extremely likely. 
Range as the difference between maximum and minimum values is 3 (i.e. 4 – 1 = 3) in the case 
of CoI-1 and CoI-3 and the range is 4 (i.e. 5 – 1 = 4) in the case of CoI-2 and CoI-4. Therefore, 
the variation in responses is comparatively lower in case of CoI-1 and CoI-3. 
Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics of the Likelihood of Deviant Decision-Making Behaviour (DD) 
In the events of CoI-1, CoI-2, CoI-3 and CoI-4, the mean values are 1.238, 2.800, 1.590 and 
1.838 and the median values are 1, 2, 1 and 2, respectively. Overall, DD is low and more 
Deviant Decision 
(DD) 
Mean Median Min Max 
Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
DD (CoI-1) 1.238 1 1 4 0.594 3.187 11.379 
DD (CoI-2) 2.800 2 1 5 1.290 0.111 -1.399 
DD (CoI-3) 1.590 1 1 4 0.752 1.253 1.305 
DD (CoI-4) 1.838 2 1 5 1.025 1.194 0.734 
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towards extreme unlikelihood (i.e. point 1). However, in the case of CoI-2, the mean value 
2.800 indicates DD as higher in comparison to other categories. The standard deviation in case 
of CoI-2 is comparatively the highest (i.e. 1.290) which indicates high dispersion of responses 
from their mean value. The next highest standard deviation (i.e. 1.025) is observed in case of 
CoI-4. The values of standard deviation in case of CoI-1 (i.e. 0.594) and CoI-3 (i.e. 0.752) 
indicate comparatively less dispersion of responses from their mean values.  
The DD appears to be highly positively skewed and kurtotic in case of CoI-1 (skewness = 3.187 
and kurtosis = 11.379) which indicates that most of the data values are clustered below the 
mean and a very few far above it and that the extreme scores are less in number. In case of CoI-
2, distribution of DD is very slightly skewed and is negatively kurtotic (skewness = 0.111 and 
kurtosis = -1.399) which indicates a high number of extreme scores. The distribution of DD in 
case of CoI-3 is positively skewed as well as kurtotic (skewness = 1.253 and kurtosis = 1.305) 
which indicates that most of the data values are clustered below the mean and that the extreme 
scores are less in number. However, the distribution of DD in case of CoI-4 is positively 
skewed, but not kurtotic (skewness = 1.194 and kurtosis = 0.734) which implies that most of 
the data values are clustered below the mean and a very few far above it. Overall, distribution 
of DD is non-normal in all the situations of conflicting interests.  
5.3.2 Likelihood of Compliant Decision-Making Behaviour (CD) 
The likelihood of compliant decision-making behaviour (CD) has been measured as the self-
reported likelihood of making a compliant decision in the events of four categories of conflict 
of interests (i.e. CoI-1, CoI-2, CoI-3 and CoI-4). The CD has been measured using 5-points 
Likert item with ‘1’ representing compliant decision-making as ‘extremely unlikely’ and ‘5’ as 
‘extremely likely’.  
Descriptive statistics revealed that for all the four categories of conflicting interests, the 
minimum value is 1 which also represents CD as extremely unlikely. Similarly, the maximum 
value is 5 which also represents the CD as extremely likely. Furthermore, range as the 
difference between maximum and minimum values (i.e. 5 – 1 = 4) is same in all the four 
situations of conflicting interests, which indicates that variation in responses is same across all 
the categories. In the events of CoI-1, CoI-3 and CoI-4, the mean values are 4.438, 4.190 and 
3.933 and the median values are 5, 4 and 4, respectively. This indicates CD as high in likelihood 
and more towards the extreme likelihood (i.e. point 5). However, in case of CoI-2, the mean 
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value is 2.629 and the median is 2 that indicate CD as lower in likelihood. Moreover, the 
standard deviation in case of CoI-2 is comparatively the highest (i.e. 1.197) which indicates 
high dispersion of responses from their mean value. The next highest standard deviation (i.e. 
1.098) is observed in the case of CoI-4. The values of standard deviation in case of CoI-1 (i.e. 
0.915) and CoI-3 (i.e. 0.967) indicate comparatively less dispersion in the responses from their 
mean value.  
Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics of the Likelihood of Compliant Decision-Making Behaviour (CD) 
The CD appears approximately normally distributed in case of CoI-2 (skewness = 0.721 and 
kurtosis = -0.634) which provides that most of the data values are distributed equally around 
the mean. In the case of CoI-4, the distribution of CD is slightly negatively skewed, but is not 
kurtotic (skewness = -1.049 and kurtosis = 0.389) which implies that most of the data values 
are clustered above the mean and a very few far below it. Distribution is negatively skewed 
and positively kurtotic in case of CoI-1 (skewness = -2.049 and kurtosis = 4.440) and also CoI-
3 (skewness = -1.419 and kurtosis = 2.005) which indicates that most of the data values are 
clustered above the mean and a very few far below it and that the extreme scores are less in 
number.  
5.3.3 Positive Outcome Expectancy of Compliant Decision-Making (POE) 
For the four categories of conflict of interests (i.e. CoI-1, CoI-2, CoI-3 and CoI-4), the positive 
outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making (POE) has been measured as the self-
reported level of agreement/disagreement with ‘the expectation that the overall positive 
outcomes of compliant decision-making will outweigh its overall negative outcomes’. 5-points 
Likert item has been used with ‘1’ representing ‘strong disagreement’ and ‘5’ the ‘strong 
agreement’. 
Compliant Decision 
(CD) 
Mean Median Min Max 
Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
CD (CoI-1) 4.438 5 1 5 0.915 -2.049 4.440 
CD (CoI-2) 2.629 2 1 5 1.197 0.721 -0.634 
CD (CoI-3) 4.190 4 1 5 0.967 -1.419 2.005 
CD (CoI-4) 3.933 4 1 5 1.098 -1.049 0.389 
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In all the four situations of conflicting interests, the minimum value is 1 which represents a 
strong disagreement with the positive outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making. 
Similarly, the maximum value is 5 which represents a strong agreement. Furthermore, range as 
the difference between maximum and minimum values (i.e. 5 – 1 = 4) is same for all the 
categories of conflicting interests, which indicates that variation in responses is same across all 
the situations. In the events of CoI-1, CoI-3 and CoI-4, the mean values are 4.200, 4.248 and 
4.067 and the median values are 5, 4 and 4, respectively. This indicates the POE as high and 
more towards the strong agreement (i.e. point 5). However, in case of CoI-2, the mean value is 
3.438 that indicates almost the neutral stance (i.e. point 3) about POE. The standard deviation 
in case of CoI-1 is comparatively the highest (i.e. 1.174), which indicates high dispersion of 
responses from their mean value. The next highest standard deviation (i.e. 1.007) is observed 
in the case of CoI-4. The values of standard deviation in case of CoI-2 (i.e. 0.985) and CoI-3 
(i.e. 0.826) indicate comparatively less dispersion in responses from their mean value.  
 Table 5.3: Descriptive Statistics of Positive Outcome Expectancy (POE) 
POE appears approximately normally distributed in case of CoI-2 (skewness = -0.128 and 
kurtosis = -0.804) which provides that most of the data values are distributed equally around 
the mean. Distribution of POE is negatively skewed and positively kurtotic in the events of 
CoI-1 (skewness = -1.615 and kurtosis = 1.802), CoI-3 (skewness = -1.421 and kurtosis = 
2.618) and also CoI-4 (skewness = -1.157 and kurtosis = 1.035), which indicates that most of 
the data values are clustered above the mean and a very few far below it and that the extreme 
scores are less in number. 
5.3.4 Perceived Difficulty in Making Compliant Decision (PD) 
For all the four categories of conflict of interests (i.e. CoI-1, CoI-2, CoI-3 and CoI-4), perceived 
Positive Outcome 
Expectancy (POE) 
Mean Median Min Max 
Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
POE (CoI-1) 4.200 5 1 5 1.174 -1.615 1.802 
POE (CoI-2) 3.438 4 1 5 0.985 -0.128 -0.804 
POE (CoI-3) 4.248 4 1 5 0.826 -1.421 2.618 
POE (CoI-4) 4.067 4 1 5 1.007 -1.157 1.035 
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difficulty in making compliant decisions (PD) has been measured as the self-reported level of 
perceived difficulty/ease in making a compliant decision. 5-points Likert item has been used 
with ‘1’ representing the perception of difficulty level in making compliant decisions as ‘very 
easy’ and ‘5’ as ‘very difficult’.  
In all the situations of conflicting interests, the minimum value is 1 which represents the 
perception of difficulty in making a compliant decision as ‘very easy’. Similarly, the maximum 
value is 5 which represents the perception as ‘very difficult’. Furthermore, range as the 
difference between maximum and minimum values (i.e. 5 – 1 = 4) is same in all the four 
situations of conflicting interests which indicates that variation in responses is same across all 
the categories. In the events of CoI-1, CoI-3 and CoI-4, the mean values are 2.171, 2.695 and 
2.562 and the median values are 2, 3 and 2, respectively. This indicates PD as lower and more 
towards the perception of difficulty level as ‘very easy’ (i.e. point 1) to ‘neutral’ (i.e. point 3). 
However, in the case of CoI-2, the mean value is 3.857 and the median is 4 that indicate PD as 
high and more towards the perception of difficulty level as ‘very difficult’ (i.e. point 5). 
Moreover, the standard deviation in case of CoI-1 is comparatively the highest (i.e. 1.457) 
which indicates high dispersion of responses from their mean value. The next highest standard 
deviation (i.e. 1.400) is observed in the case of CoI-4. The values of standard deviation in case 
of CoI-2 (i.e. 1.045) and CoI-3 (i.e. 1.339) indicate comparatively less dispersion in responses 
from their mean value. 
 Table 5.4: Descriptive Statistics of Perceived Difficulty (PD) 
PD appears approximately normally distributed in case of CoI-1 (skewness = 0.990 and 
kurtosis = -0.522) which provides that most of the data values are distributed equally around 
the mean. Distribution of PD is negatively skewed and positively kurtotic in the case of CoI-2 
Perceived Difficulty 
(PD) 
Mean Median Min Max 
Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
PD (CoI-1) 2.171 2 1 5 1.457 0.990 -0.522 
PD (CoI-2) 3.857 4 1 5 1.046 -1.431 1.773 
PD (CoI-3) 2.695 3 1 5 1.339 0.141 -1.326 
PD (CoI-4) 2.562 2 1 5 1.400 0.336 -1.351 
129 
(skewness = -1.431 and kurtosis = 1.773) which indicates that most of the data values are 
clustered above the mean and a very few far below it and that the extreme scores are less in 
number. The distribution of PD is very slightly skewed and is negatively kurtotic in the case of 
CoI-3 (skewness = 0.141 and kurtosis = -1.326) and CoI-4 (skewness = 0.336 and kurtosis = -
1.351) which indicates high number of the extreme scores. 
5.3.5 Ethical Judgement (EJ) 
In case of all the four categories of conflict of interests (i.e. CoI-1, CoI-2, CoI-3 and CoI-4) 
ethical judgement (EJ) has been measured by the participants’ judgement about the ethicality 
of compliant decision choices. Three broad decision choices are included with varying levels 
of ethicality on a continuum, with one of these representing the least ethical decision (coded 
‘1’), another representing the less ethical decision (coded ‘2’) and the third the most ethical 
decision (coded ‘3’).  
Table 5.5: Descriptive Statistics of Ethical Judgement (EJ) 
The descriptive statistics revealed that in all the four situations, the minimum value is 1 which 
also represents the least ethical judgement. Similarly, the maximum value is 3 which represents 
the most ethical judgement. Furthermore, range as the difference between maximum and 
minimum values (i.e. 3 – 1 = 2) is same in all the four situations of conflicting interests, which 
indicates that variation in responses is same across all the categories. In the events of CoI-1, 
CoI-3 and CoI-4, the mean values are 2.819, 2.762 and 2.810, respectively and the median 
value is 3 in all the cases. This indicates EJ as high and more towards the most ethical decision-
choice. However, in case of CoI-2, the mean value is 2.229 and the median is 2 that indicates 
EJ as neither high nor low (i.e. neutral) and more towards the less ethical decision-choice (i.e. 
point 2). Moreover, the standard deviation in case of CoI-2 is comparatively the highest (i.e. 
Ethical Judgement 
(EJ) 
Mean Median Min Max 
Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
EJ (CoI-1) 2.819 3 1 3 0.409 -2.097 3.589 
EJ (CoI-2) 2.229 2 1 3 0.651 -0.272 -0.705 
EJ (CoI-3) 2.762 3 1 3 0.488 -1.965 3.160 
EJ (CoI-4) 2.810 3 1 3 0.439 -2.262 4.595 
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0.651) which indicates higher dispersion of responses from their mean value. The values of 
standard deviation in case of CoI-1 (i.e. 0.409), CoI-3 (i.e. 0.488) and CoI-4 (i.e. 0.439) indicate 
comparatively less dispersion in responses from their mean value.  
EJ appears approximately normally distributed in the case of CoI-2 (skewness = -0.272 and 
kurtosis = -0.705) which provides that most of the data values are distributed equally around 
the mean. However, the distribution of EJ is negatively skewed and positively kurtotic in case 
of CoI-1 (skewness = -2.097 and kurtosis = 3.589), CoI-3 (skewness = -1.965 and kurtosis = 
3.160) and CoI-4 (skewness = -2.262 and kurtosis = 4.595) which indicates that most of the 
data values are clustered above the mean and a very few far below it and that the extreme scores 
are less in number. 
5.3.6 Occupational Self-Efficacy (OSE) 
In case of all the four categories of conflicting interests (i.e. CoI-1, CoI-2, CoI-3 and CoI-4), 
occupational self-efficacy (OSE) has been measured as the self-reported level of perceived self-
efficacy to successfully fulfil the job-related tasks. 5-points Likert-type scale, comprising of 
six items, has been used with ‘1’ corresponding to ‘not at all true’ and ‘5’ to ‘completely true’. 
The scores from against all the statements are averaged to compute a single number 
representing the ‘dispositional occupational self-efficacy’. The higher the score, the higher is 
the professional’s occupational self-efficacy. Since occupational self-efficacy represents the 
dispositional trait, it remains context-free and does not differ across any of the categories of 
conflicting interests.  
Table 5.6: Descriptive Statistics of Occupational Self-Efficacy (OSE) 
The minimum value is 3 which can be thought of as a neutral stance on one’s perceived 
occupational self-efficacy. Similarly, the maximum value is 5 which represents the perception 
of occupational self-efficacy as very high. Furthermore, range as the difference between 
maximum and minimum values (i.e. 5 – 3 = 2) indicates, on average, a difference of two points 
variation in responses against all the categories of conflict of interests. The mean value of OSE 
Occupational Self-
Efficacy (OSE) 
Mean Median Min Max 
Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
OSE (Average) 4.214 4.167 3 5 0.417 -0.194 0.042 
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is 4.214 and the median is 4.167 which is an indication of high occupational self-efficacy. 
Moreover, the standard deviation signifying dispersion of responses from their mean value is 
0.417. The distribution of OSE is approximately normal with a skewness of -0.194 and kurtosis 
0.042, which indicates that most of the data values are distributed equally around the mean.  
5.3.7 Propensity to Morally Disengage (PMD) 
In case of all the categories of conflict of interests (i.e. CoI-1, CoI-2, CoI-3 and CoI-4), 
propensity to morally disengage (PMD) has been measured as the self-reported level of 
tendency to morally disengage in the situations with an ethical content. A 5-points Likert scale, 
comprising of eight items, has been used with ‘1’ corresponding to ‘strong disagreement’ and 
‘5’ to ‘strong agreement’ with the given statement(s). The scores from against all the statements 
are averaged to compute a single number representing the ‘dispositional propensity to morally 
disengage’. The lower the score, the lower is the professional’s propensity to morally 
disengage. Since the propensity to morally disengage represents a dispositional trait, it remains 
context-free and does not differ across any of the categories of conflicting interests.  
Table 5.7: Descriptive Statistics of Propensity to Morally Disengage (PMD) 
The minimum value is 1 which is the lowest score on one’s PMD and the maximum value is 
3.125 which represents the neutral stance on one’s self-reported PMD. Furthermore, range as 
the difference between maximum and minimum values (i.e. 3.125 – 1 = 2.125) indicates, on 
average, a difference of around two points variation in responses to all the situations involving 
conflict of interests. The mean value of PMD is 1.399 and the median is 1.250 that indicate a 
low propensity to morally disengage. Moreover, the standard deviation signifying the 
dispersion of responses from their mean value is 0.373. Distribution of PMD is positively 
skewed and kurtotic (skewness = 1.606 and kurtosis = 3.977) which indicates that most of the 
data values are clustered below the mean and very few above and that the extreme scores are 
less in number.  
Propensity to 
Morally Disengage 
(PMD) 
Mean Median Min Max 
Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
PMD (Average) 1.399 1.250 1 3.125 0.373 1.606 3.977 
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5.4 Model Assessment 
Model assessment is about the examination of several criteria, including the coefficients of 
determination, path coefficients, effect size, predictive relevance, the goodness of model fit 
and multicollinearity (Jacobs, 2014). This section provides an account of the data analysis 
procedure, followed by a detailed assessment of the study’s model.  
5.4.1 Data Analysis Procedure 
Empirical data were collected using the repeated measures experiment with 105 professionals 
from the Big 4 accounting firms. Each of the professionals was exposed to 4 scenarios 
representing four different categories of conflict of interests (i.e. CoI-1, CoI-2, CoI-3 and CoI-
4). Thus, the total observations are 105 * 4 = 420. 
With CoI coded as ‘0’ and ‘1’, the path leading from CoI towards all the other variables will 
capture the impact of 105 data observations for which it is coded ‘1’. The problem arises for 
the paths leading from the POE, PD and EJ towards one another and towards the DD – this is 
because all these variables include all the 420 observations, i.e. 105 * 4 vignettes. However, 
for a particular category of CoI at a time (i.e. CoI-1, CoI-2, CoI-3 or CoI-4), the impact of only 
105 observations (representing the presence of that particular CoI) has to be captured. 
Therefore, the following steps were taken to analyse the model for one category of CoI at a 
time; 
1. Taking CoI-1 as an example, the following interaction terms have been added to the model; 
(i) 3 interaction terms ‘POE*CoI-1’ leading towards DD, PD and EJ, respectively, (ii) 2 
interaction terms ‘PD*CoI-1’ leading towards DD and EJ, respectively, (iii) 1 interaction term 
‘EJ*CoI-1’ leading towards DD, (iv) 1 interaction term ‘OSE*CoI-1’ leading towards DD and 
(v) 1 interaction term ‘PMD*CoI-1’ leading towards DD. All these interaction terms include 
COI-1 as a moderator and capture the change in relationship from, say, POE → EJ when CoI-
1 changes in value from ‘0’ to ‘1’. The same step applies to all other categories of conflict of 
interests. This step is informed by the literature related to moderated mediation (Preacher, 
Rucker and Hayes, 2007; Martin, 2008; Preacher and Hayes, 2008; Hayes and Preacher, 2014).               
2. The inclusion of interaction terms enabled computation of simple slopes that represent the 
regression of predicted variable (e.g., DD) on the predictor (e.g., POE) at the specific 
conditional values, i.e. ‘0’ and ‘1’ of the moderator (e.g., CoI-1). If b1 is the coefficient for 
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effect of the predictor (say, POE) on the predicted variable (say, DD) and b3 is the coefficient 
of the interaction term (say, POE*CoI-1 leading towards DD), then the simple slope is 
computed as ‘b1 + b3CoI-1’. When CoI-1 assumes the value of 0, the simple slope reduces to 
b1 and when CoI-1 changes to 1, the new coefficient representing simple slope is ‘b1 + b3’ 
which will then capture the impact of relevant 105 observations against the conflict of interests 
due to self-interest threat (i.e. CoI-1). This step is informed by the extant literature on simple 
slope analysis (Cohen, Cohen, West and Aiken, 2002; Bauer and Curran, 2005; Preacher, 
Curran and Bauer, 2006; Fu, Tan and Zhang, 2011).     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Path Model _ Conflict of interests and Deviant Decision-Making Behaviour 
(Note: The different colours are for differentiation and clarity purposes only) 
3. The significance of simple slope (i.e. t statistic) has been computed in two stages. First, the 
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standard error for simple slope (Sss) has been calculated using the formula ‘Sss = sqrt(Sb1 + 
cov(b1, b3)2CoI-1 + CoI-1
2Sb3)’ where Sb1 is the variance of predictor coefficient, Sb3 is the 
variance of interaction coefficient and cov (b1, b3) is the covariance of the two. SmartPLS 3 
enables calculation of the said variances and covariance. The t statistic is, then, computed by 
dividing the simple slope (i.e. b1 + b3) by its standard error (Sss). Finally, the p-value for a t 
statistic has been calculated using the online statistics calculator available at danielsoper.com 
(Preacher, 2003). 
Following the aforementioned steps for data analysis, the effect of one category of conflict of 
interests at a time could be captured. Thus, the main model was run in four subsets with 
particular category of CoI at a time. The same steps were followed for complementary analysis 
with the ‘likelihood of compliant decision-making behaviour (CD)’ as the dependent variable. 
For the sake of better understanding, all the results will be reported after the simple slopes have 
been taken into account. The figures of the tested models will also show the simple slope 
coefficients because interaction effects are not the primary concern of this study and have been 
considered only to facilitate the intended data analysis.  
The detailed screenshots of the tested models, with interaction terms included, have been 
presented in the Appendix 3.         
5.4.2 Coefficient of Determination  
The coefficient of determination (R2) is a measure of the percentage of variation in the 
dependent variable that is explained by variation in the independent variable. The magnitude 
of R2 values is examined as a standard of predictive accuracy (Field, 2009). R2 is one of the 
primary criteria for model evaluation.  
The decision regarding what level of this coefficient is high is discipline-specific. For instance, 
behavioural studies consider 0.20 as high R2, while marketing studies regard 0.75 as high (Hair, 
Ringle and Sarstedt, 2011). In the accounting and auditing studies, it is difficult to specify any 
threshold for low and high R2. Nonetheless, there is evidence of comparatively low values of 
the coefficient. For instance, R2 ranged in value from 0.12 to 0.379 in the study by Guiral, 
Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo (2010). Similarly, Chenhall (2005) reports R2 ranging from 0.17 to 
0.32. The study on the ethical intent of professional accountants (Roth, 2012) also found as low 
R2 as 0.006.      
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Table 5.8: Coefficients of determination (R2) 
Arguably, the low values of R2 in the case of POE make sense because the only path leading to 
this variable is from the conflict of interests (i.e. CoI-1, CoI-2, CoI-3, or CoI-4). In real 
professional accounting environment, many contextual factors (such as regulations, quality 
control reviews and inspections, codes of conduct ethics and compliance programs and the 
organisational culture etc.) are also the important predictors of POE. The rest of the R2 values 
range from 0.144 to 0.432 that are in accordance with an acceptable range in other comparable 
studies.    
5.4.3 Path Coefficients 
The path coefficients of PLS path model represent the standardised beta coefficients of the 
ordinary least squares regression (Hair, Ringle and Sarstedt, 2011). The sign of the estimated 
regression coefficient is an indicative of a positive or negative relationship between the 
variables. Provided that the estimated coefficient is statistically significant, its value denotes 
the degree of relationship between two variables (Hair, Black, Babin and Anderson, 2010). 
Path coefficients are interpreted as ‘the change in the dependent variable when an independent 
variable is increased by one standard deviation’, while keeping all other independent variables 
constant (Henseler, Hubona and Ray, 2016). Specifically, if the path leading from X to Y has 
a coefficient of 0.81 and if X increases by one standard deviation from its mean, Y is expected 
to increase by 0.81 its own standard deviation from its own mean, ceteris paribus 
Coefficient of Determination (R2) 
Variables 
 
CoI-1 
 
 
CoI-2 
 
 
CoI-3 
 
 
CoI-4 
 
DD 0.404 0.416 0.351 0.377 
CD 0.393 0.432 0.350 0.341 
POE 0.013 0.090 0.020 0.002 
PD 0.273 0.297 0.220 0.222 
EJ 0.154 0.254 0.144 0.155 
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(Saengphueng, 2015).    
In order to assess the significance of path coefficients, SmartPLS 3 employs bootstrapping 
procedure to compute a t statistic and p-values for the observed effects of predictors on that 
predicted. A hypothesised relationship is said to be supported if the path is significant and 
shows the sign in concordance with the hypothesised direction. Since PLS does not presume 
normality of data, it applies nonparametric bootstrapping – this process involves obtaining 
standard errors for hypothesis testing by creating the bootstrap samples, through repeated 
random sampling with replacement. The so created samples enable the estimated coefficients 
in PLS path model to be tested for their significance (Henseler, Ringle and Sinkovics, 2009). 
In order to assess the significance of path coefficients, this study uses recommended 5000 
bootstrap samples in the bootstrapping procedure. The critical t values are 1.65 for a two-tailed 
test and 1.282 for one-tailed, at a significance level of 10% (Hair, Ringle and Sarstedt, 2011). 
All the hypotheses in this study are directional, which specify not only that the effect will take 
place but also the direction of that effect – according to Field (2009), the one-tailed test is used 
in case of directional hypotheses. Thus, the results of this study are based on 10% significance 
level (p < 0.10), one-tailed. The path coefficients will be tabulated and reported in the section 
on hypotheses testing.  
5.4.4 Effect Sizes  
Having a significant t statistic is not an all in itself and it becomes necessary to consider what 
we can and what we cannot conclude from a significant t statistic. For instance, if the null 
hypothesis is not true and alternative hypothesis is accepted, we say that there is an effect if a 
t statistic is significant – however, even the unimportant effects may turn out to be statistically 
significant just because a huge number of people were used in the experiment. Furthermore, 
the probability of the t statistic occurring by chance is calculated and if the p-value is greater 
than 0.05, we reject our alternative hypothesis – however, this does not mean that the null 
hypothesis is true because all that null hypothesis tells us is that there is no effect and even if 
the effect is nonsignificant, there still is some effect and should never be interpreted as having 
no effect. This implies that even the significant tests allow us to say little about the null 
hypothesis (Field, 2009). 
In order to account for the above-mentioned limitations, it is recommended to measure, in a 
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standardised way, the size of the effect. Conceptually, an effect size denotes the objective and 
standardised measure of the magnitude of an observed effect. The purpose of calculating effect 
sizes is to determine if exogenous variables substantially affect the endogenous variables. One 
of the common measures of effect sizes in PLS path analysis is the f2 which tells us about the 
quantum of variability the model can explain. Thus, f2 is used to determine if the fitted 
regression model predicts the outcome significantly well.  
Table 5.9: Effect Sizes (f2) 
The f2 values of 0.02, 0.15 and 0.35 represent the small, medium and large effect sizes, 
respectively (Marcoulides, 1998; Hair, Ringle and Sarstedt, 2013). The f2 values for the POE 
in all the categories of CoI signify very small to small effect sizes, while f2 against all other 
predictors depict medium to sufficiently large effect sizes. Smaller values of f2 in the case of 
POE are justifiable since the only path leading to this variable is from the conflict of interests 
(i.e. CoI-1, CoI-2, CoI-3 or CoI-4) – any category of conflict of interests, in itself, is not 
expected to have a large effect size for POE. Many other contextual factors (such as regulations, 
quality control reviews and inspections, codes of conduct ethics and compliance programs and 
organisational culture etc.) are also the important predictors of POE.  
5.4.5 Predictive Relevance 
Predictive relevance denotes the model’s capability to predict. Stone-Geisser’s Q2 is used to 
assess the predictive relevance of the model. Q2 postulates that the model should have the 
capability to adequately predict each of the endogenous variables. Q2>0 indicates the 
Effect Sizes (f2) 
Variables CoI-1 CoI-2 CoI-3 CoI-4 
DD 0.678 0.712 0.541 0.605 
 CD 0.647 0.760 0.538 0.517 
POE 0.013 0.099 0.021 0.002 
 PD 0.376 0.422 0.282 0.285 
EJ 0.182 0.340 0.168 0.183 
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predictive relevance of the model, which means that the exogenous constructs have predictive 
relevance for the endogenous constructs under consideration. Thus, Q2>0 implies that the 
proposed structural relationships are not limited to the current data and can be conveniently 
used to predict endogenous constructs using other sets of data (Hair, Ringle and Sarstedt, 2011). 
Generally, the Q2 values of 0.02, 0.15 and 0.35 represent weak, moderate and strong degrees 
of predictive relevance (Hair, Ringle and Sarstedt, 2013).    
SmartPLS employs blindfolding procedure to assess Q2. Blindfolding is a sample-reuse 
technique that tends to omit every dth data point and the resulting estimates are used to predict 
the omitted part. The omission distance d of 5 to 10 is suggested, so that the number of valid 
observations divided by d is not an integer. Two types of prediction techniques can be used to 
obtain Q2, i.e. cross-validated communality and cross-validated redundancy. While cross-
validated communality measures the quality of measurement model, cross-validated 
redundancy is a measure of the quality of structural model (Hair, Ringle and Sarstedt, 2011). 
Since only the structural model is of relevance to this study, cross-validated redundancy will 
be examined.  
Table 5.10: Predictive Relevance (Q2) 
 Except for POE in the case of CoI-4, all the Q2 values are positive which imply that the 
proposed structural relationships are not limited to the current data and can be used to predict 
endogenous constructs using the other sets of data. In accordance with the criterion provided 
Predictive Relevance (Q2) 
Variables CoI-1 CoI-2 CoI-3 
 
CoI-4 
 
DD 0.363 0.334 0.316 0.331 
CD 0.363 0.389 0.318 0.306 
POE 0.009 0.089 0.017 -0.002 
PD 0.260 0.289 0.211 0.216 
EJ 0.135 0.236 0.127 0.140 
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by Hair, Ringle and Sarstedt (2013), the Q2 values for POE in cases of CoI-1 and CoI-3 signify 
very weak predictive relevance. The Q2 values against most of the variables depict moderate to 
strong predictive relevance, with the exception of that for POE in  case of CoI-2 where the 
evidence of weak to moderate relevance is found. The low values of Q2 in the case of POE 
make sense because the only path leading to this variable is from the conflict of interests (i.e. 
CoI-1, CoI-2, CoI-3 or CoI-4). In real professional accounting environment, many other 
contextual factors are also the important predictors of POE.   
5.4.6 Goodness of Fit 
This study employs ‘Standardized Root Mean Square Residuals’ (SRMR) as a criterion for 
model fit. Determining the Goodness of Fit (GoF) is about establishing if the model fits the 
data well. A model not fitting the data means that the data comprises of more information than 
the model conveys and, resultantly, the estimates obtained from model might be meaningless 
and the conclusions drawn on them become dubious (Henseler, Hubona and Ray, 2016).  
Unlike the covariance-based methods, PLS path analysis does not have adequate global 
measures of goodness of fit (Hair, Ringle and Sarstedt, 2011). However, PLS path analysis in 
SmartPLS 3 offers SRMR as the approximate model fit criterion. The test of model fit in PLS 
path analysis relies on bootstrapping, in order to determine the likelihood of obtaining 
discrepancy between empirical and the model-implied correlation matrix. The bootstrap 
samples are drawn and assessed for the value of the discrepancy. The model is said to fit the 
data if the bootstrap samples yield discrepancy values more than that of the actual model. The 
approximate model fit criteria, including SRMR, tend to determine the substantiality of 
discrepancy (i.e. square root of the sum of squared differences) between the empirical and the 
model-implied correlation matrix. An SRMR equal to 0 denotes perfect fit (Henseler, Hubona 
and Ray, 2016).      
There is a difference of opinion amongst scholars, for the acceptable value of SRMR. For 
instance, Hu and Bentler (1999) suggested SRMR value of 0.08 and below as an indication of 
acceptable model fit. Hair, Ringle, Sarstedt and Ringle (2014) found that a correctly specified 
model can even have SRMR of 0.06 and over and Byrne (2008) proposed that a cut-off value 
of 0.05 indicates acceptable model fit. Based on the different thresholds so proposed, Henseler, 
Hubona and Ray (2016) asserted that an SRMR value of 0.08 and below is appropriate.  
 
140 
Table 5.11: Goodness of Fit – SRMR 
As indicated in the table 5.11, the SRMR for this study’s model is 0.02 which indicates a very 
good fit and also meets the established criterion for the acceptable value of SRMR (i.e. < 0.08). 
This implies that the model fits the data well and conveys the intended information. 
Consequently, the estimates obtained from the model are meaningful and the conclusions 
drawn on them are not susceptible to doubtfulness.  
5.4.7 Multicollinearity 
It is desirable to have a high correlation between the predictor and the predicted variables. 
However, a strong correlation among the predictor variables is undesirable and leads to the 
problem termed multicollinearity. The higher levels of multicollinearity threaten the validity 
of the results provided by the model being tested. With the increase in multicollinearity, the 
total as well as the unique variance explained by the predictor variables decrease (Hair et al. 
2010).  
There are two common ways to check for multicollinearity. The first is to examine the 
correlation matrix of predictor variables. According to this method, the predictor variables with 
correlation > 0.90 represent a multicollinearity problem. The correlation matrix of predictors, 
as shown in table 5.12, provides that the correlation coefficients are well below 0.90 in case of 
all the four categories of conflict of interests, with a maximum value of -0.535. Hence the data 
does not suffer from multicollinearity problem.  
The second way to assess multicollinearity is to examine the variance inflation factor (VIF) of 
the predictor. VIF indicates if the predictor has a strong linear relationship with the other 
predictor(s). Multicollinearity is said to exist if VIF > 5 (Hair, Ringle and Sarstedt, 2011; 2013). 
As shown in the table 5.13, the VIF values of all the predictors are well below 5 in the events 
of all the four categories of conflict of interests, with a maximum value of 2.051 which indicates 
the absence of multicollinearity problem.  
SRMR Sample Mean Standard Deviation T-Statistics P-Value 
0.02 0.029 0.005 4.033 0.000 
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Table 5.12: Multicollinearity – Correlation Matrix 
 
Correlation Matrix 
CoI-1 
Predictors DD CD CoI-1 EJ OSE PD PMD POE 
DD 1        
CD  1       
CoI-1 -0.330 0.290 1      
EJ -0.215 0.008 0.170 1     
OSE -0.071 0.008 0.000 0.162 1    
PD 0.205 -0.071 -0.260 -0.092 0.013 1   
PMD 0.318 0.032 0.000 -0.089 -0.225 0.067 1  
POE -0.232 0.140 0.120 0.155 0.159 -0.276 -0.071 1 
CoI-2 
Predictors DD CD CoI-1 EJ OSE PD PMD POE 
DD 1        
CD  1       
CoI-2 0.483 -0.535 1      
EJ -0.444 0.475 -0.437 1     
OSE -0.153 0.102 0.000 0.194 1    
PD 0.339 -0.270 0.409 -0.176 -0.155 1   
PMD 0.230 -0.138 0.000 -0.214 -0.225 0.189 1  
POE -0.388 0.534 -0.301 0.378 0.282 -0.373 -0.197 1 
CoI-3 
Predictors DD CD CoI-1 EJ OSE PD PMD POE 
DD 1        
CD  1       
CoI-3 -0.143 0.180 1      
EJ -0.291 0.318 0.110 1     
OSE -0.221 0.359 0.000 0.196 1    
PD 0.500 -0.389 -0.050 -0.14 -0.27 1   
PMD 0.315 -0.320 0.000 -0.165 -0.225 0.217 1  
POE -0.481 0.311 0.142 0.099 0.113 -0.535 -0.205 1 
CoI-4 
Predictors DD CD CoI-1 EJ OSE PD PMD POE 
DD 1        
CD  1       
CoI-4 -0.015 0.062 1      
EJ -0.090 0.270 0.159 1     
OSE -0.160 0.198 0.000 0.128 1    
PD 0.176 -0.180 -0.102 -0.213 -0.209 1   
PMD 0.259 -0.197 0.000 -0.220 -0.225 0.123 1  
POE -0.312 0.254 0.043 0.158 0.336 -0.465 -0.179 1 
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Table 5.13: Multicollinearity – Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) 
Therefore, both the correlation matrix and the VIF values provide evidence for the absence of 
multicollinearity. This implies that the data does not suffer from the problem of strong 
correlation among the predictor variables.  
Due to the absence of multicollinearity, the validity of the results provided by the tested model 
is, therefore, not threatened. 
Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) 
CoI-1 
Predictors DD CD CoI-1 EJ PD 
CoI-1 1.259 1.259    
EJ 1.255 1.255 1.158   
OSE 1.103 1.103    
PD 1.293 1.293 1.026 1.268  
PMD 1.068 1.068    
POE 1.282 1.282 1.000 1.216 1.034 
CoI-2 
Predictors DD CD CoI-2 EJ PD 
CoI-2 2.051 2.051    
EJ 1.550 1.550 1.783   
OSE 1.124 1.124    
PD 1.731 1.731 1.242 1.700  
PMD 1.104 1.104    
POE 1.524 1.524 1.000 1.329 1.137 
CoI-3 
Predictors DD CD CoI-3 EJ PD 
CoI-3 1.118 1.118    
EJ 1.137 1.137 1.081   
OSE 1.134 1.134    
PD 1.487 1.487 1.076 1.387  
PMD 1.103 1.103    
POE 1.566 1.566 1.000 1.524 1.107 
CoI-4 
Predictors DD CD CoI-4 EJ PD 
CoI-4 1.113 1.113    
EJ 1.240 1.240 1.027   
OSE 1.149 1.149    
PD 1.337 1.337 1.005 1.297  
PMD 1.098 1.098    
POE 1.395 1.395 1.000 1.282 1.005 
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5.5 Hypotheses Testing 
This section will test and report the results of research hypotheses against each of the four 
categories of conflict of interests (i.e. CoI-1: conflict of interests due to self-interest threat, CoI-
2: that due to intimidation threat, CoI-3: that due to a combination of self-interest and self-
review threats and CoI-4: conflict of interests due to a combination of self-interest, 
intimidation, self-review and familiarity threats).  
The significance of path coefficients has been reported using the p-values instead of the t 
values. The p-values associated with path coefficients reflect the degree of relationship and 
also the power of the test. Compared to t values, the p-values are more meaningful when testing 
the research hypotheses. Furthermore, the bootstrapping procedure in SmartPLS 3 relies on 
random samples drawn from the data and the t value changes every time the PLS algorithm is 
run to test the model – the change, however, is not substantial enough to convert the significant 
relationship into nonsignificant and vice versa (Kock, 2011).  
The tables 5.14, 5.15, 5.15 and 5.16 include path coefficients (β) and correlation coefficients 
(r) for hypothesised relationships.  
Table 5.14: Hypotheses Testing _ Conflict of interests due to Self-interest threat (CoI-1) 
Hypothesis Testing: CoI-1  
[Path Coefficients (βs) & Correlation Coefficients (r)] 
Paths from Predicted Signs 
Paths to 
POE PD EJ DD 
CoI-1 +/-, +/-, +/-, + 
β = 0.116 **  
r = 0.120*** 
β = -0.220 **** 
r = -0.260**** 
β = 0.132**** 
r = 0.170**** 
β = -0.258**** 
r = -0.330**** 
POE -, +, -  
β = -0.337****  
r = -0.276*** 
β = 0.148**  
r = 0.155* 
β = -0.144**  
r = -0.232*** 
PD -, +   
β = -0.094*  
r = -0.092 
β = 0.111**  
r = 0.205** 
EJ -    
β = -0.165***  
r = -0.215** 
OSE -    
β = 0.021  
r = -0.071 
PMD +    
β = 0.143****  
r = 0.318**** 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001, 1 tailed 
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Table 5.15: Hypothesis Testing _ Conflict of interests due to Intimidation Threat (CoI-2) 
 
Table 5.16: Hypothesis Testing _ Conflict of interests due to Self-Interest and Self-Review Threats (CoI-3) 
Hypothesis Testing: CoI-2 
[Path Coefficients (βs) & Correlation Coefficients (r)] 
Paths 
from 
Predicted 
Signs 
Paths to 
POE PD EJ DD 
CoI-2 
+/-, +/-, +/-, 
+ 
β = -0.301****  
r = -0.301**** 
β = 0.314****  
r = 0.409**** 
β = -0.301****  
r = -0.437**** 
β = 0.193****  
r = 0.483**** 
POE -, +, -   
β = -0.323****  
r = -0.373****  
β = 0.331****  
r = 0.378**** 
β = -0.200****  
r = -0.388**** 
PD -, +     
β = -0.075  
r = -0.176** 
β = 0.264****  
r = 0.339**** 
EJ -       
β = -0.250****  
r = -0.444****  
OSE -       
β = 0.004  
r = -0.153* 
PMD +       
β = 0.120***  
r = 0.230*** 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001, 1 tailed 
Hypothesis Testing: CoI-3 
[Path Coefficients (βs) & Correlation Coefficients (r)] 
Paths 
from 
Predicted Signs 
Paths to 
POE PD EJ DD 
CoI-3 +/-, +/-, +/-, + 
β = 0.142****  
r = 0.142****  
β = 0.032  
r = -0.050 
β = 0.090**  
r = 0.110** 
β = -0.079**  
r = -0.143*** 
POE -, +, -   
β = -0.567****  
r = -0.535****  
β = 0.099*  
r = 0.099 
β = -0.223****  
r = -0.481****  
PD -, +     
β = -0.154***  
r = -0.140*  
β = 0.215****  
r = 0.500****  
EJ -       
β = -0.202***  
r = -0.291***  
OSE -       
β = -0.011 
r = -0.221**  
PMD +       
β = 0.113***  
r = 0.315**** 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001, 1 tailed 
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Table 5.17: Hypothesis Testing _ Conflict of interests due to Self-Interest, Intimidation, Self-Review and 
Familiarity Threats (CoI-4) 
 
5.5.1 Relationship between Conflict of interests and Deviant Decision-
Making 
This subsection reports the results of the first group of hypotheses that relate conflict of 
interests (CoI) to the accounting professionals’ likelihood of deviant decision-making 
behaviour (DD). CoI-1, CoI-2, CoI-3 and CoI-4 have been hypothesised to be positively related 
to DD (H1.1/1, H1.2/1, H1.3/1 and H1.4/1). The results indicate that CoI-1 is negatively and 
significantly related to DD (β = -0.258, p < 0.001), CoI-2 is positively and significantly related 
to DD (β = 0.193, p < 0.001), CoI-3 is negatively and significantly related to DD (β = -0.079, 
p < 0.05) and there is positive but nonsignificant relationship between CoI-4 and DD (β = 
0.018, p > 0.10). Therefore, H1.2/1 is supported while H1.1/1, H1.3/1 and H1.4/1 are not. 
5.5.2 Role of Situational Cognitive Processes towards Deviant Decision-
Making  
This subsection reports the results of the second group of hypotheses about the role of 
Hypothesis Testing: CoI-4  
[Path Coefficients (βs) & Correlation Coefficients (r)] 
Paths from Predicted Signs 
Paths to 
POE PD EJ DD 
CoI-4 +/-, +/-, +/-, + 
β = 0.043  
r = 0.043  
β = -0.083**  
r = -0.102** 
β = 0.138***  
r = 0.159**** 
β = 0.018  
r = -0.015 
POE -, +, -   
β = -0.464****  
r = -0.465**** 
β = 0.125**  
r = 0.158* 
β = -0.228****  
r = -0.312**** 
PD -, +     
β = -0.164***  
r = -0.213** 
β = 0.114**  
r = 0.176** 
EJ -       
β = -0.107*  
r = -0.090 
OSE -       
β = -0.005  
r = -0.160* 
PMD +       
β = 0.162***  
r = 0.259*** 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001, 1 tailed 
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accounting professionals’ cognitive processes towards the likelihood of deviant decision-
making behaviour. This group of hypotheses has, further, been divided into three subgroups, 
as follows; 
5.5.2.1 Relationship of Conflict of interests with Positive Outcome Expectancy, Perceived 
Difficulty and Ethical Judgement 
This subgroup of hypotheses is about the relationship of conflict of interests (CoI) with 
accounting professionals’ positive outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making (POE), 
their perceived difficulty in making compliant decisions (PD) and their ethical judgement (EJ) 
towards the likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour (DD). 
1. CoI and POE 
CoI-1, CoI-2, CoI-3 and CoI-4 have been hypothesised to be related to POE (H1a/2.1, H1b/2.1, 
H1c/2.1 and H1d/2.1). The results indicate that CoI-1 is positively and significantly related to POE 
(β = 0.116, p < 0.05), CoI-2 is negatively and significantly related to POE (β = -0.301, p < 
0.001), CoI-3 is positively and significantly related to POE (β = 0.142, p < 0.001) and there is 
positive but nonsignificant relationship between CoI-4 and POE (β = 0.043, p > 0.10) 
Therefore, H1a/2.1, H1b/2.1 and H1c/2.1, are supported while H1d/2.1 is not. 
2. CoI and PD 
CoI-1, CoI-2, CoI-3 and CoI-4 have been hypothesised to be related to PD (H2a/2.1, H2b/2.1, H2c/2.1 
and H2d/2.1). The results indicate that CoI-1 is negatively and significantly related to PD (β = -
0.220, p < 0.001), CoI-2 is positively and significantly related to PD (β = 0.314, p < 0.001), 
CoI-4 is negatively and significantly related to PD (β = -0.083, p < 0.05) and there is positive 
but nonsignificant relationship between CoI-3 and PD (β = 0.032, p > 0.10) Therefore, H2a/2.1, 
H2b/2.1 and H2d/2.1 are supported while H2c/2.1 is not. 
3. CoI and EJ 
CoI-1, CoI-2, CoI-3 and CoI-4 have been hypothesised to be related to EJ (H3a/2.1, H3b/2.1, H3c/2.1 
and H3d/2.1). The results indicate that CoI-1 is positively and significantly related to EJ (β = 
0.132, p < 0.001), CoI-2 is negatively and significantly related to EJ (β = -0.301, p < 0.001), 
CoI-3 is positively and significantly related to EJ (β = 0.090, p < 0.05) and CoI-4 is positively 
and significantly related to EJ (β = 0.138, p < 0.01). Therefore, H3a/2.1, H3b/2.1, H3c/2.1 and H3d/2.1 
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are all supported. 
5.5.2.2 Relationship of Positive Outcome Expectancy, Perceived Difficulty and Ethical 
Judgement with Deviant Decision-Making Behaviour 
This subgroup of hypotheses is about the relationship of accounting professionals’ positive 
outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making (POE), their perceived difficulty in making 
compliant decisions (PD) and their ethical judgement (EJ) with the likelihood of deviant 
decision-making behaviour (DD). 
1. POE and DD 
In the events of conflict of interests, POE has been hypothesised to be negatively related to DD 
(H1a/2.2, H1b/2.2, H1c/2.2 and H1d/2.2). The results indicate that POE is negatively and significantly 
related to DD in case of CoI-1 (β = -0.144, p < 0.05), CoI-2 (β = -0.200, p < 0.001), CoI-3 (β 
= -0.223, p < 0.001) and CoI-4 (β = -0.228, p < 0.001) Therefore, H1a/2.2, H1b/2.2, H1c/2.2 and 
H1d/2.2 are all supported. 
2. PD and DD 
In the events of conflict of interests, PD has been hypothesised to be positively related to DD 
(H2a/2.2, H2b/2.2, H2c/2.2 and H2d/2.2). The results indicate that PD is positively and significantly 
related to DD in case of CoI-1 (β = 0.111, p < 0.05), CoI-2 (β = 0.264, p < 0.001), CoI-3 (β = 
0.215, p < 0.001) and CoI-4 (β = 0.114, p < 0.05). Therefore, H2a/2.2, H2b/2.2, H2c/2.2 and H2d/2.2 
are all supported. 
3. EJ and DD 
In the events of conflict of interests, EJ has been hypothesised to be negatively related to DD 
(H3a/2.2, H3b/2.2, H3c/2.2 and H3d/2.2). The results indicate that EJ is negatively and significantly 
related to DD in case of CoI-1 (β = -0.165, p < 0.01), CoI-2 (β = -0.250, p < 0.001), CoI-3 (β 
= -0.202, p < 0.001) and CoI-4 (β = -0.107, p < 0.10). Therefore, H3a/2.2, H3b/2.2, H3c/2.2  and 
H3d/2.2 are all supported. 
5.5.2.3 Interrelationships of Positive Outcome Expectancy, Perceived Difficulty and 
Ethical Judgement  
This subgroup of hypotheses is about the interrelationship of accounting professionals’ positive 
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outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making (POE), their perceived difficulty in making 
compliant decisions (PD) and their ethical judgement (EJ) in the events of conflict of interests 
(CoI). 
1. POE and PD  
In the events of conflict of interests, POE has been hypothesised to be negatively related to PD 
(H1a/2.3, H1b/2.3, H1c/2.3 and H1d/2.3). The results indicate that POE is negatively and significantly 
related to PD in case of CoI-1 (β = -0.337, p < 0.001), CoI-2 (β = -0.323, p < 0.001), CoI-3 (β 
= -0.567, p < 0.001) and CoI-4 (β = -0.464, p < 0.001). Therefore, H1a/2.3, H1b/2.3, H1c/2.3 and 
H1d/2.3 are all supported. 
2. POE and EJ 
In the events of conflict of interests, POE has been hypothesised to be positively related to EJ 
(H2a/2.3, H2b/2.3, H2c/2.3 and H2d/2.3). The results indicate that POE is positively and significantly 
related to EJ in case of CoI-1 (β = 0.148, p < 0.05), CoI-2 (β = 0.331, p < 0.001), CoI-3 (β = 
0.099, p < 0.10) and CoI-4 (β = 0.125, p < 0.05). Therefore, H2a/2.3, H2b/2.3, H2c/2.3 and H2d/2.3 are 
all supported. 
3. PD and EJ 
In the events of conflict of interests, PD has been hypothesised to be negatively related to EJ 
(H3a/2.3, H3b/2.3, H3c/2.3 and H3d/2.3). The results indicate that PD is negatively and significantly 
related to EJ in case of CoI-1 (β = -0.094, p < 0.10), CoI-3 (β = -0.154, p < 0.01) and CoI-4 (β 
= -0.164, p < 0.01). In the case of CoI-2, there is a negative but a nonsignificant relationship 
between PD and EJ (β = -0.075, p > 0.10). Therefore, H3a/2.3, H3c/2.3 and H3d/2.3 are supported, 
while H3b/2.3 is not supported in terms of significance. 
5.5.3 Biasing Role of Conflict of Interests 
This subsection reports the results of the third group of hypotheses that relate the accounting 
professionals’ perceptual biases to the likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour (DD). 
In the events of conflict of interests, perceptual biases originate due to the interference of 
perceptions (i.e. POE and/or PD) with the analytical pathway to decision-making. 
Consistent with the approach followed by Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo (2010), the 
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results of this set of hypotheses are based on two types of effects, i.e. path coefficients (β) to 
capture the variation in predicted variable for a unit change in the predictor and the correlation 
coefficients (r) to capture the strength of relationships. Although they considered either ‘β’ 
(where relationships were hypothesised) or ‘r’ (where relationships were not hypothesised), 
this study considers both the coefficients. Accordingly, in order for a relation between two 
variables to hold significant effect, both the β and r should be significant at, at least, p < 0.10. 
The rationale to consider both the β and r simultaneously can be attributed to the difference 
between the goals of the regression and that of the correlation. Field (2009) provides that while 
regression is meant to find the best line that predicts dependent variable from the independent 
variable and indicates the pattern of relationship, the correlation coefficient is meant to denote 
the strength of association between the variables. 
In the events of conflict of interests, deviant decision-making has been hypothesised to be prone 
to perceptual biases due to the interference of their perceptions (POE and/or PD) with analytical 
pathway to deviant decision, i.e. CoI → EJ → DD (H1.1/3, H1.2/3, H1.3/3 and H1.4/3). The 
interference of POE and/or PD implies their significant effect in one or more of the following 
decision-making pathway (s); CoI → POE → DD, CoI → POE → EJ → DD, POE → EJ → 
DD, CoI → PD → DD, CoI → PD → EJ → DD, PD → EJ → DD, POE → DD and the PD → 
DD path. 
5.5.5.1 Perceptual Biases in case of CoI-1  
In case of CoI-1, the results indicate significant effects between CoI-1 and POE (β = 0.116, p 
< 0.05; r = 0.120, p < 0.01), CoI-1 and PD (β = -0.220, p < 0.001; r = -0.260, p < 0.001), POE 
and EJ (β = 0.148, p < 0.05; r = 0.155, p < 0.10), POE and DD (β = -0.144, p < 0.05; r = -0.232, 
p < 0.01), PD and DD (β = 0.111, p < 0.05; r = 0.205, p < 0.05) and EJ and DD (β = -0.165, p 
< 0.01; r = -0.215, p < 0.05). The significant path coefficient, but nonsignificant correlation 
coefficient is found between PD and EJ (β = -0.094, p < 0.10; r = -0.092, p > 0.10). Based on 
β and r, the perceptual biases are more likely to interfere with analytical pathway to deviant 
decision-making through CoI-1 → POE → EJ → DD and the CoI-1 → PD → DD pathways. 
The significant effects of POE and PD in decision-making pathways imply that H1.1/3 is 
supported.  
5.5.5.2 Perceptual Biases in case of CoI-2 
In case of CoI-2, the results indicate significant effects between CoI-2 and POE (β = -0.301, p 
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< 0.001; r = -0.301, p < 0.001), CoI-2 and PD (β = 0.314, p < 0.001; r = 0.409, p < 0.001), POE 
and EJ (β = 0.331, p < 0.001; r = 0.378, p < 0.001), POE and DD (β = -0.200, p < 0.001; r = -
0.388, p < 0.001), PD and DD (β = 0.264, p < 0.001; r = 0.339, p < 0.001) and EJ and DD (β = 
-0.250, p < 0.001; r = -0.444, p < 0.001). The nonsignificant path coefficient, but significant 
correlation coefficient is found between PD and EJ (β = -0.075, p > 0.10; r = -0.176, p < 0.05). 
Based on β and r, the perceptual biases are more likely to interfere with analytical pathway to 
deviant decision-making through CoI-2 → POE → EJ → DD and the CoI-2 → PD → DD 
pathways. The significant effects of POE and PD in decision-making pathways imply that H1.2/3 
is supported.  
5.5.5.3 Perceptual Biases in case of CoI-3 
In case of CoI-3, the results indicate significant effects between CoI-3 and POE (β = 0.142, p 
< 0.001; r = 0.142, p < 0.001), PD and EJ (β = -0.154, p < 0.01; r = -0.140, p < 0.10), POE and 
DD (β = -0.223, p < 0.001; r = -0.481, p < 0.001), PD and DD (β = 0.215, p < 0.001; r = 0.500, 
p < 0.001) and EJ and DD (β = -0.202, p < 0.01; r = -0.291, p < 0.01). Nonsignificant path and 
correlation coefficients are found between CoI-3 and PD (β = 0.032, p > 0.10; r = -0.050, p > 
0.10) and significant path coefficient, but nonsignificant correlation coefficient are found 
between POE and EJ (β = 0.099, p < 0.10; r = 0.099, p > 0.10). Based on β and r, the perceptual 
biases are more likely to interfere with analytical pathway to deviant decision-making through 
CoI-3 → POE → DD and the PD → EJ → DD pathways. The significant effects of POE and 
PD in decision-making pathways imply that H1.3/3 is supported. 
5.5.5.4 Perceptual Biases in case of CoI-4 
In case of CoI-4, the results indicate significant effects between CoI-4 and PD (β = -0.083, p < 
0.05; r = -0.102, p < 0.05), POE and EJ (β = 0.125, p < 0.05; r = 0.158, p < 0.10), PD and EJ 
(β = -0.164, p < 0.01; r = -0.213; p < 0.05), POE and DD (β = -0.228, p < 0.001; r = -0.312, p 
< 0.001) and PD and DD (β = 0.114, p < 0.05; r = 0.176, p < 0.05). Nonsignificant path and 
correlation coefficients are found between CoI-4 and POE (β = 0.043, p > 0.10; r = 0.043, p > 
0.10) and significant path coefficient, but nonsignificant correlation coefficient is found 
between EJ and DD (β = -0.107, p < 0.10; r = -0.090, p > 0.10). Based on β and r, the perceptual 
biases are more likely to interfere with analytical pathway to deviant decision-making through 
POE → DD and the CoI-4 → PD → DD pathways. The significant effects of POE and PD in 
the decision-making pathway imply that H1.4/3 is supported. 
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In case of all the categories of conflict of interests (i.e. CoI-1, CoI-2, CoI-3 and CoI-4), the 
overall results indicate that deviant decision-making is likely to be prone to perceptual biases 
due to the interference of POE and/or PD through the CoI → POE → DD, CoI → PD → DD, 
CoI → POE → EJ → DD, PD → EJ → DD and the POE → DD pathways.  
5.5.4 Role of Dispositional Cognitive Processes towards Deviant Decision-
Making 
Occupational self-efficacy (OSE) and propensity to morally disengage (PMD) are the 
dispositional cognitive processes that have been included as control variables in the tested 
model. In this regard, the previous research provides that OSE is negatively related to the 
likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour (DD). Furthermore, the extant literature also 
establishes that PMD is positively related to DD. The results indicate that there is a 
nonsignificant relationship between OSE and DD for all the categories of conflict of interests, 
i.e. CoI- 1 (β = 0.021, p > 0.10), CoI-2 (β = 0.004, p > 0.10), CoI-3 (β = -0.011, p > 0.10) and 
CoI-4 (β = -0.005, p > 0.10). Moreover, PMD is found to be significantly and positively related 
to DD for all the categories of conflict of interests, i.e. CoI-1 (β = 0.143, p < 0.001), CoI-2 (β 
= 0.120, p < 0.01), CoI-3 (β = 0.113, p < 0.01) and CoI-4 (β = 0.162, p < 0.01).    
5.6 Multi-Group Analysis  
The multi-group analysis is aimed at examining the statistically significant differences, if any, 
in the group-specific estimates (e.g. path coefficients) for predefined groups of data (Hair, 
Ringle, Sarstedt and Ringle, 2014). Conceptually, multi-group analysis can be considered a 
special case of modelling the moderating effects, in order to analyse the group differences 
related to the relationships in the model (Henseler and Chin, 2010; Henseler and Fassott, 2010). 
Gender comprising of male and female groups has been subjected to multi-group analysis. The 
rationale behind conducting multi-group analysis across males and females can be attributed 
to the two main considerations. First, the extant research remains inconclusive about the impact 
of gender on decision-making in an ethical context (Lincoln and Holme, 2011; Shadmehr and 
Moradi, 2013). Second, just as other statistical methods, PLS path analysis rests on the 
assumption that the analysed data stems from a single population. In the real world, however, 
this assumption of homogeneity is unrealistic as the individuals hold heterogeneous 
perceptions and evaluations – ignoring this concern can seriously bias the results (Sarstedt, 
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Henseler and Ringle, 2011). Therefore, it seems robust to analyse the data for any differences 
in relationships that might exist for the male and female accounting professionals. 
The multi-group analysis in SmartPLS 3 is performed using permutation test which allows 
determining if there are statistically significant differences in the group-specific estimates for 
the predefined groups of data (Sarstedt, Henseler and Ringle, 2011; Hair, Ringle, Sarstedt and 
Ringle, 2014). For the permutation test, females and males were assigned to group A and group 
B, respectively. The test creates permutations with observations that are drawn without 
replacement from the original set of data. The n observations are first assigned to group A and 
the number is same as that of the observations of group A in the original data. Similarly, the 
number of observations assigned to group B is same as that of the observations of group B in 
the original data. Resultantly, the group-specific sample size remains constant in each 
permutation run (Ringle, Wende and Becker, 2015). 
The results of multi-group analysis for males and females indicate significant differences in 
the magnitude of path coefficients for relationships between EJ → DD [in case of CoI-1 (p < 
0.10), CoI-2 (p < 0.01) and CoI-4 (p < 0.10)], PD → DD [in case of CoI-2 (p < 0.05) and CoI-
4 (p < 0.05)], POE → EJ [in case of CoI-1 (p < 0.10), CoI-2 (p < 0.05) and CoI-3 (p < 0.10)] 
and POE → DD [in case of CoI-3 (p < 0.05) and CoI-4 (p < 0.05)]. However, all the results 
differ only in the magnitude of path coefficients while the hypothesised signs are the same 
across all the paths for males and females. Therefore, the results of permutation test for multi-
group analysis indicate that the hypothesised relationships (i.e. the predicted signs) do not differ 
significantly across the male and female accounting professionals.     
5.7 Complementary Analysis 
The four main models tested in this study included the following paths; (i) leading from the 
conflict of interests (i.e. CoI-1, CoI-2, CoI-3 and CoI-4) towards the cognitive processes (i.e. 
POE, PD and EJ) and the likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour (i.e. DD), (ii) 
amongst the cognitive processes and finally (ii) from the cognitive processes towards the DD. 
Further to the main models with DD as the dependent variable, four separate complementary 
models have been tested, with the ‘likelihood of compliant decision-making behaviour (CD)’ 
as the dependent variable.  
For complementary analysis, this study tests the model presented in the figure 5.2. The only 
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difference between complementary and the main model is the inclusion of CD (instead of DD) 
as a dependent variable in the complementary model. This implies that the only path 
coefficients that would differ between the two models are; i) that leading from conflict of 
interests (i.e. CoI-1, CoI-2, CoI-3 and CoI-4) towards the likelihood of decision-making 
behaviour (i.e. DD or CD), (ii) from situational cognitive processes (i.e. POE, PD and EJ) 
towards DD or CD and (iii) from the dispositional cognitive processes (i.e. OSE and PMD – 
the control variables) towards CD or DD. However, the relationships among the cognitive 
processes will not differ. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Path Model _ Conflict of interests and Compliant Decision-Making Behaviour 
(Note: The different colours are for differentiation and clarity purposes only) 
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This approach makes sense in relation to managing conflict of interests due to the two main 
reasons. First, to check for the consistency of hypothesised relationships in the events of all the 
four categories of conflict of interests. For instance, if ‘high PD’ is the predictor of DD then it 
should not be the predictor of CD – if the signs of relationships do not differ towards DD and 
CD then we will never know if the efforts of accounting firms towards instigating ‘high PD’ 
will lead to the deviant (undesirable) or to the compliant decision-making (desirable). 
Secondly, under various categories of conflict of interests, the likelihood of deviant decision-
making should not be interpreted as implying the automatic unlikelihood of compliant 
decision-making – empirical evidence is required for definite interpretations. 
Conceptually, since the relationship between CoI (i.e. CoI-1, CoI-2, CoI-3 and CoI-4) and the 
DD was hypothesised to be positive, that between CoI and the CD should then be negative. 
Moreover, the results of the main data analysis revealed that the POE and EJ are negatively 
and the PD positively related to DD – now logically, POE and EJ should be positively and the 
PD be negatively related to CD. For instance, if PD is positively related to DD then, as a matter 
of fact, it should be related negatively to CD. Furthermore, the OSE was expected to be 
negatively and the PMD positively related to DD – thus, the OSE should be positively and the 
PMD be negatively related to CD.  
Table 5.18 shows the results of the analysis with CD as the dependent variable. The regression 
and correlation coefficients for the paths leading from CoI (i.e. CoI-1, CoI-2, CoI-3 and CoI-
4) towards CD, from situational cognitive processes (i.e. POE, PD and EJ) towards CD and 
from the dispositional cognitive processes (i.e. OSE and PMD – the control variables) towards 
CD have been tabulated. For the sake of comparison, the results with DD as the dependent 
variable have also been mentioned.      
The results of the analysis with CD as the dependent variable reveal that all the significant 
paths leading to CD are opposite in sign to the paths leading towards DD. This complementary 
analysis has very important practical implications for managing conflict of interests in the 
professional accounting firms. One of the messages that complementary analysis reveals is that 
at various stages in the efforts towards managing conflict of interests, the professional 
accounting firms should direct their efforts towards facilitating amongst professionals; (i) high 
POE, (ii) low PD and (iii) high EJ. This is because where high POE leads to low DD, there it 
leads to high CD; where low PD leads to low DD, there it leads to high CD; where high EJ 
leads to low DD, there it leads to high CD.  
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Regarding the role of perceptual biases in compliant decision-making behaviour, the overall 
results indicate that compliant decision-making is likely to be prone to perceptual biases due 
to the interference of POE and/or PD through the CoI → POE → CD, CoI → POE → EJ → 
CD, CoI → PD → EJ → CD, POE → EJ → CD and the PD → EJ → CD. These results are 
also consistent with the main data analysis with DD as the dependent variable.  
Table 5.18: Complementary Analysis: Conflict of interests & Compliant Decision-Making Behaviour 
Furthermore, the results regarding the control variables reveal that there is a nonsignificant 
relationship between OSE and CD in case of CoI- 1 (β = 0.005, p > 0.10), CoI-2 (β = -0.030, p 
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> 0.10) and CoI-4 (β = 0.052, p > 0.10). However, in the case of CoI-3, OSE is positively and 
significantly related to CD (β = 0.101, p < 0.05). PMD is found to be significantly and 
negatively related to CD in case of CoI-3 (β = -0.086, p < 0.05) and CoI-4 (β = -0.059, p < 
0.10). However, there is a nonsignificant relationship between PMD and CD in case of CoI-1 
(β = 0.009, p > 0.10) and CoI-2 (β = -0.016, p > 0.10). 
The aforementioned comparisons of complementary analysis with that of main analysis will 
be, further, elaborated in the next chapter on discussions. The detailed screenshots of 
complementary analysis with CD as the dependent variable have been included in the Appendix 
3. 
5.8 Summary 
This chapter provided a detailed account of data analysis procedures that have been applied to 
the empirical data. The data was examined for the possibility of outliers, the missing values 
and the normality assumption. Descriptive statistics were considered to summarized the 
research data and the model assessment procedures were also detailed.  
Figure 5.3: Path Model _ Conflict of interests due to Self-interest threat (CoI-1) 
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Figure 5.4: Path Model _ Conflict of interests due to Intimidation Threat (CoI-2) 
Figure 5.5: Path Model _ Conflict of interests due to Self-Interest and Self-Review Threats (CoI-3) 
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Figure 5.6: Path Model _ Conflict of interests due to Self-Interest, Intimidation, Self-Review and Familiarity 
Threats (CoI-4) 
Figures 5.3 to 5.6 summarise the results of main path models tested in the study. Overall, the 
results of hypotheses testing evidenced significant relationship between the conflict of interests 
and the accounting professionals’ decision-making behaviour. The professionals’ cognitive 
processes were found to be significantly related to their decision-making behaviour. 
Furthermore, the professionals’ decision-making behaviour was also evidenced to be prone to 
the perceptual biases.  
Moreover, the results of multi-group analysis indicated that the hypothesised relationships (i.e. 
the predicted signs) do not differ, significantly, across the male and female accounting 
professionals who participated in this study. As expected, the results of the complementary 
analysis revealed that all the significant paths leading to the ‘likelihood of compliant decision-
making behaviour’ were opposite in signs to the paths leading towards the ‘likelihood of 
deviant decision-making behaviour’. 
The results of data analysis will be discussed and interpreted in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
“If you can’t explain it simply, you don’t understand it well enough”. 
(Dykes, 2012) 
6.1 Introduction 
Regardless of the robustness of data analysis and the significance of insights, the findings and 
results are to be successfully communicated. The key is to simplify the message so that others 
understand how to act on the insights (Dykes, 2012). This chapter is meant to interpret and 
discuss the empirical results obtained against the hypotheses tested in the previous chapter on 
data analysis. The primary purpose is to relate the demonstrated results to the aim, objectives, 
research questions and the research problem driving this study. The results will be discussed in 
relation to the extant literature and the theoretical framework that draws on the integration of 
social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1986; 2006; 2008) with the throughput model of decision-
making (Rodgers, 1997; 2006; 2009; Rodgers and Gago, 2001; 2006; Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz 
and Gonzalo, 2010).     
The second section to the sixth will include interpretation and discussion of the empirical 
results. The results regarding the control variables will be elaborated in the seventh section. 
The eighth section pertains to the results of the complementary model. The recap of the 
connections between empirical results and the aim of this study will be included in the ninth 
section, followed by a summary of the chapter in the tenth section.  
6.2 Conflict of Interests & Deviant Decision-Making Behaviour 
All the four categories of conflict of interests (i.e. CoI-1: conflict of interests due to self-interest 
threat, CoI-2: that due to intimidation threat, CoI-3: that due to a combination of self-interest 
and self-review threats and CoI-4: conflicts interests due to a combination of self-interest, 
intimidation, self-review and familiarity threats) were hypothesised (H1.1/1, H1.2/1, H1.3/1 and 
H1.4/1) to be positively related to the professionals’ likelihood of deviant decision-making 
behaviour (DD). The results indicated that CoI-1 and CoI-3 are negatively and significantly 
related to DD, CoI-2 is positively and significantly related to DD and there is positive but a 
nonsignificant relationship between CoI-4 and DD. Therefore, H1.2/1 is supported while H1.1/1, 
H1.3/1 and H1.4/1 are not.    
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The significant positive relationship between CoI-2 and DD implies that the ‘conflict of 
interests due to intimidation threat’ increased the likelihood of deviant decision-making 
behaviour. This result is consistent with the literature relating conflict of interests to the reduced 
quality of audit (Beattie and Fearnley, 2002; Stumpf, Doh and Clark, 2002; Boyd, 2004; 
McMillan, 2004; Reinstein and McMillan, 2004; Favere-Marchesi and Emby, 2005; Young, 
2005; Pierce, 2007; Daugherty, Dickins, Hatfield and Higgs, 2012), that relating CoI to the 
impaired independence of professionals (Ronen, 2010; Bae, Kallapur and Rho, 2013; Ahmad, 
2015), that relating CoI to the audit-quality threatening behaviours (Craswell, Stokes and 
Laughton, 2002; Frankel, Johnson and Nelson, 2002; Kinney, Palmrose and Scholz, 2004; 
Ruddock, Taylor and Taylor, 2004) and the literature that relates CoI to the dysfunctional 
practices in professional accounting firms (Malone and Roberts, 1996; Willett and Page, 1996; 
Anderson-Gough, Grey and Robson, 2001; Sikka, 2004; Davis, DeZoort and Kopp, 2006; 
Wickramasinghe, Hamid, Pirzada and Ahmad, 2015). 
The significant negative relationship of CoI-1 and CoI-3 with DD imply that the conflict of 
interests due to self-interest threat and that due to a combination of self-interest and self-review 
threats’ decreased the likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour. Furthermore, the 
nonsignificant relationship between CoI-4 and DD means that the conflict of interests due to a 
combination of self-interest, intimidation, self-review and familiarity threats did not have a 
significant effect on the likelihood of deviant decision-making. These results are, apparently, 
inconsistent with the prior relevant studies (e.g., Favere-Marchesi and Emby, 2005; Young, 
2005; Daugherty, Dickins, Hatfield and Higgs, 2012). However, these empirical results are 
justifiable because this study has considered different categories of conflict of interests as 
‘risks’ that are ‘expected to threaten’ the adoption of compliant behaviour (Davis, 1993; Gaa, 
1994; Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2006; Thagard, 2007; Lo and Field, 2009; Florio, 
2012), but do not always result in deviant behaviour.   
The results for different categories of conflict of interests are, therefore, inconsistent and there 
might be even more variations for other categories not explicitly included in this study. These 
inconsistent results against H1.1/1, H1.2/1, H1.3/1 and H1.4/1 call for probing into more details of 
the process through which conflict of interests operates at the level of an individual accounting 
professional. In this regard, literature relevant to the cognitive psychology of conflict of 
interests (Rodgers and Gago, 2001; 2006; Chugh, Banaji and Bazerman, 2005; Rodgers, 2006; 
2009, Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo, 2010; Moore, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2010), the social 
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cognitive theory (Bandura, 2008) and the throughput model (Rodgers, 2009) suggest that the 
relationship between CoI (the stimuli) and DD (the response) can only be explained by taking 
into account the intervening cognitive processes (i.e. POE, PD and EJ). Accordingly, the results 
for hypotheses in the subsequent sections will be linked back to the results obtained for 
hypotheses in this section – the main concern will be to understand the reasons behind 
inconsistencies in the direction and strength of relationship between the different categories of 
CoI and the DD.  
6.3 Role of Situational Cognitive Processes  
This section includes discussion of the results for the role of accounting professionals’ 
situational cognitive processes (i.e. positive outcome expectancy of compliant decision-
making, perceived difficulty in making a compliant decision and ethical judgement) towards 
deviant decision-making behaviour in the face of a conflict of interests. Results will be 
discussed in three subsections, as below; 
6.3.1 Relationship of Conflict of interests with Positive Outcome Expectancy, 
Perceived Difficulty and Ethical Judgement 
1. Conflict of interests & Positive Outcome Expectancy 
All the four categories of conflict of interests (i.e. CoI-1, CoI-2, CoI-3 and CoI-4) were 
hypothesised (H1a/2.1, H1b/2.1, H1c/2.1 and H1d/2.1) to be related to the professionals’ positive 
outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making (POE). The results indicated that CoI-1 and 
CoI-3 are positively and significantly related to POE, CoI-2 is negatively and significantly 
related to POE and there is a positive but nonsignificant relationship between CoI-4 and POE. 
Therefore, H1a/2.1, H1b/2.1 and H1c/2.1 are supported while H1d/2.1 is not. 
The significant positive relationship of CoI-1 and CoI-3 with POE imply that in the events of 
conflict of interests due to self-interest threat and that due to a combination of self-interest and 
self-review threats, the accounting professionals expected the positive outcomes of making 
compliant decisions to outweigh its negative outcomes. Likewise, the significant negative 
relationship between CoI-2 and POE implies that in the event of a conflict of interests due to 
intimidation threat, the accounting professionals did not expect the positive outcomes of 
making compliant decision to outweigh its negative outcomes (or alternatively expected the 
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negative outcomes of making compliant decision to outweigh its positive outcomes). These 
mixed results are justified and are consistent with prior studies (Rodgers, 1997; 2006; 2009; 
Rodgers and Gago, 2001; 2006; Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo, 2010; Cvejic, Lloyd and 
Vollmer-Conna, 2016), because the perceptions are subjective and two or more individuals 
could perceive the same situation differently.  
Furthermore, the nonsignificant relationship between CoI-4 and POE means that the conflict 
of interests due to a combination of self-interest, intimidation, self-review and familiarity 
threats did not have a significant effect on accounting professionals’ positive outcome 
expectancy of compliant decision-making. In accordance with the social cognitive theory’s 
concept of person-environment interaction, the nonsignificant role of CoI-4 draws attention 
towards the strong impact, on POE, of the other contextual factors. As per the literature, the 
main contextual factors are the codes of conduct (Shafer, Morris and Ketchand, 2001; Jones, 
Massey and Thorne, 2003; Bazerman and Gino, 2012), the ethics and compliance programs 
(Florio, 2012; Williford and Small, 2013), the organizational culture (Booth and Schulz, 2004; 
Bobek and Radtke, 2007; Caldarelli et al., 2012; Florio 2012) and the reward systems 
(Schminke, Arnaud and Kuenzi; 2007; Amali, 2010; Green and Zimiles; 2013).   
With particular reference to the throughput model, the mixed results for the relationship 
between CoI and POE are justifiable (Rodgers, 1997; 2006; 2009; Rodgers and Gago, 2001; 
2006; Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo, 2010). For instance, the model provides that an 
accounting professional can take various pathways to reach a particular decision and the 
information surrounding conflict of interests might well be disregarded during this process (due 
to incomplete information, inadequate understanding, conflicting information signals and the 
undifferentiated alternatives). In the cases where CoI is significantly related to POE, the 
decision-making process is driven by CoI. Moreover, in the cases where CoI has a 
nonsignificant relationship with POE, the decision-making process is driven by the 
professional’s perceptions (i.e. POE and/or PD). 
Interestingly, the results demonstrated for the relationship between CoI and POE seemingly 
make some connections to the results evidenced for the relationship between CoI and DD. The 
CoI-1 and CoI-3 are negatively and significantly related to DD, while positively and 
significantly to POE; CoI-2 is positively and significantly related to DD, while negatively and 
significantly to POE. Furthermore, there is a nonsignificant relationship of CoI-4 with DD as 
well as with POE. These results indicate that conflict of interests tends to decrease the 
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likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour, if accounting professionals expect the 
positive outcomes of making compliant decisions to outweigh its negative outcomes. Similarly, 
conflict of interests increases the likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour, if 
accounting professionals expect the negative outcomes of making compliant decisions to 
outweigh its positive outcomes. Hence, as provided by the social cognitive theory and the 
throughput model, the relationship between conflict of interests (i.e. the stimulus) and the 
decision-making behaviour (i.e. the response) is affected by POE as the intervening cognitive 
process. 
2. Conflict of interests & Perceived Difficulty 
All the four categories of conflict of interests (i.e. CoI-1, CoI-2, CoI-3 and CoI-4) were 
hypothesised (H2a/2.1, H2b/2.1, H2c/2.1 and H2d/2.1) to be related to the professionals’ perceived 
difficulty in making a compliant decision (PD). The results indicated that CoI-1 and CoI-4 are 
negatively and significantly related to PD, CoI-2 is positively and significantly related to PD 
and there is positive but a nonsignificant relationship between CoI-3 and PD. Therefore, H2a/2.1, 
H2b/2.1 and H2d/2.1 are supported while H2c/2.1 is not. 
The significant negative relationship of CoI-1 and CoI-4 with PD implies that in the events of 
conflict of interests due to self-interest threat and that due to a combination of self-interest, 
intimidation, self-review and familiarity threats, the accounting professionals perceived low 
difficulty in making the given compliant decisions. Likewise, the significant positive 
relationship between CoI-2 and PD implies that in the event of a conflict of interests due to 
intimidation threat, the accounting professionals perceived high difficulty in making the given 
compliant decision. These mixed results are justified and are consistent with the prior studies 
(Rodgers, 1997; 2006; 2009; Rodgers and Gago, 2001; 2006; Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz and 
Gonzalo, 2010; Cvejic, Lloyd and Vollmer-Conna, 2016) which provide that, since the 
perceptions are subjective, two or more individuals could perceive the same situation 
differently.  
The nonsignificant relationship between CoI-3 and PD means that the conflict of interests due 
to a combination of self-interest and self-review threats did not have a significant effect on the 
accounting professionals’ perceived difficulty in making a given compliant decision. In 
accordance with the social cognitive theory’s concept of person-environment interaction, the 
nonsignificant role of CoI-3 draws attention towards the strong impact, on PD, of the various 
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contextual factors. The main contextual factors are the codes of conduct (Shafer, Morris and 
Ketchand, 2001; Jones, Massey and Thorne, 2003; Bazerman and Gino, 2012), the ethics and 
compliance programs (Florio, 2012; Williford and Small, 2013), the organizational culture 
(Booth and Schulz, 2004; Bobek and Radtke, 2007; Caldarelli et al., 2012; Florio 2012) and 
the reward systems (Schminke, Arnaud and Kuenzi; 2007; Amali, 2010; Green and Zimiles; 
2013). 
With particular reference to the throughput model (Rodgers, 1997; 2006; 2009; Rodgers and 
Gago, 2001; 2006; Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo, 2010), the mixed results for the 
relationship between CoI and PD are justifiable. For instance, the model provides that an 
accounting professional can take various pathways to reach a particular decision and the 
information surrounding conflict of interests might well be disregarded during this process (due 
to incomplete information, inadequate understanding, conflicting information signals and the 
undifferentiated alternatives). In the cases where CoI is significantly related to PD, the 
decision-making process is driven by CoI. Moreover, in the cases where CoI has a 
nonsignificant relationship with PD, the decision-making process is driven by the 
professional’s perceptions (i.e. PD and/or POE). 
The results evidenced for the relationship between CoI and PD make some connections to the 
results demonstrated for the relationship between CoI and DD. For instance, CoI-1 is negatively 
and significantly related to both DD and PD and CoI-2 is positively and significantly related to 
both DD and PD. These results indicate that the conflict of interests decreases the likelihood 
of deviant decision-making behaviour, if the accounting professionals perceive less difficulty 
in making the given compliant decision. Similarly, conflict of interests tends to increase the 
likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour, if accounting professionals perceive high 
difficulty in making the given compliant decision. Thus, as provided by the social cognitive 
theory and the throughput model, the relationship between conflict of interests (i.e. the 
stimulus) and decision-making behaviour (i.e. the response) is affected by PD as the 
intervening cognitive process. 
3. Conflict of interests & Ethical Judgement 
All the four categories of conflict of interests (i.e. CoI-1, CoI-2, CoI-3 and CoI-4) were 
hypothesised (H3a/2.1, H3b/2.1, H3c/2.1 and H3d/2.1) to be related to the professionals’ judgement 
about the ethicality of compliant decision choices (EJ). The results indicated that CoI-1, CoI-3 
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and CoI-4 are positively and significantly related to EJ and the CoI-2 is negatively and 
significantly related to EJ. Therefore, H3a/2.1, H3b/2.1, H3c/2.1 and H3d/2.1 are all supported. These 
results are consistent with the literature regarding ethical judgement in the context-specific 
behaviour (Bandura, 2001; Armstrong, Ketz and Owsen, 2003; Cohen and Bennie, 2006; 
Rodgers and Gago, 2006; Rodgers, 2009; Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo, 2010; Johari, 
Mohd-Sanusi, Rahman and Omar, 2013). In accordance with the social cognitive theory’s 
concept of person-environment interaction, the significant relationship between CoI and EJ 
implies that the accounting professionals’ judgement is modified by different conflict of 
interests that serve as an external factor from the environment.  
The significant positive relationship of CoI-1, CoI-3 and CoI-4 with EJ implies that in the 
events of conflict of interests due to self-interest threat, that due to a combination of self-interest 
and self-review threats and that due to a combination of self-interest, intimidation, self-review 
and familiarity threats, the accounting professionals formed highly ethical judgements. 
Likewise, the significant negative relationship between CoI-2 and EJ implies that in the event 
of a conflict of interests due to intimidation threat, the accounting professionals formed a less 
ethical judgement. The mixed results are justified and are consistent with prior studies (Rodgers 
and Gago, 2001; 2006; Rodgers, 2006; 2009) which provide that since judgement implies 
subjective and deliberate information processing strategies, two or more individuals could form 
different judgements in the same ethical situation. 
The mixed results for the relationship between CoI and EJ are also justified in the light of the 
throughput model (Rodgers, 1997; 2006; 2009; Rodgers and Gago, 2001; 2006; Guiral, 
Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo, 2010). For instance, the model provides that an accounting 
professional can adopt various pathways to a particular decision and that the information 
surrounding conflict of interests might well be disregarded during this process (due to 
incomplete information, inadequate understanding, conflicting information signals and the 
undifferentiated alternatives). The significance of the relationship between CoI and EJ implies 
that the available information pertaining to CoI is not disregarded, but subjected to a thorough 
analysis at the judgement stage in decision-making. 
The results demonstrated for the relationship between CoI and EJ make some connections to 
the results evidenced for the relationship between CoI and DD. For instance, CoI-1 and CoI-3 
are negatively and significantly related to DD, while positively and significantly to EJ. 
Moreover, CoI-2 is positively and significantly related to DD, while negatively and 
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significantly to EJ. These results indicate that conflict of interests tends to decrease the 
likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour, if accounting professionals form the 
judgement that a given compliant decision choice is the most ethical course of action. Similarly, 
conflict of interests increases the likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour, if 
accounting professionals form the judgement that a given compliant decision choice is the least 
(or less) ethical course of action. Therefore, as provided by the social cognitive theory and the 
throughput model, the relationship between conflict of interests (i.e. the stimulus) and decision-
making behaviour (i.e. the response) is affected by EJ as the intervening cognitive process. 
6.3.2 Relationship of Positive Outcome Expectancy, Perceived Difficulty and 
Ethical Judgement with Deviant Decision-Making Behaviour 
1. Positive Outcome Expectancy & Deviant Decision-Making Behaviour 
In the events of conflict of interests (i.e. CoI-1, CoI-2, CoI-3 and CoI-4), the accounting 
professionals’ positive outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making (POE) was 
hypothesised (H1a/2.2, H1b/2.2, H1c/2.2 and H1d/2.2) to be negatively related to their likelihood of 
deviant decision-making behaviour (DD).  
The results indicated that POE is negatively and significantly related to DD in the case of CoI-
1, CoI-2, CoI-3 and CoI-4. Therefore, H1a/2.2, H1b/2.2, H1c/2.2 and H1d/2.2 are all supported. These 
results are consistent with the literature relevant to POE and behaviour, in a wide variety of 
contexts (e.g., Sniehotta, Schwarzer, Scholz and Schüz, 2005; Smith, Simpson and Huang, 
2007; Baker-Eveleth and Stone, 2008; Brown, Littlewood and Vanable, 2013; Cheng and Chu, 
2013). The significant negative relationship between the POE and DD implies that in the events 
of conflict of interests, the likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour is low in case of 
the professionals who expect the positive outcomes of making compliant decision to outweigh 
its negative outcomes. Similarly, the likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour is high 
in the case of the professionals who tend to expect the negative outcomes of compliant 
decision-making to outweigh its positive outcomes. Specifically, low POE is demonstrated to 
be one of the situational cognitive predictors of DD. 
In agreement with the social cognitive theory’s concept of person-behaviour interaction, the 
significant role of POE towards DD implies that the accounting professionals’ decision-making 
is also affected by their perception about the positive versus the negative outcomes of 
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performing a compliant behaviour (Bandura, 2006; 2008). The results for the relationship 
between POE and DD are also directly relatable to the throughput model of decision-making 
(Rodgers, 1997; 2006; 2009; Rodgers and Gago, 2001; 2006; Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz and 
Gonzalo, 2010). For instance, the model provides that there can be various pathways to a 
particular decision – the significant relationship between POE and DD implies that the 
accounting professionals’ deviant decision-making behaviour is an outcome of the pathway 
characterised by the important role of their POE. 
Importantly, the consistent negative relationship between POE and DD provides that the 
accounting firms should increase their efforts towards encouraging high positive outcome 
expectancy of compliant decision-making. This could be a plausible step towards effective 
management of conflict of interests in professional accounting firms. The consistent results 
also imply that one of the risk management tools, for accounting firms to decrease (increase) 
the likelihood of deviant (compliant) decision-making in the events of the conflict of interests, 
could be the increased efforts to facilitate high POE – social cognitive theory (Bandura, 2008) 
suggests that the desired behavioural change can be encouraged by making adjustments to the 
environment, or by influencing personal attitudes. 
2. Perceived Difficulty & Deviant Decision-Making Behaviour 
In the events of conflict of interests, the accounting professionals’ perceived difficulty in 
making compliant decisions (PD) was hypothesised (H2a/2.2, H2b/2.2, H2c/2.2 and H2d/2.2) to be 
positively related to their likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour (DD).  
The results indicated that PD is positively and significantly related to DD in the case of CoI-1, 
CoI-2, CoI-3 and CoI-4. Therefore, H2a/2.2, H2b/2.2, H2c/2.2 and H2d/2.2 are all supported. These 
results are consistent with the extant literature relevant to PD and behaviour in a wide variety 
of contexts (e.g., Schwarzer and Renner, 2000; Palfai, 2002; Garcia and Mann, 2003; Zebracki 
and Drotar, 2004; Sniehotta, Schwarzer, Scholz and Schüz, 2005; Bandura, 2006; Baker-
Eveleth and Stone, 2008; Brown, Littlewood and Vanable, 2013; Cheng and Chu, 2013). The 
significant positive relationship between PD and DD implies that the likelihood of deviant 
decision-making is high in the case of the professionals who perceive high difficulty in making 
a given compliant decision. Similarly, the likelihood of deviant decision-making is low in case 
of the professionals who tend to perceive less difficulty in making a compliant decision. 
Specifically, high PD is demonstrated to be one of the situational cognitive predictors of DD. 
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In accordance with the social cognitive theory’s concept of person-behaviour interaction, the 
significant role of PD towards DD implies that the accounting professionals’ decision-making 
is affected by their perception about the level of difficulty in making compliant decisions 
(Bandura, 2006; 2008). The results for the relationship between PD and DD are also directly 
relatable to the throughput model (Rodgers, 1997; 2006; 2009; Rodgers and Gago, 2001; 2006; 
Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo, 2010). For instance, the model provides that there can be 
different pathways to reach a particular decision. A significant relationship between PD and 
DD implies that the accounting professionals’ deviant decision-making is an outcome of the 
pathway characterised by the important role of their PD. 
Importantly, the consistent positive relationship between PD and DD provides that the 
accounting firms should increase their efforts towards encouraging low perceived difficulty in 
making compliant decisions. The consistent results also imply that one of the risk management 
tools, to decrease (increase) the likelihood of ‘deviant (compliant) decision-making in the 
events of the conflict of interests, is the firms’ efforts to facilitate low PD – social cognitive 
theory (Bandura, 2008) suggests that the desired behavioural change can be encouraged by 
making adjustments to the environment, or by influencing personal attitudes.   
3. Ethical Judgement & Deviant Decision-Making Behaviour 
In the events of conflict of interests, the accounting professionals’ ethical judgement (EJ) was 
hypothesised (H3a/2.2, H3b/2.2, H3c/2.2 and H3d/2.2) to be negatively related to their likelihood of 
deviant decision-making behaviour (DD). The results indicated that EJ is negatively and 
significantly related to DD in cases of CoI-1, CoI-2, CoI-3 and CoI-4. Therefore, H3a/2.2, H3b/2.2 
H3c/2.2 and H3d/2.2 are all supported.  
The demonstrated results are consistent with the literature relevant to EJ and ethical behaviour 
(Trevino and Youngblood, 1990; Jones, 1991; Ponemon, 1992; Adams, Tashchian and Shore, 
2001; Sullivan, 2004; Cohen and Bennie, 2006; Sauers, Ballantine and Kennedy, 2006; 
Rodgers and Gago, 2006; Rodgers, 2009). The significant negative relationship between EJ 
and DD implies that the likelihood of deviant decision-making is low in case of the 
professionals who form a judgement that compliant decision choice is the most ethical course 
of action. Similarly, the likelihood of deviant decision-making is high in the case of the 
professionals who form a judgement that compliant decision choice is not the most ethical 
course of action or that deviant decision choice is the most ethical. Specifically, low EJ is 
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demonstrated to be one of the situational cognitive predictors of DD. 
In accordance with the social cognitive theory’s concept of person-behaviour interaction, the 
significant role of EJ towards DD implies that the accounting professionals’ decision-making 
is the result of their judgement about the ethicality of compliant decision choice (Bandura, 
2006; 2008). The results for the relationship between EJ and DD are also directly relatable to 
the throughput model of decision-making (Rodgers, 1997; 2006; 2009; Rodgers and Gago, 
2001; 2006; Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo, 2010). For instance, the model provides that 
an accounting professional can take various pathways to reach a particular decision – 
significant relationship between EJ and DD implies that the accounting professionals’ deviant 
decision-making is an outcome of the pathway characterised by important role of their 
judgement about the ethicality of compliant decision choice. 
Essentially, the consistent negative relationship between EJ and DD suggests that the 
accounting firms should increase their efforts towards encouraging the formation of highly 
ethical judgements. The consistent results also imply that one of the risk management tools, to 
decrease (increase) the likelihood of deviant (compliant) decision-making in the events of the 
conflict of interests, is the firms’ efforts to facilitate high ethical judgements towards compliant 
decision-making – social cognitive theory (Bandura, 2008) suggests that the desired 
behavioural change can be encouraged by making adjustments to the environment, or by 
influencing personal attitudes. 
6.3.3 Interrelationships of Positive Outcome Expectancy, Perceived 
Difficulty and Ethical Judgement  
1. Positive Outcome Expectancy & Perceived Difficulty 
In the events of conflict of interests, the accounting professionals’ positive outcome expectancy 
of compliant decision-making (POE) was hypothesised (H1a/2.3, H1b/2.3, H1c/2.3 and H1d/2.3) to be 
negatively related to their perceived difficulty in making a compliant decision (PD). The results 
indicated that POE is negatively and significantly related to PD in the case of CoI-1, CoI-2, 
CoI-3 and CoI-4. Therefore, H1a/2.3, H1b/2.3, H1c/2.3 and H1d/2.3 are all supported. 
The demonstrated results are consistent with the extant literature that relates POE to self-
efficacy, in general and to the perceived difficulty, in particular (Borkovec, 1978; Teasdale, 
1978; Kazdin, 1978; 1982; 1985; Sherer et al., 1982; Corcoran, 1991; 1995; Eastman and 
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Marzillier, 1984; Sniehotta, Scholz and Schwarzer, 2005; Lin, Ko and Wu, 2008; Williams, 
2010; Wongpinunwatana and Panchoo, 2014). The significant negative relationship between 
POE and PD implies that, in the events of a conflict of interests, lower perceived difficulty in 
making compliant decisions is probable in case of the accounting professionals who tend to 
expect that compliant decision-making has more positive than the negative outcomes. 
Similarly, higher perceived difficulty in making compliant decisions is probable in case of the 
professionals who expect that compliant decision-making has less positive than the negative 
outcomes. 
With particular reference to managing conflict of interests, the consistent negative relationship 
between POE and PD provides that the accounting firms should increase their efforts towards 
inducing, amongst professionals, the higher positive outcome expectancy of compliant 
decision-making. Resultantly, the lower perceived difficulty in making compliant decisions is 
expected (due to the negative relationship between POE and PD) which, in turn, decreases the 
likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour (due to the, earlier demonstrated, positive 
relationship between PD and DD). In accordance with the provisions of social cognitive theory 
(Bandura, 1986; 2006; 2008) and that of the throughput model (Rodgers and Gago, 2001; 2006; 
Rodgers, 2006; 2009; Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo, 2010), these discussions support the 
indispensable interconnectedness of conflict of interests with the accounting professionals’ 
cognitive processes (i.e. POE and PD) and their behaviour. This implies that in the events of 
conflict of interests, the accounting professionals’ mental processes play an important role 
towards their decision-making behaviour.  
2. Positive Outcome Expectancy & Ethical Judgement 
In the events of conflict of interests, the accounting professionals’ positive outcome expectancy 
of compliant decision-making (POE) was hypothesised (H2a/2.3, H2b/2.3, H2c/2.3 and H2d/2.3) to be 
positively related to their ethical judgement (EJ). The results indicated that POE is positively 
and significantly related to EJ in the case of CoI-1, CoI-2, CoI-3 and CoI-4. Therefore, H2a/2.3, 
H2b/2.3, H2c/2.3 and H2d/2.3 are all supported. 
The demonstrated results are consistent with the extant literature that relates POE to ethical 
decision-making, in general and to the ethical judgements, in particular (e.g. Zebracki and 
Drotar, 2004; Sniehotta, Schwarzer, Scholz and Schüz, 2005; Smith, Simpson and Huang, 
2007; Baker-Eveleth and Stone, 2008; Charles, 2011; Brown, Littlewood and Vanable, 2013; 
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Cheng and Chu, 2013; Agle, Hart, Thompson and Hendricks, 2014). The significant positive 
relationship between POE and EJ implies that the accounting professionals who expect that 
compliant decision-making has more positive than the negative outcomes, are expected to form 
highly ethical judgements. Similarly, the professionals who tend to expect that compliant 
decision-making has less positive than the negative outcomes, are expected to form less ethical 
judgements.  
With particular reference to managing conflict of interests, the consistent positive relationship 
between POE and EJ suggests that the accounting firms should increase their efforts towards 
inducing amongst professionals, the higher positive outcome expectancy of compliant 
decision-making. Resultantly, the highly ethical judgements are expected (due to a positive 
relationship between POE and EJ) which, in turn, decreases the likelihood of deviant decision-
making (due to, the earlier demonstrated, negative relationship between EJ and DD). In 
accordance with the provisions of social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1986; 2006; 2008) and that 
of the throughput model (Rodgers and Gago, 2001; 2006; Rodgers, 2006; 2009; Guiral, 
Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo, 2010), the aforementioned discussions support the 
interconnectedness of conflict of interests with the accounting professionals’ cognitive 
processes (i.e. POE and EJ) and their behaviour.  This implies that in the events of conflict of 
interests, the accounting professionals’ mental processes play an important role towards their 
decision-making behaviour. 
3. Perceived Difficulty & Ethical Judgement 
In the events of conflict of interests, the accounting professionals’ perceived difficulty in 
making a compliant decision (PD) was hypothesised (H3a/2.3, H3b/2.3, H3c/2.3 and H3d/2.3) to be 
negatively related to their ethical judgement (EJ). The results indicated that PD is negatively 
and significantly related to EJ in the case of CoI-1, CoI-3 and CoI-4.  Moreover, there is a 
negative but a nonsignificant relationship between PD and EJ in the case of CoI-2. Therefore, 
H3a/2.3, H3c/2.3 and H3d/2.3 are supported, while H3b/2.3 is supported in terms of the direction of a 
relationship but not in terms of significance. 
The significant negative relationship between PD and EJ is consistent with the extant literature 
that relates PD to ethical decision-making, in general and to the ethical judgements, in 
particular (Schwarzer and Renner, 2000; Palfai, 2002; Garcia and Mann, 2003; Zebracki and 
Drotar, 2004; Bandura, 2006; Baker-Eveleth and Stone, 2008; Iskandar and Sanusi, 2011; 
172 
Brown, Littlewood and Vanable, 2013; Cheng and Chu, 2013; Afifah, Sari, Anugerah and 
Sanusi, 2015). The demonstrated results for the negative relationship between PD and EJ imply 
that the accounting professionals who tend to perceive that compliant decisions are difficult to 
undertake, are expected to form less ethical judgements. Similarly, the professionals who tend 
to perceive that compliant decisions are easy (less difficult) to undertake, are expected to form 
highly ethical judgements. 
In the case of conflict of interests due to intimidation threat (i.e. CoI-2), the perceived difficulty 
in making a compliant decision is found to have a negative but a nonsignificant relationship 
with ethical judgement. This nonsignificant relationship implies the main effects of other 
variables (including the CoI-2, POE and the other contextual factors) on the professionals’ EJ 
(Bobek and Radtke, 2007; Bedard, Deis, Curtis and Jenkins, 2008; Bazerman and Gino, 2012; 
Caldarelli et al., 2012; Florio, 2012; Williford and Small, 2013). 
With reference to managing conflict of interests, the consistent negative relationship between 
PD and EJ indicate that the accounting firms should increase their efforts towards inducing, 
amongst professionals, the perceptions of less difficulty in performing a compliant behaviour. 
Resultantly, the highly ethical judgements are expected (due to a negative relationship between 
PD and EJ) which, in turn, decreases the likelihood of deviant decision-making (due to, the 
earlier demonstrated, negative relationship between EJ and DD). Thus, as long as the negative 
relationship is empirically demonstrated for the relationship between PD and EJ, even the 
nonsignificant strength of relationship does not invalidate the discussions in this section. 
In accordance with provisions of the social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1986; 2006; 2008) and 
the throughput model (Rodgers and Gago, 2001; 2006; Rodgers, 2006; 2009; Guiral, Rodgers, 
Ruiz and Gonzalo, 2010), the results support interconnectedness of conflict of interests with 
the accounting professionals’ cognitive processes (i.e. PD and EJ) and their behaviour. This 
implies that in the events of conflict of interests, the accounting professionals’ mental processes 
play an important role towards their decision-making behaviour. 
6.4 Biasing Role of the Conflict of Interests  
This section includes the discussion of results for the role of perceptual biases towards 
decision-making behaviour in the events of conflict of interests. The professionals’ positive 
outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making (POE) and their perceived difficulty in 
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making compliant decisions (PD) serve as the sources of perceptual biases (Rodgers and Gago, 
2001; 2006; Rodgers, 2006; 2009; Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo, 2010). In the events of 
conflict of interests, the accounting professionals’ deviant decision-making behaviour is 
hypothesised (H1.1/3, H1.2/3, H1.3/3 and H1.4/3) to be prone to bias, due to the interference of their 
perceptions (i.e. POE and/or PD) with the analytical pathway to deviant decision (i.e. CoI → 
EJ → DD).  
In case of all the categories of conflict of interests (i.e. CoI-1, CoI-2, CoI-3 and CoI-4), the 
overall results indicate that deviant decision-making is likely to be prone to perceptual biases 
due to the interference of POE and/or PD through CoI → POE → DD, CoI → PD → DD, CoI 
→ POE → EJ → DD, PD → EJ → DD and the POE → DD paths. The significant effects of 
POE and PD in the decision-making pathways imply that H1.1/3, H1.2/3, H1.3/3 and H1.4/3 are all 
supported. Particularly, perceptions as a direct driver of decision (i.e. the POE → DD path) 
introduces intentional bias in decision-making and the other paths involving the role of 
perceptions (i.e. the CoI → POE → DD, CoI → PD → DD, CoI → POE → EJ → DD and the 
PD → EJ → DD paths) introduce unintentional bias in decision-making.  
The accounting standards require the professionals to adopt bias-free analytical pathway to 
decision-making, i.e. CoI → EJ → DD (Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo, 2010). Since this 
path does not involve the role of professionals’ perceptions, its adoption implies that the 
information surrounding conflict of interests (CoI) is subjected to the detailed analysis (EJ), 
which leads the professionals to refrain from deviant decision-making (DD) or alternatively to 
adopt compliant decision-making behaviour (Rodgers, 1997; 2006; 2009; Rodgers and Gago, 
2001; 2006). The results, however, reveal the significance of perceptions which means that in 
situations involving a conflict of interests, the accounting professionals are prone to 
disregarding the adoption of the analytical pathway and, resultantly, their likelihood of deviant 
behaviour increases. 
The demonstrated results comply with the extant literature which supports the idea that conflict 
of interests leads to biases in decision-making (Foot, 1967; Thomson, 1986; Unger, 1996; 
Greene et al., 2001; Casebeer and Churchland, 2003; Chugh, Banaji and Bazerman, 2005; 
Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2006; Green, Ha and Bullock, 2010; Guiral, Rodgers, 
Ruiz and Gonzalo, 2010). Accordingly, the decision outcome in any given conflict of interests’ 
situations is largely affected by the decision-makers’ subjective experience. These biases serve 
as the psychological and cognitive barriers which, in turn, threaten the accounting 
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professional’s independence in fact.  
As detailed in the theoretical framework chapter, the pathways to decision-making are 
characterised by particular moral philosophies (Rodgers and Gago, 2001; 2006, Rodgers, 2006; 
2009). For instance, CoI → POE → DD and CoI → PD → DD are underpinned by ‘ethical 
relativism’, CoI → POE → EJ → DD by ‘ethics of care’, PD → EJ → DD by ‘deontology’ 
and the POE → DD path is characterised by ‘psychological egoism’. Resultantly, such ethical 
predispositions lead to a wide variety of biases in decision-making. For instance ethical 
relativism supports the determination of group consensus on a given behaviour and the 
professionals with psychological egoism would be motivated to act in their perceived self-
interest. The findings are in agreement with the literature (e.g. Reiter, 1996; Bay, 2002; 
McPhail, 2006) that highlights the important role of ethical predispositions towards decision-
making.  
Similarly, the results regarding the role of perceptual biases can also be related to literature that 
highlights the positive relationship between employees’ perceptions of organizational culture 
and the resultant ethical behaviour (Greene et al., 2001; 2004; Shafer, Morris and Ketchand, 
2001; Casebeer and Churchland, 2003; Jones, Massey and Thorne, 2003; Ashkanasy, Windsor 
and Trevino, 2006). Accordingly, the POE and PD aligned with the compliant decision-making 
are likely to induce accounting professionals refrain from deviant decision-making behaviour 
– professionals who expect the overall positive outcomes of compliant decision-making to 
outweigh its negative outcomes and those who perceive less difficulty in making compliant 
decisions, will be likely to refrain from deviant decision-making behaviour. 
With reference to managing conflict of interests, the above results and findings suggest that 
decision-making in the face of conflict of interests is prone to the perceptual biases through 
various pathways. However, this is not necessarily a bad news. Thankfully, the process thinking 
approach, that draws on the interaction of information, perception, judgement and decision 
choice, provides a constructive way of formulating thoughts and biases into a successful 
strategy (Rodgers and Gago, 2001; 2006). The immediate usefulness of process thinking is that 
it can alert individuals of the particular pathway they use to arrive at a decision. Generally, 
success across the pathway journey is achieved when an individual and those governing 
individuals’ behaviour are aware of the obstacles they encounter during decision-making 
(Rodgers, 2006; 2009; Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo, 2010). These provisions are useful 
in developing behavioural interventions for facilitating effective management of conflict of 
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interests. 
Therefore, conflict of interests plays biasing role by introducing perceptual biases in the 
decision-making process. POE and PD serve as the sources of said perceptual biases that have 
been demonstrated to be, largely, unintentional. This implies that in the events of conflict of 
interests, the deviations from compliant behaviour can even occur undesirably.   
6.5 Role of Dispositional Cognitive Processes  
This section includes the discussions of results for the relationship of two types of dispositional 
cognitive processes, i.e. occupational self-efficacy (OSE) and the propensity to morally 
disengage (PMD), with the likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour (DD). OSE and 
PMD have been included in this study’s model as the control variables. 
6.5.1 Occupational Self-Efficacy & Deviant Decision-Making Behaviour 
In the events of conflict of interests, a negative relationship was expected between the 
professionals’ OSE and DD. The empirical results, however, indicate that there is a 
nonsignificant relationship between OSE and DD for all the categories of conflict of interests 
(i.e. CoI-1, CoI-2, CoI-3 and CoI-4).  
The demonstrated results, therefore, are not consistent with the literature that suggests a 
negative relationship between an accounting professional’s OSE and DD (MacNab and 
Worthley, 2008; Iskandar and Sanusi, 2011; Palmer, 2013; Agle, Hart, Thompson and 
Hendricks, 2014, Afifah, Sari, Anugerah and Sanusi, 2015). This nonsignificant relationship 
can be related to the provision by Bandura (1986; 2006; 2008) that self-efficacy is largely 
context-specific. Since situations involving a conflict of interests are also specific to the given 
context (Cohen and Bennie, 2006), the results suggest that, compared to OSE, the accounting 
professionals’ situational cognitive processes (i.e. POE, PD and EJ) had a dominant impact on 
their deviant decision-making behaviour.  
In relation to managing conflict of interests, the nonsignificant impact of dispositional OSE 
suggests that accounting firms might mitigate the devastating impacts of conflict of interests 
by influencing the professionals’ situational cognitive processes (Bandura, 2008). Since, the 
dispositional OSE is not found to significantly affect decision-making behaviour, using the 
situational POE, PD and EJ, to develop behavioural interventions, seems a promising tool to 
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facilitate effective management of conflict of interests in professional accounting firms.  
6.5.2 Propensity to Morally Disengage & Deviant Decision-Making 
Behaviour 
In the events of conflict of interests, the professionals’ propensity to morally disengage (PMD) 
was expected to be positively related to their likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour 
(DD). The empirical results also indicate that there is a significant positive relationship between 
PMD and DD for all the categories of conflict of interests (i.e. CoI-1, CoI-2, CoI-3 and CoI-4). 
The demonstrated results, therefore, are consistent with the literature that suggests a positive 
relationship between an accounting professional’s PMD and DD (Bandura, Barbaranelli, 
Caprara and Pastorelli, 1996; Bandura, 1999; 2002; Bandura, Caprara and Zsolnai, 2000; 
Moore, 2008; Cabrera-Fria, 2012; Moore et al., 2012). This significant relationship implies that 
the accounting professionals’ PMD is as important as are the situational cognitive processes 
(i.e. POE, PD and EJ), in affecting their likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour. 
Specifically, low PMD is demonstrated to be one of the dispositional cognitive predictors of 
deviant decision-making behaviour. 
In relation to managing conflict of interests, the significant impact of PMD suggests that 
accounting firms might be able to alleviate the devastating impacts of conflict of interests, by 
influencing the professionals’ PMD and their situational cognitive processes (i.e. POE, PD and 
EJ). Considering the situational POE, PD and EJ along with the dispositional PMD, to develop 
behavioural interventions, seems a promising tool to facilitate effective management of conflict 
of interests in professional accounting firms.  
6.6 Discussion of Results for Complementary Model 
The complementary analysis was also performed for the complementary model of this study, 
which includes the likelihood of compliant decision-making behaviour (CD), instead of the 
deviant decision-making behaviour (DD), as the dependent variable. The independent and 
intervening variables remain the same.  Thus, the only results that would differ between the 
two models were expected to be; i) that leading from conflict of interests (i.e. CoI-1, CoI-2, 
CoI-3 and CoI-4) towards the likelihood of decision-making behaviour (i.e. DD or CD), (ii) 
from situational cognitive processes (i.e. POE, PD and EJ) towards DD or CD and (iii) from 
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the dispositional cognitive processes (i.e. OSE and PMD – the control variables) towards CD 
or DD.  
The results of complementary analysis reveal that in the case of CoI-1, CoI-2, CoI-3 and CoI-
4, all the significant paths leading to CD (i.e. CoI → CD; POE → CD, PD → CD and the EJ 
→ CD) are opposite in sign to the paths leading towards DD (i.e. CoI → DD; POE → DD, PD 
→ DD and the EJ → DD). The complementary analysis has very important practical 
implications for managing conflict of interests in professional accounting firms. This further 
analysis provides that at various stages in the entire process of managing conflict of interests, 
the professional accounting firms should direct their efforts towards encouraging amongst 
professionals; (i) the high POE (where high POE leads to low DD, there it leads to high CD), 
(ii) the low PD (where low PD leads to low DD, there it leads to high CD) and (iii) the high EJ 
(where high EJ leads to low DD, there it leads to high CD).  
Regarding the role of perceptual biases in compliant decision-making behaviour, the overall 
results indicate that compliant decision-making is likely to be prone to perceptual biases due 
to the interference of POE and/or PD through the CoI → POE → CD, CoI → POE → EJ → 
CD, CoI → PD → EJ → CD, POE → EJ → CD and the PD → EJ → CD pathways. These 
results are also consistent with analysis of the main model with DD as the dependent variable. 
With reference to managing conflict of interests, the results suggest that decision-making in 
the face of conflict of interests is prone to perceptual biases (i.e. due to POE and PD) through 
various pathways. With the process thinking approach (Rodgers and Gago, 2006), such biases 
can be directed into a successful strategy. These provisions can be useful for developing 
behavioural interventions to facilitate effective management of conflict of interests. 
Since a negative relationship was expected between the OSE and DD, it would have made 
sense for OSE to positively affect CD. The results revealed the nonsignificant relationship 
between OSE and CD in the case of CoI-1, CoI-2 and CoI-4 and the significant positive 
relationship in case of CoI-3. Similarly, since the positive relationship was demonstrated 
between the PMD and DD, it would have made sense for PMD to negatively affect CD. The 
results demonstrated the significant negative relationship between PMD and CD in the case of 
CoI-3 and CoI-4 and the nonsignificant relationship in the case of CoI-1 and CoI-2. The 
explanations for nonsignificant relationships is beyond the scope of this study. However, the 
results demonstrated for complementary model do not invalidate the overall nonsignificant 
impact of dispositional OSE on DD and the overall significant positive impact of dispositional 
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PMD on DD in the events of conflicting interests.  
When considered in relation to the main theoretical model of this study, the results for 
complementary model provide empirical evidence for the reliability of hypothesised 
relationships. For instance, if the directions of relationships had not differed across DD and 
CD, we would have never known if the efforts of accounting firms to encourage, for example, 
‘low PD’ will lead to compliant decision-making (i.e. desirable behaviour) or to the deviant 
(i.e. undesirable behaviour). With complementary analysis, it has been affirmed that low 
perceived difficulty leads to the higher likelihood of compliant decision-making. The same 
arguments are applicable to other variables of the study.   
6.7 Empirical Results and the Research Aim & Objectives  
This section will recap connections between the empirical results and the aim of this study. The 
purpose is to specify how the demonstrated results inform the aim and objectives and contribute 
towards filling the gaps in the literature. Results for the three groups of hypotheses, 
corresponding to the three groups of research questions, were discussed. These groups can be 
considered as the pieces of puzzle regarding the research problem. 
The discussion of results for the relationship between conflict of interests (CoI) and the 
likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour (DD) puts the first piece in the puzzle. 
Specifically, different categories of CoI might have significant positive, significant negative or 
even nonsignificant relationship with DD. This inconsistency in the direction of relationship 
draws attention towards understanding the process through which the relationship between CoI 
and DD is governed.    
The discussion of results for the relationship between conflict of interests (CoI) and the 
situational cognitive processes (i.e. POE, PD and EJ) sheds some light on the process through 
which the relationship between CoI and DD is governed and puts the second piece in the puzzle. 
Specifically, different categories of CoI might have significant positive, significant negative, 
or even nonsignificant relationship with POE, PD and EJ. This inconsistency in the direction 
of the relationship is justified because perceptions and judgement are subjective in nature. 
Thus, two or more individuals could perceive the same situation differently and could also form 
different judgements in the same ethical situation. Importantly, different categories of conflict 
of interests have been evidenced to decrease DD for the accounting professionals with high 
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POE, low PD and the high EJ. 
The discussion of results for the relationship between the cognitive processes (i.e. POE, PD 
and EJ) and the likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour (DD) sheds more light on the 
process through which the relationship between CoI and DD is governed and puts the third 
piece in the puzzle. Specifically, low POE, high PD and the low EJ serve as the situational 
cognitive predictors of DD. Similarly, for the complementary model, high POE, low PD and 
the high EJ are the situational cognitive predictors of the likelihood of compliant decision-
making behaviour (CD). 
The discussion of results for the interrelationships of cognitive processes (i.e. POE, PD and EJ) 
puts the fourth piece in the puzzle. Specifically, POE is negatively related to PD and positively 
to EJ. Furthermore, PD is negatively related to EJ. The accounting firms should increase their 
efforts towards encouraging high POE and low PD – resultantly, the accounting professionals 
are expected to form highly ethical judgements and the likelihood of deviant (compliant) 
decision-making will decrease (increase).     
The discussion of results for the role of perceptual biases towards decision-making behaviour, 
in the event of a conflict of interests, puts the fifth piece in the puzzle. Specifically, decision-
making is prone to perceptual biases (i.e. due to POE and PD) through various pathways. The 
process thinking approach can, however, provide a constructive way of formulating such biases 
into a successful strategy, with an ultimate focus on decreasing (increasing) the likelihood of 
deviant (compliant) decision-making behaviour. 
The discussion of results for the relationship of OSE and PMD (the control variables) with 
decision-making adds strength to the puzzle regarding the research problem. Specifically, 
dispositional OSE is found to have a nonsignificant impact on DD and the dispositional PMD 
is demonstrated to have a significant positive impact on DD. Thus, high propensity to morally 
disengage is the dispositional cognitive predictor of DD. When managing conflict of interests, 
accounting firms should take into consideration the accounting professionals’ PMD.   
Therefore, the interpretation and discussions of the empirical results against the hypotheses, 
corresponding to the research questions, enhance our understanding of the process through 
which conflict of interests affects accounting professionals’ decision-making behaviour and, 
thus, contribute towards understanding how the conflict of interests operate at the level of an 
individual accounting professional. Consequently, many useful insights have been sought for 
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addressing this study’s research problem. For instance, the situational cognitive predictors of 
DD (CD) are (i) low (high) POE, (ii) high (low) PD and (iii) less (high) EJ. Similarly, the 
dispositional cognitive predictor of DD (CD) is the high (low) PMD. The said insights will be 
combined to propose behavioural interventions to be incorporated in the framework(s) for 
managing conflict of interests in professional accounting firms.  
Following the suggestions of some scholars (e.g., Nelson, 2004; Chugh, Banaji and Bazerman, 
2005; Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2006; Moore, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2010; Ayal 
and Gino, 2012), the aim and objectives were meant to address the accounting professionals’ 
independence in fact. Since all the insights revealed by this study’s empirical results are directly 
relevant to the professionals’ state of mind and is about their unbiasedness and actual 
objectivity in the events of a conflict of interests, the interventions developed on the basis of 
these insights will help strengthen accounting professionals’ independence in fact. Arguably 
(Moore, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2010; Bazerman and Gino, 2012; Williford and Small, 2013), 
the enhancement of independence in fact will facilitate effective management of conflict of 
interests in professional accounting firms. 
6.8 Summary 
This chapter elaborated the empirical results obtained against the hypotheses tested in the 
previous chapter on data analysis. The primary purpose was to relate demonstrated results to 
the aim and objectives and the research problem driving this study. The results were discussed 
in relation to the extant literature, the social cognitive theory and the throughput model of 
decision-making. The connections between empirical results and the aim of this study were 
specified. The purpose was to discuss how the demonstrated results informed the aim and 
objectives and how the evidence so obtained contributed in filling the gap towards accounting 
professionals’ deviant behaviour due to conflicts of interest.  
The next chapter on conclusions will detail how the insights sought against the research 
questions can be combined to propose the behavioural interventions for strengthening the 
accounting professionals’ independence in fact and, thus, to facilitate effective management of 
conflict of interests in professional accounting firms. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 Introduction 
This study views conflict of interests through the lens of behavioural risk management. It 
defines conflict of interests as a situation involving a disagreement between the accounting 
profession’s primary interest and the professional’s secondary interest(s) which, in turn, leads 
to the likelihood of deviant behaviour. The research problem driving this study is the 
accounting professionals’ deviant decision-making behaviour due to conflict of interests. The 
prevalence of said problem is attributable to the ineffective management of conflict of interests, 
since the existing procedures do not account, sufficiently, for the accounting professionals’ 
independence in fact (Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2006; Clements, Neill and Stovall, 
2012; Bazerman and Gino, 2012; Crump, 2013; Williford and Small, 2013). Some scholars 
(Nelson, 2004; Chugh, Banaji and Bazerman, 2005; Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu and Bazerman, 
2006; Moore, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2010; Ayal and Gino, 2012) suggested that one of the 
potential solutions to this problem could be the increased focus on professionals’ independence 
in fact. In this regard, the significant gap in literature was identified to be the lack of 
understanding about how conflict of interests operates at the level of an individual accounting 
professional.  
In order to fill the gap in the literature, this study was aimed at examining the process through 
which conflict of interests affects accounting professionals’ decision-making behaviour. With 
particular reference to facilitating effective management of conflict of interests, the aim and 
objectives were meant to address the research problem through a specific focus on the 
accounting professionals’ independence in fact. In order to achieve the research aim and 
objectives, the theoretical framework was developed through the integration of the social 
cognitive theory with the throughput model of decision-making. The framework served as a 
filtering tool for selecting appropriate research questions and to determine the methodology 
adopted for seeking answers to these questions. Accordingly, the empirical data were collected 
using web-based quasi-experiments, conducted with 105 accounting professionals from the Big 
Four accounting firms in the UK. The results and findings were produced by subjecting the 
data to analysis, using SmartPLS 3 for path analysis. These results lead to the conclusions that 
will provide an account of how this study has achieved its aim and objectives for addressing 
the problem that drove this study.  
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The second section will revisit this study’s research questions. The third section will revisit the 
aim, followed by development of the behavioural framework in the fourth section. The main 
contributions of this study will be presented in the fifth section and the practical implications 
will be discussed in the sixth section. Limitations of this research and the directions for future 
research will be presented in the seventh section. The epilogue to close this research will be 
presented in the eighth section. 
7.2 Revisiting the Research Questions 
This study considered the four important categories of conflict of interests (CoI), i.e. conflict 
of interests due to self-interest threat (CoI-1), that due to intimidation threat (CoI-2), that due 
to a combination of self-interest and self-review threats (CoI-3) and conflict of interests due to 
a combination of self-interest, intimidation, self-review and familiarity threats (CoI-4). The 
intervening variables included three situational cognitive processes, i.e. the positive outcome 
expectancy of compliant decision-making (POE), the perceived difficulty in making compliant 
decisions (PD) and the ethical judgement (EJ). The dependent variables included the likelihood 
of deviant decision-making behaviour (DD) for this study’s main model and the likelihood of 
compliant decision-making behaviour (CD) for complementary analysis. Two dispositional 
cognitive processes, i.e. occupational self-efficacy (OSE) and the propensity to morally 
disengage (PMD) were considered as the control variables. 
The empirical results have generated possible answers to this study’s research questions. In 
order to clarify how the so generated answers have informed this study’s aim and objectives, 
the research questions have been revisited in this section.  
7.2.1 First Group of Research Questions 
The first research question examined relationship between the conflict of interests and the 
accounting professionals’ likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour. This question was 
meant to testify the threatening impact of the different categories of conflict of interests on the 
accounting professionals’ adoption of compliant behaviour.  
RQ1: What is the relationship between the conflict of interests and the accounting 
professionals’ likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour? 
All the categories of conflict of interests were hypothesised to be positively related to the 
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accounting professionals’ likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour. Empirical results 
demonstrated that CoI-1 and CoI-3 have significant negative, while CoI-2 has a significant 
positive relationship with DD. However, CoI-4 has a positive but nonsignificant relationship. 
In the case of complementary analysis, CoI-1 and CoI-3 have significant positive, while CoI-2 
has a significant negative relationship with CD. However, CoI-4 has a positive but 
nonsignificant relationship. As evidenced, different categories of conflict of interests can have 
positive, negative, or even nonsignificant relationship with the likelihood of deviant (and 
compliant) decision-making behaviour. The differing directions of relationships suggest that 
there can be more variations in the results for other categories of conflict of interests, not 
explicitly included in this study.  
In relation to the first objective of this study (i.e. to examine the relationship between the 
conflict of interests and the accounting professionals’ likelihood of deviant decision-making 
behaviour), the main insight the answer(s) to this research question provides is that since 
conflict of interests is a risk, it is expected to threaten the adoption of compliant behaviour and 
does not always result in the deviant behaviour. Therefore, conflict of interests threatens the 
accounting professionals’ adoption of compliant decision-making behaviour.   
Compliant behaviour is about compliance with the fundamental principles of accounting 
profession, i.e. integrity, objectivity, professional competence and due care, confidentiality and 
the professional behaviour. The said compliance constitutes primary interest of the accounting 
profession (IESBA, 2015). However, the inconsistent relationships between the different 
categories of conflict of interests and the likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour raise 
another thought-provoking concern, i.e. why is it that some conflict of interests increase the 
likelihood of deviant decision-making (i.e. undesirable behaviour), while some decrease its 
likelihood (i.e. desirable behaviour)? With particular reference to the professionals’ 
independence in fact, this concern draws attention towards understanding the role of 
professionals’ intervening mental processes towards their decision-making in the events of 
conflict of interests (Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2006; Moore, Tanlu and Bazerman, 
2010; Bazerman and Gino, 2012; Clements, Neill and Stovall, 2012) – the second and third 
research questions address this concern.     
7.2.2 Second Group of Research Questions 
The second group of research questions was meant to understand the role of accounting 
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professionals’ cognitive processes (i.e. positive outcome expectancy, perceived difficulty and 
ethical judgement) towards their decision-making behaviour in the events of conflict of 
interests.  
RQ2: What is the role of accounting professionals’ cognitive processes towards their deviant 
decision-making behaviour in the events of conflict of interests? 
This question was, further, divided into three subgroups. 
7.2.2.1 Subgroup-1  
The first subgroup examined the relationship between conflict of interests and the accounting 
professionals’ positive outcome expectancy, perceived difficulty and the ethical judgement. 
The purpose was to understand the process through which the relationship between conflict of 
interests and the likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour is governed.  
1. Conflict of interests & Positive Outcome Expectancy  
RQ1/2.1: What is the relationship between the conflict of interests and the accounting 
professionals’ positive outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making? 
All the categories of conflict of interests were hypothesised to be related to the accounting 
professionals’ positive outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making. Empirical results 
demonstrated that CoI-1 and CoI-3 have significant positive, while CoI-2 has a significant 
negative relationship with POE. However, CoI-4 has a positive but a nonsignificant 
relationship with POE. As evidenced, different categories of conflict of interests can have a 
positive, a negative, or even nonsignificant relationship with the professionals’ positive 
outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making. Accordingly, conflict of interests might 
lead an accounting professional to expect that the positive outcomes of making a compliant 
decision will outweigh its negative outcomes. Similarly, they might expect the negative 
outcomes of making a compliant decision to outweigh its positive outcomes. In some cases, 
conflict of interests might not even significantly affect the professionals’ positive outcome 
expectancy. Since the perceptions are highly subjective (Rodgers, 1997; 2006; 2009; Rodgers 
and Gago, 2001; 2006; Guiral, Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo, 2010; Cvejic, Lloyd and Vollmer-
Conna, 2016), the mixed results are justified because different individuals could perceive the 
same situation differently.   
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Interestingly, the relationship between the conflict of interests and the accounting 
professionals’ positive outcome expectancy is connected to the results demonstrated for the 
relationship between the conflict of interests and the likelihood of deviant decision-making. 
Specifically, conflict of interests decreases the likelihood of deviant decision-making, if 
accounting professionals expect the positive outcomes of making compliant decisions to 
outweigh its negative outcomes. Similarly, conflict of interests increases the likelihood of 
deviant decision-making behaviour, if professionals expect the negative outcomes of making a 
compliant decision to outweigh its positive outcomes. Thus, the relationship between the 
conflict of interests and the deviant decision-making behaviour is, in part, governed by the 
agency of accounting professionals’ POE. 
Furthermore, as discussed in the chapter on data analysis, the lower numerical values of 
coefficient of determination (R2), effect size (f2) and predictive relevance (Q2) indicate the 
eminent role of other contextual factors in affecting the accounting professionals’ positive 
outcome expectancy. As emphasised in the literature review, the main environmental or 
contextual factors include professional accounting regulations, codes of conduct ethics and 
compliance programs, organisational culture and the reward systems. In cases where the 
conflict of interests has nonsignificant relationship with the professionals’ positive outcome 
expectancy, the impact of context is, arguably, even stronger (Booth and Schulz, 2004; Bobek 
and Radtke, 2007; Schminke, Arnaud and Kuenzi; 2007; Amali, 2010; Caldarelli et al., 2012; 
Florio 2012; Green and Zimiles; 2013). However, since positive outcome expectancy is a 
situation-specific process (Bandura, 1986; 2006; 2008), the nonsignificant or weak 
relationships does not, in any way, imply the irrelevance of conflict of interests. In fact, POE 
is affected by contextual factors, strictly, in relation to the given conflict of interests (Bandura, 
2008).   
In relation to the second objective of this study (i.e. to understand the role of accounting 
professionals’ cognitive processes towards their decision-making behaviour in the events of 
conflict of interests), the answer(s) against this sub-question provide two main insights. First, 
different categories of conflict of interests tend to decrease (increase) the likelihood of deviant 
decision-making behaviour for accounting professionals with high (low) positive outcome 
expectancy of compliant decision-making. Second, the argued important role of contextual 
factors invites the attention of professional accounting firms towards introducing behavioural 
interventions for strengthening the professionals’ independence in fact, in order to facilitate 
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effective management of conflict of interests. Specifically, the said interventions should 
encourage high positive outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making. 
Therefore, the above-mentioned insights testify that the process through which different 
conflict of interests threatens compliant behaviour (i.e. compliance with the fundamental 
principles of accounting profession – integrity, objectivity, professional competence and due 
care, confidentiality and the professional behaviour) is, partly, governed through the agency of 
accounting professionals’ positive outcome expectancy.  
2. Conflict of interests & Perceived Difficulty 
RQ2/2.1: What is the relationship between the conflict of interests and the accounting 
professionals’ perceived difficulty in making compliant decisions? 
All the categories of conflict of interests were hypothesised to be related to the accounting 
professionals’ perceived difficulty in making compliant decisions. Empirical results 
demonstrated that CoI-1 and CoI-4 have significant negative, while CoI-2 has a significant 
positive relationship with PD. However, CoI-3 has a positive but nonsignificant relationship. 
As evidenced, different categories of conflict of interests can have a positive, a negative, or 
even nonsignificant relationship with the professionals’ perceived difficulty in making 
compliant decisions. Accordingly, conflict of interests might lead an accounting professional 
to perceive high difficulty in making compliant decisions or, similarly, they might perceive 
less difficulty in making compliant decisions. In some cases, conflict of interests might not 
even significantly affect the professionals’ perceived difficulty. Since the perceptions are 
highly subjective (Rodgers, 1997; 2006; 2009; Rodgers and Gago, 2001; 2006; Guiral, 
Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo, 2010; Cvejic, Lloyd and Vollmer-Conna, 2016), the mixed results 
are justified.   
Interestingly, the relationship between the conflict of interests and the accounting 
professionals’ perceived difficulty is connected to the results demonstrated for the relationship 
between the conflict of interests and the likelihood of deviant decision-making. Specifically, 
the conflict of interests decreases the likelihood of deviant decision-making, if accounting 
professionals perceive less difficulty in making compliant decisions. Similarly, conflict of 
interests tends to increase the likelihood of deviant decision-making, if the professionals 
perceive high difficulty in making compliant decisions. Thus, the relationship between the 
conflict of interests and the deviant decision-making behaviour is, in part, governed by the 
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agency of accounting professionals’ perceived difficulty in making compliant decisions. 
Furthermore, as discussed in the chapter on data analysis, the numerical values of coefficient 
of determination (R2), effect size (f2) and predictive relevance (Q2) indicate the eminent role of 
other contextual factors in affecting the accounting professionals’ perceived difficulty in 
making compliant decisions. As emphasised in the literature review, the main contextual 
factors include professional accounting regulations, codes of conduct ethics and compliance 
programs, organisational culture and the reward systems. In cases where conflict of interests 
has a nonsignificant relationship with the professionals’ perceived difficulty, the impact of 
context is, arguably, even stronger (Booth and Schulz, 2004; Bobek and Radtke, 2007; 
Schminke, Arnaud and Kuenzi; 2007; Amali, 2010; Caldarelli et al., 2012; Florio 2012; Green 
and Zimiles; 2013. However, since perceived difficulty is a situation-specific process 
(Bandura, 1986; 2006; 2008), the nonsignificant or weak relationships do not, in any way, 
imply the irrelevance of conflict of interests. In fact, PD is affected by the contextual factors, 
strictly, in relation to the given conflict of interests (Bandura, 2008).   
In relation to the second objective of this study (i.e. to understand the role of accounting 
professionals’ cognitive processes towards their decision-making behaviour in the events of 
conflict of interests), the answer(s) against this sub-question provide two main insights. First, 
different categories of conflict of interests tend to decrease (increase) the likelihood of deviant 
decision-making behaviour for the accounting professionals with low (high) perceived 
difficulty in making compliant decisions. Second, the argued important role of contextual 
factors invites the attention of professional accounting firms towards introducing behavioural 
interventions for strengthening the professionals’ independence in fact, in order to facilitate 
effective management of conflict of interests. Specifically, the said interventions should 
encourage low perceived difficulty in making compliant decisions. 
Therefore, the above-mentioned insights testify that the process through which different 
conflict of interests threatens compliant behaviour (i.e. compliance with the fundamental 
principles of accounting profession – integrity, objectivity, professional competence and due 
care, confidentiality and the professional behaviour) is, in part, governed by the agency of 
accounting professionals’ perceived difficulty in making compliant decisions.  
3. Conflict of interests & Ethical Judgement 
RQ3/2.1: What is the relationship between the conflict of interests and the accounting 
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professionals’ ethical judgement? 
All the categories of conflict of interests were hypothesised to be related to the accounting 
professionals’ ethical judgement. Empirical results demonstrated that CoI-1, CoI-3 and CoI-4 
have significant positive, while CoI-2 has a significant negative relationship with EJ. As 
evidenced, different categories of conflict of interests can have significant positive or 
significant negative relationship with the professionals’ judgements about the ethicality of 
compliant decision choices. Accordingly, conflict of interests might lead an accounting 
professional to form a judgement that the given compliant decision choice is the most ethical 
course of action. Similarly, they might even form a judgement that the given compliant decision 
choice is the least ethical course or, alternatively, that the deviant decision choice is the most 
ethical course of action. Since judgement implies subjective and deliberate information 
processing strategies (Rodgers, 1997; 2006; 2009; Rodgers and Gago, 2001; 2006; Guiral, 
Rodgers, Ruiz and Gonzalo, 2010), the mixed results are justified because different individuals 
could form different judgements in the same ethical situation. 
Interestingly, the relationship between the conflict of interests and the accounting 
professionals’ ethical judgements is connected to the results demonstrated for the relationship 
between the conflict of interests and the likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour. 
Specifically, conflict of interests decreases the likelihood of deviant decision-making, if the 
accounting professionals form a judgement that the given compliant decision choice is the most 
ethical course of action. Similarly, conflict of interests increases the likelihood of deviant 
decision-making, if the professionals form a judgement that the given compliant decision 
choice is the least ethical course of action or, alternatively, that the noncompliant/deviant 
decision choice is the most ethical course of action. Thus, the relationship between the conflict 
of interests and the likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour is, in part, governed by 
the agency of accounting professionals’ judgements about the ethicality of compliant decision 
choices. 
Furthermore, as discussed in the chapter on data analysis, the numerical values of coefficient 
of determination (R2), effect size (f2) and predictive relevance (Q2) indicate the eminent role of 
other contextual factors in affecting the accounting professionals’ ethical judgements. As 
emphasised in the literature review, the main contextual factors include professional 
accounting regulations, codes of conduct ethics and compliance programs and the 
organisational culture. However, since situational ethical judgement is a situation-specific 
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process (Bandura, 1986; 2006; 2008), even the weak or less strong relationships do not, in any 
way, imply the irrelevance of conflict of interests. In fact ethical judgements about compliant 
decision choices are affected by the contextual factors, strictly in relation to the given conflict 
of interests (Bandura, 2008). 
In relation to the second objective of this study (i.e. to understand the role of accounting 
professionals’ cognitive processes towards their decision-making behaviour in the events of 
conflict of interests), the answer(s) against this sub-question provide two main insights. First, 
different categories of conflict of interests tend to decrease (increase) the likelihood of deviant 
decision-making behaviour for accounting professionals who form a judgement that the given 
compliant decision choice is (is not) the most ethical course of action. Second, the argued 
important role of contextual factors invites the attention of professional accounting firms 
towards introducing behavioural interventions for strengthening the professionals’ 
independence in fact, in order to facilitate effective management of conflict of interests. 
Specifically, the said interventions should encourage highly ethical judgements about the 
compliant decision choices. 
Therefore, the above-mentioned insights testify that the process through which different 
conflict of interests threatens compliant behaviour (i.e. compliance with the fundamental 
principles of accounting profession – integrity, objectivity, professional competence and due 
care, confidentiality and the professional behaviour) is, in part, governed by the agency of 
accounting professionals’ judgements about the ethicality of compliant decision choices.  
7.2.2.2 Subgroup-2  
The second subgroup examined the relationship of the accounting professionals’ positive 
outcome expectancy, perceived difficulty and ethical judgement with their likelihood of 
deviant decision-making behaviour. The purpose was to establish, in the events of conflict of 
interests, the situational cognitive predictors of the accounting professionals’ likelihood of 
deviant decision-making behaviour. 
1. Positive Outcome Expectancy & Deviant Decision-Making Behaviour 
RQ1/2.2: How in the events of conflict of interests, is the accounting professionals’ positive 
outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making related to their likelihood of deviant 
decision-making behaviour? 
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The accounting professionals’ positive outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making was 
hypothesised to be negatively related to their likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour. 
Empirical results demonstrated that in the events of all the categories of conflict of interests 
(i.e. CoI-1, CoI-2, CoI-3 and CoI-4), the accounting professionals’ positive outcome 
expectancy of compliant decision-making has a negative (positive) relationship with their 
likelihood of deviant (compliant) decision-making behaviour. Accordingly, given the conflict 
of interests, the likelihood of deviant decision-making decreases in case of the accounting 
professionals who expect the positive outcomes of compliant decision-making to outweigh its 
negative outcomes. Similarly, the likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour increases 
in case of the professionals who do not expect the positive outcomes of compliant decision-
making to outweigh its negative outcomes or, alternatively, expect the negative outcomes to 
outweigh the positive outcomes. Thus, low (high) positive outcome expectancy of compliant 
decision-making is one of the situational cognitive predictors of the likelihood of deviant 
(compliant) decision-making behaviour.  
In relation to the second objective of this study (i.e. to understand the role of accounting 
professionals’ cognitive processes towards decision-making behaviour in the events of conflict 
of interests), the answer(s) against this sub-question provides that the professionals’ POE plays 
an important role as a predictor of their likely behaviour. The consistent negative (positive) 
relationship between the positive outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making and the 
likelihood of deviant (compliant) decision-making behaviour has important implications for 
managing conflict of interests. In this regard, with particular reference to strengthening the 
professionals’ independence in fact, behavioural interventions should be introduced at the stage 
of assessment of conflict of interests. When identifying the sources, causes, consequences and 
the likely impact of conflict of interests, the risk managers should take into consideration that 
the lower the professionals’ positive outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making, the 
higher is the likelihood of their deviant decision-making behaviour.  
Therefore, the insights reveal that one of the situational cognitive predictors of the deviation 
from compliant behaviour (i.e. compliance with the fundamental principles of accounting 
profession – integrity, objectivity, professional competence and due care, confidentiality and 
the professional behaviour), in the events of a conflict of interests, is the low positive outcome 
expectancy of compliant decision-making. 
2. Perceived Difficulty & Deviant Decision-Making Behaviour  
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RQ2/2.2: How in the events of conflict of interests, is the accounting professionals’ perceived 
difficulty in making compliant decisions related to their likelihood of deviant decision-
making behaviour? 
The accounting professionals’ perceived difficulty in making a compliant decision was 
hypothesised to be positively related to their likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour. 
Empirical results demonstrated that in the events of all the categories of conflict of interests 
(i.e. CoI-1, CoI-2, CoI-3 and CoI-4), the accounting professionals’ perceived difficulty in 
making compliant decisions has a positive (negative) relationship with their likelihood of 
deviant (compliant) decision-making behaviour. Accordingly, given the conflict of interests, 
the likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour increases in case of the accounting 
professionals who perceive high difficulty in making compliant decisions. Similarly, the 
likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour decreases in case of the professionals who 
perceive low difficulty in making compliant decisions. Thus, high (low) perceived difficulty in 
making compliant decisions is one of the situational cognitive predictors of the likelihood of 
deviant (compliant) decision-making behaviour.  
In relation to the second objective of this study (i.e. to understand the role of accounting 
professionals’ cognitive processes towards their decision-making behaviour in the events of 
conflict of interests), the answer(s) against this sub-question provides that the professionals’ 
PD plays an important role as a predictor of their likely behaviour. The consistent positive 
(negative) relationship between the perceived difficulty in making compliant decisions and the 
likelihood of deviant (compliant) decision-making has important implications for managing 
conflict of interests. In this regard, with particular reference to strengthening the professionals’ 
independence in fact, behavioural interventions should be introduced at the stage of assessment 
of conflict of interests. When identifying the sources, causes, consequences and the likely 
impact of conflict of interests, the risk managers should take into consideration that the higher 
the professionals’ perceived difficulty in making compliant decisions, the higher is the 
likelihood of their deviant decision-making behaviour.  
Therefore, the insights reveal that one of the situational cognitive predictors of the deviation 
from compliant behaviour (i.e. compliance with the fundamental principles of accounting 
profession – integrity, objectivity, professional competence and due care, confidentiality and 
the professional behaviour), in the events of a conflict of interests, is the high perceived 
difficulty in making compliant decisions. 
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3. Ethical Judgement & Deviant Decision-Making Behaviour 
RQ3/2.2: How in the events of conflict of interests, is the accounting professionals’ ethical 
judgement related to their likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour? 
The accounting professionals’ ethical judgement was hypothesised to be negatively related to 
their likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour. Empirical results demonstrated that in 
the events of all the categories of conflict of interests (i.e. CoI-1, CoI-2, CoI-3 and CoI-4), the 
accounting professionals’ ethical judgement has a negative (positive) relationship with their 
likelihood of deviant (compliant) decision-making behaviour. Accordingly, given the conflict 
of interests, the likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour decreases in case of the 
accounting professionals who form a judgement that the given compliant decision choice is the 
most ethical course of action. Similarly, the likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour 
increases in case of the professionals who form a judgement that the given compliant decision 
choice is the least ethical course of action or, alternatively, the deviant decision choice is the 
most ethical course. Thus, less (high) ethical judgement about compliant decision choices is 
one of the situational cognitive predictors of the likelihood of deviant (compliant) decision-
making behaviour. 
In relation to the second objective of this study (i.e. to understand the role of accounting 
professionals’ cognitive processes towards their decision-making behaviour in the events of 
conflict of interests), the answer(s) against this sub-question provides that the professionals’ 
EJ plays an important role as a predictor of their likely behaviour. The consistent negative 
(positive) relationship between the ethical judgements regarding compliant decision choices 
and the likelihood of deviant (compliant) decision-making behaviour has important 
implications for managing conflict of interests. In this regard, with particular reference to 
strengthening the professionals’ independence in fact, behavioural interventions should be 
introduced at the stage of assessment of conflict of interests. When identifying the sources, 
causes, consequences and the likely impact of conflict of interests, the risk managers should 
take into consideration that the less ethical is the professionals’ judgement about compliant 
decision choice, the higher is their likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour. 
Therefore, the insights reveal that one of the situational cognitive predictors of the deviation 
from compliant behaviour (i.e. compliance with the fundamental principles of accounting 
profession – integrity, objectivity, professional competence and due care, confidentiality and 
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the professional behaviour), in the events of a conflict of interests, is the professionals’ 
judgement that compliant decision choice is the least or less ethical course of action.  
7.2.2.3 Subgroup-3  
The third subgroup examined the interrelationships of accounting professionals’ positive 
outcome expectancy, perceived difficulty and ethical judgement. The purpose was to 
understand the process through which the relationship of the accounting professionals’ 
cognitive processes with their likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour is governed. 
1. Positive Outcome Expectancy & Perceived Difficulty 
RQ1/2.3: How in the events of conflict of interests, are the accounting professionals’ positive 
outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making and their perceived difficulty in making 
compliant decisions interrelated? 
The accounting professionals’ positive outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making was 
hypothesised to be negatively related to their perceived difficulty in making a compliant 
decision. In the events of all the categories of conflict of interests (CoI-1 CoI-2, CoI-3 and CoI-
4), the accounting professionals’ positive outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making 
is evidenced to have a negative relationship with their perceived difficulty in making a 
compliant decision. Accordingly, in the events of conflict of interests, the accounting 
professionals who expect the positive outcomes of compliant decision-making to outweigh its 
negative outcomes are likely to perceive less difficulty in making that compliant decision. 
Similarly, the professionals who do not expect the positive outcomes of compliant decision-
making to outweigh its negative outcomes (or, alternatively, that the negative outcomes will 
outweigh the positive outcomes) are likely to perceive high difficulty in making that compliant 
decision.  
In accordance with the earlier discussed positive (negative) relationship of the PD with DD 
(CD), the said interrelationship also suggests that the low (high) perceived difficulty in making 
compliant decisions, in response to the high (low) positive outcome expectancy, tends to 
decrease (increase) the likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour. Thus, in the events of 
a conflict of interests, the relationship between positive outcome expectancy and the likelihood 
of deviant decision-making behaviour is, in part, governed by the agency of perceived 
difficulty. Moreover, the evidenced interrelationship also testifies the predictive power of the 
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low (high) positive outcome expectancy towards the likelihood of deviant (compliant) 
decision-making behaviour – the lower (higher) the positive outcome expectancy, the more 
(less) is the perceived difficulty in making compliant decisions and the more is the likelihood 
of deviant (compliant) decision-making behaviour. 
In relation to the second objective of this study (i.e. to understand the role of accounting 
professionals’ cognitive processes towards their decision-making behaviour in the events of 
conflict of interests), the answer(s) against this sub-question provides that POE and PD interact 
to affect professionals’ decision-making behaviour. The consistent negative relationship 
between POE and PD has important implications for managing conflict of interests. In this 
regard, with particular reference to strengthening the professionals’ independence in fact, 
behavioural interventions should be introduced in the stages of establishing the context and 
during the assessment of conflict of interests. The risk managers should take into consideration 
that interventions aimed at encouraging the high positive outcome expectancy of compliant 
decision-making will lead to the  low perceived difficulty in making that compliant decision 
(due to a negative relationship between the two) which, in turn, will decrease the likelihood of 
deviant decision-making behaviour (due to, the earlier demonstrated, positive relationship 
between the perceived difficulty and the likelihood of deviant decision-making).  
Therefore, the insights testify that, in the events of a conflict of interests, the process through 
which the positive outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making affects compliant 
behaviour (i.e. compliance with the fundamental principles of accounting profession – 
integrity, objectivity, professional competence and due care, confidentiality and the 
professional behaviour) is, in part, governed by the agency of accounting professionals’ 
perceived difficulty in making the given compliant decision. 
2. Positive Outcome Expectancy & Ethical Judgements 
RQ2/2.3: How in the events of conflict of interests, are the accounting professionals’ positive 
outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making and their ethical judgement interrelated? 
The accounting professionals’ positive outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making was 
hypothesised to be positively related to their ethical judgement. In the events of all the 
categories of conflict of interests (i.e. CoI-1 CoI-2, CoI-3 and CoI-4), the accounting 
professionals’ positive outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making is found to have a 
positive relationship with their ethical judgements about the compliant decision choices. 
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Accordingly, in the events of conflict of interests, the accounting professionals who expect the 
positive outcomes of compliant decision-making to outweigh its negative outcomes, are likely 
to form a judgement that the given compliant decision choice is the most ethical course of 
action. Similarly, the professionals who do not expect the positive outcomes of compliant 
decision-making to outweigh its negative outcomes (or, alternatively, that the negative 
outcomes will outweigh the positive outcomes), are likely to form a judgement that the given 
compliant decision choice is the least ethical course of action or, alternatively, that the 
noncompliant/deviant decision choice is the most ethical course.  
In accordance with the earlier discussed negative (positive) relationship between EJ and DD 
(CD), the said interrelationship also suggests that the high (less) ethical judgements about the 
compliant decision choices, in response to the high (low) positive outcome expectancy, tend to 
decrease (increase) the likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour. Thus, the relationship 
between positive outcome expectancy and the likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour 
is, in part, governed by the agency of the professionals’ judgements about the ethicality of 
compliant decision choices. Moreover, the interrelationship also testifies the predictive power 
of low (high) positive outcome expectancy towards the likelihood of deviant (compliant) 
decision-making behaviour – the lower (higher) the positive outcome expectancy, the less 
(more) ethical the judgements and the more is the likelihood of deviant (compliant) decision-
making behaviour. 
In relation to the second objective of this study (i.e. to understand the role of accounting 
professionals’ cognitive processes towards their decision-making behaviour in the events of 
conflict of interests), the answer(s) against this sub-question provides that POE and EJ interact 
to affect professionals’ decision-making behaviour. The consistent positive relationship 
between POE and EJ has important implications for managing conflict of interests. In this 
regard, with particular reference to strengthening the professionals’ independence in fact, 
behavioural interventions should be introduced in the stages of establishing the context and 
during the assessment of conflict of interests. The risk managers should take into consideration 
that the interventions aimed at encouraging high positive outcome expectancy of compliant 
decision-making will lead to the more ethical judgements (due to a positive relationship 
between the two) which, in turn, will decrease the likelihood of deviant decision-making 
behaviour (due to, the earlier demonstrated, negative relationship between ethical judgements 
and the likelihood of deviant decision-making). 
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Therefore, the insights testify that in the events of a conflict of interests, the process through 
which the positive outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making affects compliant 
behaviour (i.e. compliance with the fundamental principles of accounting profession – 
integrity, objectivity, professional competence and due care, confidentiality and the 
professional behaviour) is, in part, governed by the agency of the accounting professionals’ 
judgements about the ethicality of compliant decision choice. 
3. Perceived Difficulty & Ethical Judgement 
RQ3/2.3: How in the events of conflict of interests, are the accounting professionals’ perceived 
difficulty in making compliant decisions and their ethical judgement interrelated? 
The accounting professionals’ perceived difficulty in making compliant decision was 
hypothesised to be negatively related to their ethical judgement. In the events of all the 
categories of conflict of interests (i.e. CoI-1 CoI-2, CoI-3 and CoI-4), the accounting 
professionals’ perceived difficulty in making compliant decisions is found to have a negative 
relationship with their ethical judgements about the compliant decision choices. Accordingly, 
in the events of conflict of interests, the accounting professionals who perceive less difficulty 
in making a compliant decision, are likely to form a judgement that the given compliant 
decision choice is the most ethical course of action. Similarly, the professionals who perceive 
high difficulty in making a compliant decision, are likely to form a judgement that the given 
compliant decision choice is the least ethical course of action or, alternatively, that the deviant 
decision choice is the most ethical course.  
In accordance with the earlier discussed negative (positive) relationship between EJ and DD 
(CD), the said interrelationship also suggests that the high (less) ethical judgements about the 
compliant decision choices, in response to the low (high) perceived difficulty, decreases 
(increases) the likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour. Thus, in the events of conflict 
of interests, the relationship between the perceived difficulty and the likelihood of deviant 
decision-making is, in part, governed by the agency of the judgements about the ethicality of 
compliant decision choices. Moreover, the interrelationship also testifies the predictive power 
of high (low) perceived difficulty towards the likelihood of deviant (compliant) decision-
making behaviour – the higher (lower) the perceived difficulty in making compliant decisions, 
the less (more) ethical the judgements and the more is the likelihood of deviant (compliant) 
decision-making behaviour. 
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In relation to the second objective of this study (i.e. to understand the role of accounting 
professionals’ cognitive processes towards their decision-making behaviour in the events of 
conflict of interests), the answer(s) against this sub-question provides that PD and EJ interact 
to affect professionals’ decision-making behaviour. The consistent negative relationship 
between the perceived difficulty and the ethical judgement has important implications for 
managing conflict of interests. In this regard, with particular reference to strengthening the 
professionals’ independence in fact, behavioural interventions should be introduced in the 
stages of establishing the context and during the assessment of conflict of interests. The risk 
managers should take into consideration that the interventions aimed at encouraging low 
perceived difficulty in making compliant decisions will lead to more ethical judgements (due 
to a negative relationship between the two) which, in turn, decreases the likelihood of deviant 
decision-making behaviour (due to the earlier demonstrated negative relationship between the 
ethical judgements and the likelihood of deviant decision-making). 
Therefore, the insights testify that in the events of a conflict of interests, the process through 
which the perceived difficulty in making compliant decisions affects compliant behaviour (i.e. 
compliance with the fundamental principles of accounting profession – integrity, objectivity, 
professional competence and due care, confidentiality and the professional behaviour) is, in 
part, governed by the agency of accounting professionals’ judgements about the ethicality of 
compliant decision choices. 
7.2.3 Third Group of Research Questions 
The third group of research questions sought to examine the biasing role of conflict of interests 
towards accounting professionals’ decision-making behaviour. The main purpose was to 
understand the process through which the unintentional and/or intentional perceptual biases 
might, in the events of a conflict of interests, increase the likelihood of deviant decision-making 
behaviour. 
RQ3: Why in the events of conflict of interests, might the accounting professionals’ deviant 
decision-making behaviour be prone to perceptual biases? 
The accounting professionals’ deviant decision-making behaviour was hypothesised to be 
prone to bias due to the interference of their perceptions (i.e. the positive outcome expectancy 
of compliant decision-making and the perceived difficulty in making compliant decisions) with 
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the analytical pathway to deviant decision-making. Since the analytical path (i.e. conflict of 
interests → ethical judgement → decision) does not involve the role of perceptions, its adoption 
implies that the information surrounding conflict of interests is subjected to the detailed 
analysis, which results in the formation of ethical judgements and, resultantly, the professionals 
refrain from deviant decision-making or alternatively adopt compliant decision-making 
behaviour. This argument, however, is based on the assumption that the professionals are well 
equipped with all the required technical knowledge and scepticism – the experimental vignettes 
used in data collection were kept simple and straightforward enough to ensure that the level of 
professionals’ knowledge and scepticism do not affect any of the observed relationships.    
Perceptions as the indirect drivers of decisions were evidenced to introduce unintentional 
biases in decision-making, by interfering with analytical pathway through the following paths; 
Conflict of Interests → Positive Outcome Expectancy → Decision and Conflict of Interests → 
Perceived Difficulty → Decision, underpinned by ethical relativism, Conflict of Interests → 
Positive Outcome Expectancy → Ethical Judgement → Decision and Conflict of Interests → 
Perceived Difficulty → Ethical Judgement → Decision, underpinned by ethics of care and 
Positive Outcome Expectancy → Ethical Judgement → Decision and Perceived Difficulty → 
Ethical Judgement → Decision path, underpinned by deontology. Moreover, perceptions as the 
direct drivers of decisions were evidenced to introduce intentional biases in decision-making 
by interfering with the analytical pathway through the Positive Outcome Expectancy → 
Decision path, underpinned by psychological egoism. Resultantly, the ethical predispositions 
underlying these pathways lead professionals to behave in a biased manner and, therefore, 
increase the likelihood of biased decision-making. 
In relation to the third objective of this study (i.e. to understand the biasing role of conflict of 
interests towards the accounting professionals’ decision-making behaviour), the answer(s) to 
this research question provides that the conflict of interests plays its biasing role by introducing 
perceptual biases in the decision-making process – POE and PD serve as the sources of said 
biases that have been demonstrated to be, largely, unintentional. This implies that in the events 
of conflict of interests, deviations from the compliant behaviour can even occur undesirably. 
The finding that decision outcome, in the events of conflict of interests, is largely affected by 
the decision-makers’ subjective experiences, has important implications for managing conflict 
of interests. In this regard, with particular reference to strengthening the professionals’ 
independence in fact, behavioural interventions should be introduced in the stages of treatment 
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and control regarding the conflict of interests. The firms’ decision to adopt a particular 
treatment of conflict of interests should be informed by the fact that decision-making in the 
events of conflict of interests is largely prone to bias. As one of the control measures, 
implementation of the process thinking approach (Rodgers and Gago, 2001; 2006) seems 
promising. This approach provides a constructive way of formulating biases into a successful 
strategy, by alerting professionals of the pathway they use to arrive at a decision and also by 
increasing their awareness of the obstacles and shortcuts they encounter during decision-
making. 
Therefore, the insights testify that in the events of a conflict of interests, the accounting 
professionals are prone to disregarding the adoption of the analytical pathway. Particularly, the 
perceptual biases serve as the psycho-cognitive barriers that impair the professionals’ 
independence in fact and, resultantly, threaten compliance with the fundamental principles (i.e. 
integrity, objectivity, professional competence and due care, confidentiality and the 
professional behaviour) of the accounting profession.  
7.2.4 Control Variables 
The occupational self-efficacy (OSE) and the propensity to morally disengage (PMD) were 
empirically observed for their relationship with the likelihood of deviant decision-making 
behaviour (DD). Both the OSE and PMD represent the professionals’ dispositional cognitive 
processes and were included in the theoretical model as the control variables. 
In the events of all the categories of conflict of interests (i.e. CoI-1, CoI-2, CoI-3 and CoI-4), 
the empirical results revealed the nonsignificant relationship between OSE and DD and the 
positive relationship between PMD and DD. Specifically, the high (low) propensity to morally 
disengage is demonstrated to be one of the dispositional cognitive predictors of the deviant 
(compliant) decision-making behaviour in the face of conflict of interests. The consistent 
positive (negative) relationship between PMD and the likelihood of deviant (compliant) 
decision-making behaviour has important implications for managing conflict of interests. In 
this regard, with particular reference to strengthening the professionals’ independence in fact, 
behavioural interventions should be introduced at the stage of assessment of conflict of 
interests. When identifying the sources, causes, consequences and the likely impact of conflict 
of interests, the risk managers should take into consideration the level (high or low) of the 
professionals’ propensity to morally disengage. 
200 
7.3 Revisiting the Research Aim  
Some scholars (e.g., Nelson, 2004; Chugh, Banaji and Bazerman, 2005; Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu 
and Bazerman, 2006; Moore, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2010; Ayal and Gino, 2012) suggested that 
one of the potential solutions to accounting professionals’ deviant decision-making behaviour 
is to facilitate effective management of conflict of interests, through increased focus on the 
professionals’ independence in fact. Accordingly, the lack of understanding about how the 
conflict of interests operates at the level of an individual accounting professional was identified 
as a significant gap in the extant literature. Consequently, the aim and objectives of this study 
were meant to fill this gap in relation to the professionals’ independence in fact.  
The previous sections clarified how the answers to this study’s research questions have 
informed the objectives of this study. Revelations against each of the objectives, eventually, 
serve the aim of this study (i.e. examination of the process through which conflict of interests 
affects accounting professionals’ decision-making behaviour). Accordingly, the process 
through which conflict of interests affects the accounting professionals’ decision-making 
behaviour can be summarised as follows; 
Conflict of interests in professional accounting firms tends to threaten the accounting 
professionals’ adoption of compliant decision-making behaviour. The process through which 
conflict of interests threatens compliant behaviour is governed by the agency of the accounting 
professionals’ positive outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making (POE), their 
perceived difficulty in making compliant decisions (PD) and their judgements about the 
ethicality of compliant decision choices (EJ). As such, the situational cognitive predictors of 
the likelihood of deviant (compliant) decision-making behaviour are the low (high) POE, high 
(low) PD and the less (high) EJ. Moreover, POE, PD and EJ interact to affect the professionals’ 
decision-making in the events of conflict of interests – specifically, high (low) POE leads to 
low (high) PD and high (low) EJ and high (low) PD leads to low (high) EJ. During this process, 
the conflict of interests plays biasing role towards the accounting professionals’ decision-
making process – the professionals’ POE and PD serve as the sources of perceptual biases that 
have been demonstrated to be, largely, unintentional. This implies that, in the events of a 
conflict of interests, the deviations from compliant behaviour often occur undesirably.  
With particular reference to facilitating the effective management of conflict of interests, the 
empirical results of this study offer some useful insights towards developing the behavioural 
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interventions for strengthening the accounting professionals’ independence in fact. 
7.4 Behavioural Framework to Manage Conflict of interests 
The answers to research questions (through main analysis) and the other supplementary 
findings (through complementary analysis) have revealed some useful insights, that can be 
combined into a behavioural framework for facilitating the effective management of conflict 
of interests in professional accounting firms. The said framework draws on some behavioural 
interventions that can potentially serve as a complement to the existing frameworks that the 
firms implement for managing conflict of interests. As a possible solution to this study’s 
research problem, the intention is to strengthen the accounting professionals’ independence in 
fact – this, according to Bandura (2008), can be achieved through encouragement of the desired 
behavioural change, by making adjustments to the environment or by influencing personal 
attitudes. 
As per this study’s findings, the situational cognitive predictors of the likelihood of deviant 
decision-making behaviour (DD) are; (i) low positive outcome expectancy of compliant 
decision-making (POE), (ii) high perceived difficulty in making compliant decisions (PD) and 
(iii) less ethical judgements about the compliant decision choices (EJ). Furthermore, the 
dispositional cognitive predictor of DD is the high propensity to morally disengage (PMD).  
Moreover, the situational cognitive predictors of the likelihood of compliant decision-making 
behaviour (CD) are; (i) high POE, (ii) low PD and (iii) high EJ. Moreover, the dispositional 
cognitive predictor of CD is the low PMD. Following the insights revealed, a behavioural 
framework is developed to propose various interventions at the typical stages of establishing 
the context, assessment (i.e. identification, analysis and evaluation), treatment and the control 
and monitoring of conflict of interests. This framework is proposed as a complement to the 
accounting firms’ current efforts towards managing conflict of interests. The highlights of this 
framework are as follows; 
1. When establishing the context for managing conflict of interests, the accounting firms should 
introduce the interventions aimed at encouraging high POE, low PD and high EJ. According 
to Bandura (2008), this could be achieved by making adjustments to the environment/context. 
For instance, the firms should improve ethical codes of conduct for their provisions regarding 
prioritization of adopting the compliant behaviour (Bazerman and Gino, 2012; Clements, Neill 
and Stovall, 2012), a strong ethics and compliance program should be implemented that 
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promotes a culture of compliance (Williford and Small, 2013), organizational culture should 
reinforce ethical conduct and must not tolerate anything that casts doubts on high ethical 
standards (Florio, 2012), reward systems should be aligned with the primary interest of the 
profession, such that the compliant decision-making is rewarded and the deviant punished 
(Amali, 2010; Green and Zimiles, 2013). Arguably, such adjustments are likely to work as the 
interventions towards reducing the instances of deviant behaviour, by encouraging high POE, 
low PD and high EJ. 
2. When assessing (i.e. identifying, analysing and evaluating) conflict of interests, the risk 
managers should take into consideration the predictive powers of the professionals’ cognitive 
processes. Specifically, Low (High) POE → DD (CD), High (Low) PD → DD (CD), Less 
(High) EJ → DD (CD), High (Low) POE → Low (High) PD, High (Low) POE → High (Less) 
EJ, High (Low) PD → Less (High) EJ and the High (Low) PMD → DD (CD). This implies 
that the identification of the sources, causes, consequences and the likely impact of conflict of 
interests is bound to be affected by the decision-makers’ cognitive processes. As such, there is 
a need to determine the level (i.e. high versus low) of the said cognitive predictors. This could 
possibly be achieved through electronic decision aids (Pierce and Sweeney, 2004) that might 
be customized to include some checklists or measures for the levels of POE, PD, EJ and PMD 
of the professionals who have to make decisions. Similarly, a review of the firms' codes of 
conduct (Clements, Neill and Stovall, 2012), their ethics and compliance program (Williford 
and Small, 2013), organizational culture (Florio, 2012) and the reward systems (Green and 
Zimiles, 2013) can also be indicative of the probable level of professionals’ POE, PD and EJ 
in the firms’ working environment. Consultation units within the firm (Trotman, Wright and 
Wright, 2005) might also provide support in this regard. 
3. The firms’ decision to adopt particular treatment of conflict of interests should be informed 
by the fact that decision-making in the face of conflict of interests is largely prone to bias. 
Particularly, the evidence that unintentional and intentional biases threaten the compliant 
behaviour should inform the decisions to accept, avoid, share or reduce the conflict of interests. 
For instance, if the interventions at the stages of establishing the context and assessing conflict 
of interests (as discussed above) suggest that the likelihood of deviant decision-making is not 
very high or is low then the firms might want to accept or reduce the conflict of interests. 
Similarly, if the level of the professionals’ cognitive processes indicates that the likelihood of 
deviant decision-making behaviour is high, then the firms might want to avoid or share the 
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probable ramifications, of the conflict of interests, with the third parties. In this regard, the 
quality control reviews and inspections (Bedard, Deis, Curtis and Jenkins, 2008) and the 
consultation units (Trotman, Wright and Wright, 2005) might also be useful when 
implementing the treatment for conflict of interests.    
4. Having evidenced that the professionals’ low POE, high PD, low EJ and high PMD serve as 
the cognitive barriers to compliant decision-making and that their perceptual biases play an 
indispensable role in this regard, implementation of the process thinking approach (Rodgers 
and Gago, 2001; 2006) as one of the control measures seems promising. The proposition of 
this intervention follows the suggestions by Tenbrunsel (2005) that the essential steps to 
facilitate effective management of conflict of interests include the recognition of cognitive 
barriers to compliant decision-making and then finding the ways to overcome these barriers. 
This approach provides a constructive way of formulating biases into a successful strategy by 
alerting professionals of the pathway they use to arrive at a decision and also by increasing 
their awareness of the obstacles and shortcuts they encounter during decision-making. This 
could possibly be achieved through provision of trainings (Florio, 2012; Williford and Small, 
2013) to raise awareness about psycho-cognitive barriers to compliant behaviour. The use of 
electronic decision aids (Dowling, 2009) might also help reducing the instances of biased 
decision-making.  
5. Finally, the interventions introduced in the entire process of managing conflict of interests 
require review and continuous improvement. In this regard, the potential benefits of accounting 
consultation units (Kadous, Kennedy and Peecher, 2003; Iyer and Rama, 2004), quality control 
reviews (Ayers and Kaplan, 2003), peer reviews (Bedard, Deis, Curtis and Jenkins, 2008) and 
whistleblowing (Curtis, 2006) are well documented in the extant literature. 
Due to their potential to strengthen the accounting professionals’ independence in fact, it is 
expected that the adoption of the interventions proposed in this study’s behavioural framework 
will contribute towards facilitating effective management of conflict of interests in professional 
accounting firms.  
Figure 7.1 presents the behavioural framework that combines the aforementioned interventions 
into a coherent framework. 
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The framework is flexible enough and offers different options to the professional accounting 
firms and the professionals, for facilitating effective management of conflict of interests. For 
instance, the cognitive predictors (i.e. POE, PD, EJ and PMD) have been empirically evidenced 
to work in exactly the opposite manners towards the deviant and compliant decision-making 
behaviour – low (high) POE, high (low) PD, less (more) EJ and the high (low) PMD tend to 
increase (decrease) the likelihood of deviant behaviour, or alternatively, low (high) POE, high 
(low) PD, less (more) EJ and the high (low) PMD tend to decrease (increase) the likelihood of 
compliant behaviour. In relation to the accounting professionals’ deviant behaviour in the 
events of conflict of interests, the firms might want to focus on decreasing the instances of 
deviant behaviour or on increasing the instances of compliant behaviour, such as, by making 
adjustments to the environment or by influencing their personal attitudes. 
7.5 Research Contributions 
The main addressees of this research are the academic researchers, individual accounting 
professionals, the professional accounting firms and the regulators and policy makers. The 
outcome of this research makes several theoretical, methodological and the empirical 
contributions to the existing knowledge.  
7.5.1 Theoretical Contribution 
In the wake of repeated calls to examine conflict of interests as a topic deserving of its own 
focus and from a behavioural ethics perspective (Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2006; 
Moore, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2010; Ayal and Gino, 2012; Bazerman and Gino, 2012), this 
study has contributed to existing knowledge by viewing conflict of interests through the lens 
of behavioural risk management and has adopted a cognitive approach to address the research 
problem driving this study. In this way, this study provides a new solution for addressing the 
longstanding problem of accounting professionals’ deviant behaviour due to the conflict of 
interests. It has focused on the professionals’ independence in fact, in order to complement the 
existing measures that are focused on their independence in appearance.  
The study’s theoretical framework draws on the integration of social cognitive theory with the 
throughput model, that offers the much-needed cognitive approach to examine the process 
through which conflict of interests affects accounting professionals’ decision-making 
behaviour. By allowing examination of the role of mental processes and the biases in decision-
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making, this approach enables addressing the professionals’ independence in fact. 
Conceptually, the Stimulus-Organism-Response paradigm (Holt et al., 2015) that underlies the 
theoretical framework offers a fresh perspective to address a wide range of behavioural 
concerns – this paradigm allows examining the cognitive processes as intervening variables 
(the organism dimension), between the situations involving conflict of interests as an 
independent variable (the stimulus dimension) and the behaviour as the dependent variable (the 
response dimension). Most of the studies have used Stimulus-Response paradigm (Holland, 
2008) that implies using cognitive processes as the independent variable (stimulus) and the 
resulting behaviour as the dependent variable (response) – this paradigm does not allow a 
thorough examination of phenomena as complex as the conflicts of interests. Therefore, the 
integration of social cognitive theory and the throughput model has offered an appropriate 
approach for achieving the aim and objectives of this research.  
The theoretical framework of this study has also contributed towards overcoming the 
weaknesses in social cognitive theory and those in the throughput model. Particularly, the 
social cognitive theory regards behaviour as an outcome of mainly the deliberative efforts and 
it largely ignores the impact of unconscious thought processes (Fishbein and Cappella, 2006; 
Fishbein, 2008; Conner, 2010). Furthermore, social cognitive models are meant to predict 
behaviour, but they leave much of the variance in the behaviour unexplained (Sutton, 1998). 
Throughput model can arguably overcome the said limitations due to its ability to explain the 
possibility of not only the intentional but also the unintentional biases in the decision-making 
process. The throughput model emphasises the central role of perceptions in various pathways 
to decision-making, but do not provide specific perceptual constructs. Social cognitive theory 
overcomes this limitation by providing the specific constructs (Bandura, 2008) representing 
the perceptions that are of predominant importance in decision-making behaviour. Therefore, 
the combination of throughput model and the social cognitive theory, as in this study, offers 
advantages in terms of better predictive and explanatory power of the resultant models. 
Nonetheless, the application of social cognitive theory and the throughput model to the 
professional accounting context is yet another contribution. 
Following the insights revealed by this research, the behavioural framework has been 
developed that proposes various interventions against different stages in the management of 
conflict of interests. The intention is to encourage the accounting professionals’ independence 
in fact, so as to facilitate effective management of conflict of interests. Importantly, the ability 
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to move beyond the traditional focus on independence in appearance to the independence in 
fact can be regarded as one of the hallmarks of this study’s theoretical model, in general and 
of the proposed behavioural framework, in specific. Therefore, this study has added to the 
extant research, a new horizon for addressing the longstanding problem of accounting 
professionals’ deviant decision-making behaviour due to the conflict of interests.  
7.5.2 Contribution to Methodology Application 
Unlike most of the previous studies that have utilised archival approaches to address the 
behavioural concerns surrounding conflict of interests, this study has adopted a quasi-
experimental methodology. Owing to the novel nature of this study, the said experiment has 
been specially designed for the study. The final version of the experiment was settled following 
two rigorous pilot studies conducted with the accounting professionals and the professional 
accounting students. The main concerns were to ensure the possibility of data collection 
through web-based experiment, the content of experimental vignettes, manipulation checks and 
the clarity of instructions and questions included in the research instrument. Since quasi-
experiments incorporate features from both the experimental and non-experimental designs (in 
that both the manipulated and measured variables can be brought in), these tend to maximise 
the internal and external validity.  
Due to the inherent difficulty in converting behavioural concepts into measurable constructs, 
the operationalisation of this study’s variables is yet another achievement. In this regard, a large 
number of studies were reviewed from different disciplines and the researcher ensured that the 
operationalised definitions reflect the intended purpose of the variables included in 
experimental vignettes. The model assessment procedures, as detailed in the data analysis 
chapter, confirmed the suitability of the so operationalised variables. The existing accounting 
literature lacks in the operationalisation of behavioural constructs and because of which most 
of the researchers prefer adopting the archival approaches.  
Thus, the quasi-experiment developed and adopted in this study is quite robust and has added 
to the existing literature that lacks in experimental scenarios to, specifically, address the 
conflict of interests. This study, therefore, contributes to the application of quasi-experimental 
methodology to examine ethical issues in the professional accounting environment. The study’s 
experimental vignettes can, conveniently, be used by other researchers in the field.   
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7.5.3 Empirical Contribution 
The professionals from the Big Four accounting firms in the UK have been chosen for the 
empirical part of the study. Since the Big Four represent the largest international services 
network and offer a wide range of audit and non-audit services to the vast majority of 
companies, this study’s findings reflect an overall picture in the professional accounting world. 
Most of the studies regarding conflict of interests have been conducted in the US and there is 
a lack of empirical evidence regarding the impact of conflict of interests on accounting 
professionals’ decision-making within the UK firms. When most of the studies have employed 
accounting firms as the units of analysis, this study’s attempt to use the individual professional 
accountants as units of analysis is yet another contribution. 
Perhaps, empirical evidence for the process through which conflict of interests affects decision-
making behaviour in the events of conflict of interests is unique to this study. Particularly, this 
study provides empirical evidence for the direct relationship of conflict of interests with the 
professionals’ deviant decision-making behaviour and also for the indirect relationship through 
three types of cognitive processes, i.e. positive outcome expectancy, perceived difficulty and 
ethical judgement. Application of the Stimulus-Organism-Response paradigm (Holt et al., 
2015) offers a fresh perspective to address these behavioural concerns – it allows examination 
of the cognitive processes as intervening variables (the organism dimension), between the 
situations involving conflict of interests as the independent variable (the stimulus dimension) 
and the behaviour as the dependent variable (the response dimension). Nonetheless, this study 
is a significant addition to the lack of studies addressing the professionals’ independence in 
fact.    
7.6 Practical Implications 
Broadly speaking, this research has implications for existing practice since the main addressees 
of this research can use the new knowledge to make better decisions and to improve their 
policies. Since the Big Four firms are considered trendsetters in the professional accounting 
world and their policies also have an impact on non-Big Fours, this study’s findings and the 
new knowledge it has generated are of concern to all the professional accounting firms alike.  
The behavioural framework developed on the basis of this study’s insights offers practical 
contributions at different levels. The broad practical contribution is its ability to complement 
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the existing procedures that are implemented by the firms for managing the conflict of interests. 
7.6.1 General Implications for Practice 
This study argued that the root causes underlying all the conflict of interests are; (i) the 
misaligned incentives with roots in temptation for gain, (ii) the misaligned incentives with roots 
in fear of loss and (iii) the workplace pressures with roots in fear of loss. Various combinations 
of the said root causes were considered when categorising the conflict of interests. This 
approach is of practical significance because the accounting professionals experience diverse 
categories of conflict of interests in their working environment. Most importantly, the results 
against different categories of conflict of interests converged to the same insights and 
conclusions which evidences that, in principle, all the categories of conflict of interests affect 
decision-making in the same way and are governed in a similar manner. Therefore, the findings 
of this study can be generalised across all the various categories of conflict of interests. In this 
regard, the immediate practical implication is that the proposed behavioural framework (its 
interventions) is applicable to all the conflict of interests, irrespective of their sources.   
Notably, the current professional accounting practice adopts the threats and safeguards 
approach to address the ethical issues including that of conflict of interests. Since this research 
has also adopted the same approach, the practical usefulness of its findings becomes more 
relevant.  
7.6.2 Implications for Professional Accounting Firms 
The behavioural framework developed on the basis of this study’s insights will enable the 
accounting firms to incorporate proposed behavioural interventions into the procedures they 
apply to manage conflict of interests. Since various interventions are proposed at the stages of 
the establishment of context, assessment, treatment and the control and monitoring regarding 
conflict of interests, the accounting firms have many factors at their disposal to work around. 
For instance, interventions can be integrated into different contextual factors, in an attempt to 
encourage the high positive outcome expectancy of compliant decision-making (POE), the low 
perceived difficulty in making compliant decisions (PD) and the high ethical judgements about 
the compliant decision choices (EJ). The said contextual factors include, but are not limited to, 
the procedures adopted by professional accountancy bodies, quality control reviews and 
inspections, codes of conduct ethics and compliance programs and the organisational culture. 
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By encouraging the high POE, low PD and high EJ in the work environment, the accounting 
firms have an opportunity to concentrate their efforts towards aligning the contextual factors 
with the primary interest of the profession.  
Similarly, the established relationships between this study’s variables must be taken into 
account during the assessment and treatment of conflict of interests. This is useful because the 
said relationships are of relevance to the identification of the sources and causes of the conflict 
of interests, their likely impact and of their consequences. Furthermore, decisions about the 
treatment of conflict of interests should be informed by this study’s finding that the 
professionals’ intentional and unintentional biases threaten compliant behaviour. Moreover, 
specialised training can be used as an effective behavioural intervention at the control stage, to 
educate the accounting professionals about how the conflict of interests interferes with their 
decision-making behaviour.   
7.6.3 Implications for Accounting Professionals 
Since professional accountants experience conflict of interests, the findings and insights of this 
research could also help them in various ways. For instance, as emphasised in the proposed 
behavioural framework, the implementation of the process thinking approach (Rodgers and 
Gago, 2001; 2006) can work as a useful control measure. This approach can potentially provide 
the professionals up with a constructive way of formulating the biases into a successful 
strategy. The process thinking (that is about the interaction of information, perceptions, 
judgements and the decision choices) alerts them of the pathway they use to arrive at a decision 
and also increases their awareness of the obstacles and shortcuts they encounter during 
decision-making.   
The findings that low (high) POE, high (low) PD, less (high) EJ and high (low) PMD are the 
psycho-cognitive barriers (facilitators) to compliant decision-making behaviour, have 
important practical implications for the professionals. For instance, the conscious awareness 
that they have a higher positive outcome expectancy, in the event of a conflict of interests, can 
possibly help them reflect on their likely behaviour and to make the required adjustments 
accordingly.   
7.6.4 Implications for Policy Makers 
Despite the increase in accounting regulations, especially in response to the numerous 
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corporate scandals in the last two decades, the instances of deviant behaviour due to conflict 
of interests are still prevalent. The main possible reasons for this, as argued in the literature, 
are the focus on independence in appearance than on that in fact and the lack of consideration 
to decision-makers’ intentional and unintentional biases. Accordingly, increasing the 
regulations to strengthen the professionals’ independence in appearance does not guarantee 
the elimination of conflict of interests (Cain, Loewenstein and Moore, 2005; Moore, Tetlock, 
Tanlu and Bazerman, 2006; Clements, Neill and Stovall, 2012).   
As a response to the above-mentioned limitations in existing regulations, the findings of this 
study invite the attention of the regulators and policy makers who might consider revisions to 
their existing policies, by taking into consideration the much-needed behavioural insights. The 
proposed behavioural framework can be used as a guide to understanding the nature of the 
interventions that are particularly useful in addressing the professionals’ independence in fact. 
The regulators and policy makers may propose similar frameworks to facilitate effective 
management of conflict of interests, or might even enforce the adoption of behavioural risk 
management frameworks to address the conflict of interests in professional accounting firms.  
7.6.5 Implications for other Professions  
Other professions that are known to face the ramifications of conflict of interests (such as law, 
engineering, medicine and architecture) can also avail the advantages of this study’s insights. 
Specifically, the proposed behavioural framework can be considered as a guiding tool to 
address the issues surrounding conflict of interests.  
Overall, it is expected that the adoption of behavioural interventions proposed in the study’s 
behavioural framework will facilitate effective management of conflict of interests, due to its 
likely usefulness towards addressing the accounting professionals’ independence in fact. 
7.7 Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
In addition to the contributions of this study, there are some limitations that need to be 
addressed in future research. Because this study is the work of a single researcher, it was 
constrained by the limited time and financial resources. The specific limitations and the 
corresponding opportunities for future research are as follows;    
7.7.1 Limitations and Directions Regarding Theoretical Model  
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This study’s theoretical model draws on the combination of social cognitive theory (Bandura, 
1986) and the throughput model of decision-making (Rodgers, 1997). This integration provides 
conceptual enrichment to the model, suitable enough to serve this study’s aim in relation to 
filling the research gap. However, despite its robustness, there still is a margin to incorporate 
some more variables, including the attitude and situational propensity to morally disengage. 
Future research might attempt to examine the moderating impact of the said variables. 
Moreover, there also is an opportunity to, empirically, examine how the situational cognitive 
processes (i.e. positive outcome expectancy, perceived difficulty and ethical judgement) are 
affected by the environmental factors other than the conflict of interests itself.   
Furthermore, this study categorised conflict of interests in terms of the threats that serve as its 
possible sources. The root causes, as argued in this study, underlying all the conflict of interests 
are either the misaligned incentives with roots in temptation for gain and/or fear of loss and the 
workplace pressures with roots in fear of loss. Various combinations of the said root causes 
were considered when categorising conflict of interests on the basis of specific threats to 
compliant decision-making. The results against different categories of conflict of interests 
converged to the same insights and conclusions, which evidenced that, in principle, all the 
categories of conflict of interests affect decision-making in the same way and are governed in 
a similar manner – however, there still is a need for more empirical evidence regarding the 
diverse categories of conflict of interests. In this regard, the conflict of interests might be 
categorised considering one particular threat and also the different combinations of threats.  
7.7.2 Limitations and Directions Regarding Demographics  
Due to the reluctance of accounting professionals to participate in the studies related to ethical 
dilemmas, this study adopted convenience sampling technique. Because all the accounting 
professionals are involved, directly or indirectly, in making the decisions that demand 
professionals to act in the best interest of the public, ideally the participants in my research 
should have been diverse in terms of their rank, experience, age and gender. This study’s 105 
participants, however, are limited in terms of the diversity in demographic characteristics. For 
instance, 79% are the partners, which implies higher rank in their respective firm; 79% have 
more than 20 years of work experience, which implies higher work experience; 82% of the 
participants are more than 40 years old and the 81% are male. Various steps were taken to 
address these limitations. For instance, statistical multi-group analysis for this study’s 
empirical data evidenced that the hypothesised relationships (predicted signs) do not differ 
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significantly across the male and female participants.  
Kish-Gephart, Harrison and Trevino (2010) conducted meta-analytic evidence about the 
sources of unethical decisions and found that when examining unethical behaviour, 
demographic variables become inconsequential once the other situational cognitive factors are 
accounted for. This study’s theoretical model also accounts for situational cognitive factors and 
it can be argued that their effect dominates. Moreover, since the majority of this study’s 
hypotheses have been supported, it can be further argued that the demographics did not have 
an impact, significant enough, to disprove the literature-enriched hypothesised relationships. 
However, generalisations of this study’s findings must still be made with caution. Nonetheless, 
future studies are needed to replicate this study with a diverse sample. 
7.7.3 Limitations and Directions Regarding Methodology 
Although this study is methodologically innovative, it still has some limitations that need to be 
addressed in future research. The study’s variables representing cognitive processes and 
behaviour have been measured as the self-reported perceptions and intentions. Likert items and 
scales have been used to record the data. The practice of self-reported measures of constructs 
is fairly justified and acceptable in the behaviour related studies – it must, however, be 
remembered that since there is a difference between reality and perception of reality, self-
reported data cannot be substituted for absolute truth (Churchland, 1979). The philosophical 
paradigm underlying this study is the postpositivism which supports using self-reported 
measures of data and believes that only imperfect evidence can be established, such that the 
knowledge so gained will be conjectural. Quite possibly, due to the behavioural nature of this 
study, social desirability bias might have induced the respondents to answer the questions in a 
manner that is viewed favourably by the researcher (such as over-reporting on good behaviour 
or under-reporting on undesirable behaviour). This tendency might have affected the validity 
of some of the data. 
In order to tackle the above-mentioned possible limitations, dispositional cognitive processes 
(i.e. occupational self-efficacy and propensity to morally disengage) were measured using the 
already existing scales with adequate psychometric properties. These scales demonstrate 
excellent goodness-of-fit indexes and acceptable scale reliability, convergent validity and 
discriminant validity. The situational cognitive processes (i.e. positive outcome expectancy, 
perceived difficulty and ethical judgement), the deviant and the compliant decision-making 
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behaviours were measured using single Likert items that were informed by the literature from 
different disciplines. Since the questions were presented as inviting the participants’ 
perceptions, expectations and the likelihood of adopting the behaviour, it can be argued that 
social desirability bias was not much of an issue in the case of this study. Despite the efforts to 
minimise the influence of social bias, future researchers might repeat this study in the same 
context. Nevertheless, positivists should attempt replicating this study using more direct 
measures of data.       
Moreover, all the four vignettes in this study experiment are based on the hypothetical 
situations. The said vignettes have been derived from Ethical Dilemmas Case Studies 
developed by the UK and Ireland’s Consultative Committee of Accountancy Bodies. 
Importantly, all the case studies are followed by clear guidance on the compliant versus deviant 
decision in given dilemma situations and the same have been included in this study’s vignettes. 
Thus, the decision on what constitutes compliant or deviant behaviour in any given situation is 
not susceptible to researcher’s bias. However, some might not agree with the employment of 
hypothetical situations. While it is highly doubtful if this study can be replicated in real settings 
of the accounting professionals, future research should explore this possibility.  
This study has collected empirical data using the web-based experiments which invite criticism 
that they have weaker experimental controls than traditional laboratory ones. For instance, the 
participants might not take the experiment seriously and that they might make wrong claims 
about their demographics. However, some researchers (Reips, 1996; Hartshome, 2007) 
disregard such criticisms and assert that the laboratory experiments can also be affected by the 
same problems. Schoeffler et al. (2013) compared laboratory and web-based results of a 
particular experiment and did not find any significant differences between the results. The 
robustness of this study’s experiment and the professionality of the research participants is 
expected to overcome many limitations associated with web-based experiments. Future 
research might, however, repeat this study in laboratory settings to assess if the results differ 
any significantly.    
7.7.4 Limitations and Directions Regarding PLS Path Modelling 
This study has, justifiably, adopted PLS path analysis which should not be mistaken for the 
more advanced and full-fledged PLS path modelling. Recently, debate on the usefulness and 
application of PLS path modelling/structural equation modelling has gained considerable hype. 
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A small number of researchers (Goodhue, Thompson and Lewis, 2013; McIntosh, Edwards 
and Antonakis, 2014; Rönkkö et al., 2016) has been critical of PLS. In response, Sarstedt et al. 
(2016), Hair et al. (2017) and Nitzl and Chin (2017) have refuted many arguments the critics 
have made. While the extent to which the criticisms on path modelling are readily applicable 
to path analysis is not completely clear, it is necessary to be considerate of the current debate 
because both the techniques share same PLS algorithm. Accordingly, although this research 
has justified the choice of path analysis, it must be borne in mind that limitations regarding 
PLS-based techniques might emerge as the very debate on path modelling progresses. Future 
researchers need to be mindful of the two main concerns, i.e. the main distinction between path 
analysis and path modelling and the current debate on PLS path modelling. Their choice for 
adoption of the PLS-based techniques, be it path analysis or path modelling, must be informed 
by the recent critical debate. Particularly, the choice of PLS adoption should move beyond the 
traditional claims and be informed by the more plausible recent claims such as the suitability 
of PLS-based techniques for estimating only the composite models.        
Future researchers have an opportunity to add to the ongoing debate on PLS path modelling, 
perhaps through conducting rigorous simulation studies. Further comparison studies about the 
application of variance-based PLS and covariance-based SEM to the composite versus 
common factor models are required. Moreover, future research might want to focus on 
providing more analytical support for the claim that the estimation of both the measurement 
and structural models, using PLS-based techniques, is consistent and unbiased. The need to 
address these concerns is duly supported by the proponents of PLS path modelling (e.g., 
Sarstedt et al., 2016 and Hair et al., 2017). 
7.7.5 Limitations and Directions Regarding Research Context 
The Big Four professional accounting firms (i.e. Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers) in the UK have been chosen for the empirical part of the study. While 
there are many compelling reasons that make the Big Four in the UK an appropriate research 
context, the findings might be readily applicable only to other similar contexts. Perhaps, there 
is an excellent opportunity for future researchers to conduct the same study in the contexts that 
differ from the UK in terms of cultural background, the size of the firms and the regulatory 
environment. A comparative study with a developing country sounds a good research 
opportunity to pursue. It is expected that while the results in different contexts may not vary, 
there might be some countervailing factors in other contexts that tend to affect the evidenced 
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relationships between the variables considered in this study.  
7.7.6 Opportunity to Improve the Proposed Behavioural Framework 
Having discussed that the behavioural framework developed on the basis of this study’s 
insights will enable professional accounting firms to incorporate some behavioural 
interventions into the methods they use to manage conflict of interests, there are several 
opportunities for future research in this regard.  
Various interventions are proposed at the stages of the establishment of context, assessment 
(i.e. identification, analysis and evaluation), treatment and the control and monitoring regarding 
conflict of interests. Future research should attempt to suggest more interventions. Similarly, 
future research is needed to determine how exactly the firms can practically make use of the 
proposed behavioural interventions. For instance, all the stages towards managing conflict of 
interests should focus on making adjustments to other environmental factors and existing 
practices such that high POE, low PD, high EJ and low PMD is encouraged – how exactly to 
do this is a question mark and this concern needs to be empirically investigated in future 
research. In this regard, the prospective researchers might want to focus on one stage, towards 
managing the conflict of interests, at a time.   
7.8 Epilogue 
This study provided empirical evidence for the process through which conflict of interests 
affects the accounting professionals’ decision-making behaviour. The main findings were that 
the relationship between the conflict of interests and the accounting professionals’ likelihood 
of deviant and compliant decision-making behaviour is, in part, governed by the agency of the 
professionals’ situational cognitive processes (i.e. their positive outcome expectancy of 
compliant decision-making, their perceived difficulty in making compliant decisions and their 
judgements about the ethicality of compliant decision choices). Moreover, the said situational 
cognitive processes were found to affect decision-making behaviour directly and also indirectly 
through the significant interrelationships among these. Furthermore, the professionals’ 
propensity to morally disengage (i.e. a dispositional cognitive process) was also evidenced to 
affect their likelihood of decision-making behaviour. Additionally, decision-making in the face 
of conflict of interests is prone to the perceptual biases that interfere with decision-making 
through different pathways. 
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Since all the insights revealed by this study’s empirical results are directly relevant to the 
professionals’ state of mind and is about their actual objectivity in the events of conflict of 
interests, the behavioural framework developed on the basis of these insights will help 
strengthen the accounting professionals’ independence in fact. Arguably (e.g., Moore, Tanlu 
and Bazerman, 2010; Bazerman and Gino, 2012; Williford and Small, 2013), the enhancement 
of independence in fact will facilitate effective management of conflict of interests in the 
professional accounting firms. 
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Appendix 1: Interview Questions 
Q1. Could you please describe the audit engagement process followed in your firm? 
• What factors are considered when accepting a client? 
• What is the composition of audit engagement teams? 
• Could you please brief me on the decision-making process during engagements? 
Q2. What type of rewards and pressures/incentives and disincentives do you think auditors 
might receive within the environment of audit firms they are working in? 
Q3. Do you think auditor’s performance and decision-making can be affected in case of 
specific rewards which are not aligned with the primary interest of audit profession i.e. to act 
in the best interest of public? How? Examples. 
Q4. Do you think the workplace pressures contradicting with primary interest can impact an 
auditor’s performance and decision-making? How? Examples. 
Q5. Is conflict of interests a negative phenomenon as generally presumed, or are these a natural 
phenomenon that needs effective management? 
Q6. What regulations, measures and/or frameworks does your firm adopt to manage conflict 
of interests?  
• External 
• Internal 
• How effective are those existing measures in practice? 
Q7. Have you ever personally experienced or observed a situation that involved a conflict of 
interests? Would you mind sharing that experience?  
• How do you think the conflict of interests can affect your mindset and perceptions? 
Example. 
Q8. What do you think could be the reason(s) that might lead a professional auditor to not do 
complete justice to their primary responsibility of serving in the best interest of public (i.e. 
provision of appropriate audit opinion), despite his/her very good intentions? 
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Appendix 2: Research Instrument* 
INTRODUCTION 
The entire study comprises of two brief phases and takes about 15 minutes to complete. You can either complete 
it in one go or, alternatively, do a part of the study now and return later to continue from where you last left it.    
Please click 'Next' to start. Happy Participation!   
PHASE-1 
In this phase, you will be requested to first provide information on some demographics (which will be used 
anonymously during data analysis) and then to respond to some measures related to behaviour. 
Demographics      
i. Your Rank(s) in the Firm 
 Management Board 
 Partner 
 Director 
 Statutory Auditor 
 Other, please specify ___________________ 
 
ii. Gender  Male  Female 
iii. Years of 
Work 
Experience 
 1 – 5  5 – 10  10 -15  15 - 20  20 – 30  30 - 40  40 - 50 
 More 
than 50 
iv. Age (in 
years) 
 20 - 30  30 – 40  40 - 50  50 - 60 
 More 
than 60 
 
Please indicate how true is the following about you? 
Particulars 
Not at all True 
1 
2 3 4 
Completely True 
5 
OSE-1. I can 
remain calm when 
facing difficulties 
in my job because 
I can rely on my 
abilities 
          
OSE-2. When I am 
confronted with a 
problem in my job, 
          
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I can usually find 
several solutions 
OSE-3. Whatever 
comes my way in 
my job, I can 
usually handle it 
          
OSE-4. My past 
experiences in my 
job have prepared 
me well for my 
occupational future 
          
OSE-5. I meet the 
goals that I set for 
myself in my job 
          
OSE-6. I feel 
prepared for most 
of the demands in 
my job 
          
 
Please indicate your level of agreement/disagreement with the following; 
Particulars 
Strongly Disagree 
1 
2 3 4 
Strongly Agree 
5 
PMD-1. It is okay 
to spread rumours 
to defend those you  
care about 
          
PMD-2. Taking 
something without 
the owner’s 
permission is okay 
as long as you’re 
just borrowing it 
          
PMD-3. 
Considering the 
ways people grossly 
misrepresent 
themselves, it’s 
hardly a sin to 
inflate your own 
credentials a bit 
          
PMD-4. People 
shouldn’t be held 
accountable for 
doing questionable 
things when they 
were just doing 
what an authority 
          
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figure told them to 
do 
PMD-5. People 
can’t be blamed for 
doing things that 
are technically 
wrong when all 
their friends are 
doing it too 
          
PMD-6. Taking 
personal credit for 
ideas that were not 
your  
own is no big deal 
          
PMD-7. Some 
people have to be 
treated roughly 
because they lack 
feelings that can be 
hurt 
          
PMD-8. People 
who get mistreated 
have usually done 
something to bring 
it on themselves 
          
 
PHASE-2 
In this phase, you will be presented with four very simple and brief vignettes comprising of different situations. 
You will be requested to respond to the measures included in each of these. 
VIGNETTE 1 
"You are a junior accountant and currently a part of a team providing audit and non-audit services to your firm’s 
client that deals in home improvement and renovation materials. During the engagement, you told the client's 
controller that you are remodelling an old house. The controller likes you and had a load of needed materials 
delivered to your house, billing you at a 70% discount — saving you quite a lot above the normal cash 
discount. You are very happy to have the materials, which you otherwise would not have been able to afford on 
your insufficient salary. Your colleagues and seniors have always found you a very professional and vigilant 
employee who never ever lets personal affairs affect the work related responsibilities".       
Keeping in mind the situation (scenario and role/rank assigned to you), please respond to the following by 
indicating your choice from the drop-down options;  
PD-1. Given the 
situation, what is 
the level of 
 Very Difficult 
(5) 
 Difficult 
(4) 
 Neutral 
(3) 
 Easy 
(2) 
 Very Easy 
(1) 
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difficulty in 
refusing to 
accept the offered 
70% discount? 
POE-1. Given the 
situation, I expect 
the overall positive 
outcomes of 
declining the 
offered 70% discou
nt to outweigh its 
overall negative 
outcomes 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
 Disagree 
(2) 
 Neither Agree 
nor Disagree 
(3) 
 Agree 
(4) 
 Strongly 
Agree 
(5) 
DD-1. Given the 
situation, I might be 
willing to accept the 
offered 70% 
discount 
 Extremely 
Unlikely 
(1) 
 Unlikely 
(2) 
 Neutral 
(3) 
 Likely 
(4) 
 Extremely 
Likely 
(5) 
CD-1. Given the 
situation, I will be 
able to decline the 
offered 70% 
discount and will 
avail only the 
normal cash 
discount 
 Extremely 
Unlikely 
(1) 
 Unlikely 
(2) 
 Neutral 
(3) 
 Likely 
(4) 
 Extremely 
Likely 
(5) 
EJ-1. Regardless of 
whichever decision 
(3 or 4 above) 
is more likely to 
take place in a given 
situation, which 
according to you is 
ethically 
more appropriate? 
 Acceptance of 
offered 70% 
discount 
(1) 
 Both can be 
appropriate if 
principles of 
professional 
ethics are not 
compromised 
(2) 
 Declining the 
offered 70% 
discount 
(3) 
  
 
VIGNETTE 2 
"During an assurance engagement, your immediate supervisor is on sick leave and you are due to go on parental 
leave in 3 days' time. Your firm is facing exceptionally challenging times and is not able to engage any other 
accountant on this assignment. You have been told by the top management that, before you go on leave, you must 
complete some complicated reconciliation work. Given the complexity of work, the deadline suggested (i.e. 2 
days) appears very unrealistic.  You feel that you are not sufficiently experienced to complete the work alone and 
that you need additional supervision to complete it to the required standard. The top management appears unable 
to offer the necessary support. Furthermore, neither the deadline can be extended, nor can you postpone your 
leave. You fear losing your own and your firm’s reputation, should you refuse to perform the assigned task. You 
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feel very intimidated by the top management and feel pressure to do whatever you can in your firm’s challenging 
times".       
Keeping in mind the situation (scenario and role/rank assigned to you), please respond to the following by 
indicating your choice from the drop-down options;  
PD-2. Given the 
situation, what is 
the level of 
difficulty in 
refusing to perform 
the task? 
 Very Difficult 
(5) 
 Difficult 
(4) 
 Neutral 
(3) 
 Easy 
(4) 
 Very Easy 
(1) 
POE-2. Given the 
situation, I expect 
the overall positive 
outcomes of 
refusing to 
perform the task to 
outweigh its overall 
negative outcomes 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
 Disagree 
(2) 
 Neither Agree 
nor Disagree 
(3) 
 Agree 
(4) 
 Strongly 
Agree 
(5) 
DD-2. Given the 
situation, I will 
agree to work alone 
and will try my 
level best to 
complete the task 
assigned to me 
 Extremely 
Unlikely 
(1) 
 Unlikely 
(2) 
 Neutral 
(3) 
 Likely 
(4) 
 Extremely 
Likely 
(5) 
CD-2. Given the 
situation, I will 
refuse to perform 
the task assigned to 
me 
 Extremely 
Unlikely 
(1) 
 Unlikely 
(2) 
 Neutral 
(3) 
 Likely 
(4) 
 Extremely 
Likely 
(5) 
EJ-2. Regardless of 
whichever decision 
(3 or 4 above) 
is more likely to 
take place in a 
given situation, 
which according to 
you is ethically 
more appropriate? 
 Agreeing to 
work alone 
(1) 
 Both can be 
appropriate if 
principles of 
professional 
ethics are not 
compromised 
(2) 
 Refusing to 
perform the 
task 
(3) 
  
 
VIGNETTE 3    
"You are a junior accountant charged with evaluation of internal control system of your firm’s client. You 
evaluated and reported the system as very effective and also received bonus and appreciations for your hard work. 
Now during the audit of the same client, you have discovered that internal control system is not as effective as 
you evaluated since there are some minor weaknesses that you overlooked. You are concerned that nullifying your 
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previous evaluation will be discrediting and will affect your expected promotion and pay rise right after the audit. 
You are completely sure that no one else from the audit team is going to find out about those minor weaknesses 
in the internal control system of the client".       
Keeping in mind the situation (scenario and role/rank assigned to you), please respond to the following by 
indicating your choice from the drop-down options;  
PD-3. Given the 
situation, what is 
the level of 
difficulty in 
accepting your 
negligence in 
initial evaluation of 
the internal control 
system of the client? 
 Very Difficult 
(5) 
 Difficult 
(4) 
 Neutral 
(3) 
 Easy 
(2) 
 Very Easy 
(1) 
POE-3. Given the 
situation, I expect 
the overall positive 
outcomes of 
disclosing my 
negligence in initial 
evaluation to 
outweigh its overall 
negative outcomes 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
 Disagree 
(2) 
 Neither Agree 
nor Disagree 
(3) 
 Agree 
(4) 
 Strongly 
Agree 
(5) 
DD-3. Keeping in 
mind the bonus & 
appreciations receiv
ed and the 
opportunity of 
promotion and pay 
rise, I might not be 
able to disclose the 
minor weaknesses 
in internal control 
system of the client 
 Extremely 
Unlikely 
(1) 
 Unlikely 
(2) 
 Neutral 
(3) 
 Likely 
(4) 
 Extremely 
Likely 
(5) 
CD-3. No matter 
how discrediting it 
is, I will admit 
negligence in my 
initial evaluation of 
internal control 
system of the client 
 Extremely 
Unlikely 
(1) 
 Unlikely 
(2) 
 Neutral 
(3) 
 Likely 
(4) 
 Extremely 
Likely 
(5) 
EJ-3. Regardless of 
whichever decision 
(3 or 4 above) 
is more likely to 
take place in a given 
situation, which 
 Admitting 
Minor 
weaknesses 
might be 
ignored 
(1) 
 Both can be 
appropriate if 
principles of 
professional 
ethics are not 
compromised 
 Admitting 
negligence 
(3) 
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according to you is 
ethically more 
appropriate? 
(2) 
 
VIGNETTE 4   
"You are a partner in a firm of accountants engaged in preparing year end accounts and tax returns for one of your 
biggest, friendliest and the trustworthy client companies. During the engagement, you become aware that staff 
purchases of goods manufactured by the company are authorised by production managers and then processed 
outside the accounting system. The client company uses the proceeds from these sales to fund its Christmas party. 
The practice is in place since three years but your firm failed to find this in the previous years while providing 
same services to the client.   You are concerned that omitting the income from staff sales will result in the financial 
statements and returns to the tax authority being misleading. The client is willing to correctly record the sales for 
the current year but they requested you to ignore the improper accounting in previous years as they were not aware 
of the proper treatment. You and the other higher authorities in your firm also believe that highlighting the 
mistakes from previous years will not only affect good terms with the client but will also reveal your firm’s 
negligence in discovering the issue in earlier years which, in turn, will badly affect the firm’s reputation. You are 
also considerate of the high proportion of fees generated through services provided to the client".       
Keeping in mind the situation (scenario and role/rank assigned to you), please respond to the following by 
indicating your choice from the drop-down options;  
PD-4. Given the 
situation, what is 
the level of 
difficulty in 
disclosing the past 
undisclosed income 
to tax authorities? 
 Very Difficult 
(5) 
 Difficult 
(4) 
 Neutral 
(3) 
 Easy 
(2) 
 Very Easy 
(1) 
POE-4. Given the 
situation, I expect 
the overall positive 
outcomes of 
disclosing the past 
undisclosed income 
to tax authorities to 
outweigh its overall 
negative outcomes 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
 Disagree 
(2) 
 Neither Agree 
nor Disagree 
(3) 
 Agree 
(4) 
 Strongly 
Agree 
(5) 
DD-4. Given the 
situation, I will 
dissociate myself 
from any 
involvement with 
client’s financial 
statements but it 
might not be 
 Extremely 
Unlikely 
(1) 
 Unlikely 
(2) 
 Neutral 
(3) 
 Likely 
(4) 
 Extremely 
Likely 
(5) 
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practical to report 
the matter to tax 
authorities 
CD-4. No matter 
how my co-partners 
react, I will report 
the matter to tax 
authorities 
 Extremely 
Unlikely 
(1) 
 Unlikely 
(2) 
 Neutral 
(3) 
 Likely 
(4) 
 Extremely 
Likely 
(5) 
EJ-4. Regardless of 
whichever decision 
(3 or 4 above) 
is more likely to 
take place in a 
given situation, 
which according to 
you is ethically 
more appropriate? 
 Not reporting 
to tax 
authority 
(1) 
 Both can be 
appropriate if 
principles of 
professional 
ethics are not 
compromised 
(2) 
 Reporting 
matter to tax 
authority 
(3) 
  
 
Comments, if any __________________________________________________________________________ 
DONE! Please click 'Submit the Responses' at the bottom right corner 
*The layout of the original web-based research instrument is exactly as has been detailed in the methodology 
chapter. The original layout (web-based) is far more compact and attractive than it appears here (on paper). For 
the sake of clarification, the measures in experimental vignettes have been labelled (e.g. PD-1, POE-2 etc.) - the 
original web-based research instrument did not label any measure. Furthermore, the instrument also mentions 
scoring/item point against the given levels (e.g. strongly disagree, extremely unlikely etc.) to choose from – the 
points were not mentioned in the original web-based instrument.  
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Appendix 3: Screenshots of the Models Tested in SmartPLS 3 
(with interaction terms included) 
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